


1998

# The aetiology of an argument: how scientism affected Freud's (mis)treatment of Dora's (hy)story

Sue Ann Tatro  
*Iowa State University*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd>

 Part of the [Clinical Psychology Commons](#), [History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons](#), [Psychiatry and Psychology Commons](#), [Rhetoric and Composition Commons](#), [Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons](#), and the [Women's Studies Commons](#)

## Recommended Citation

Tatro, Sue Ann, "The aetiology of an argument: how scientism affected Freud's (mis)treatment of Dora's (hy)story" (1998). *Retrospective Theses and Dissertations*. 12637.  
<https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/12637>

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [digirep@iastate.edu](mailto:digirep@iastate.edu).

## INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

**The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.** Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

# UMI

A Bell & Howell Information Company  
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA  
313/761-4700 800/521-0600



## **NOTE TO USERS**

**The original manuscript received by UMI contains indistinct print. All efforts were made to acquire the highest quality manuscript from the author or school. Page(s) were microfilmed as received.**

**This reproduction is the best copy available**

**UMI**



**The aetiology of an argument: how scientism affected Freud's (mis)treatment of Dora's  
(hy)story**

by

Sue Ann Tatro

A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

Major: Rhetoric and Professional Communication

Major Professor: Margaret Baker Graham

Iowa State University

Ames, Iowa

1998

Copyright © Sue Ann Tatro, 1998. All rights reserved.

**UMI Number: 9924792**

---

**UMI Microform 9924792**  
**Copyright 1999, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.**

**This microform edition is protected against unauthorized  
copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

---

**UMI**  
**300 North Zeeb Road**  
**Ann Arbor, MI 48103**

Graduate College  
Iowa State University

This is to certify that the Doctoral dissertation of  
Sue Ann Tatro  
has met the dissertation requirements of Iowa State University

Signature was redacted for privacy.

Major Professor

Signature was redacted for privacy.

For the Major Program

Signature was redacted for privacy.

For the Graduate College



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>1</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b> . . . . .	3
	Psychoanalytic Precepts: Science, Philosophy, Fiction . . . . .	6
	Freud's Enormous Influence . . . . .	7
	Narrative Layering and Hero-Worship . . . . .	10
<b>2</b>	<b>NARRATIVE DETERMINATION</b> . . . . .	14
	The Move From History to Archive . . . . .	17
	Determinism: the Shape of Narrative . . . . .	19
	Multiple Chronotopes, Multiple Story-telling . . . . .	23
	Narrative Account, Scientific (objective) Body of Knowledge . . . . .	25
<b>3</b>	<b>THE PROBLEM OF SCIENCE: LEGITIMACY AS THE MEASURE OF SCIENTIFIC REASON</b> . . . . .	28
	Rouse and Lyotard: Pulling Freud into the Postmodern . . . . .	28
	Freud's Newtonian Project . . . . .	33
	Dubious Origins of Psychoanalysis Necessitate Scientific Justification . . . . .	34
	Mesmerized, Hypnotized, Psychoanalyzed: From Charcot to Freud . . . . .	35
	Hypnosis and Hysteria: Medicine or Witchcraft? . . . . .	38
	The Psychoanalytic Project . . . . .	42
<b>4</b>	<b>THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY AND THE PROBLEM OF HERO</b> . . . . .	45
	Narrative Authority, Interpretive Authority . . . . .	45
	Dora's Case History . . . . .	46
	Fragment of an Analysis . . . . .	49
	Dora's Family Circle . . . . .	51
	Dora as a Short Story . . . . .	54

<b>5</b>	<b>A CLOSER LOOK AT DORA AS FREUD WROTE HER</b>	<b>64</b>
	Freud's <i>Apologia</i>	65
	Tightly-woven Threads of Justification	68
	Freud Writing, Dora Dreaming	75
	Postscript	85
<b>6</b>	<b>CONCLUSIONS: THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY</b>	<b>86</b>
	Nineteenth Century Science and History	89
	Toppling the Monumental Freud	91
	From History to Archive: Foucault's Far-Reaching Questions	92
	<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>98</b>

To the memory of my father, Aubrey Tatro. To my children, William and Ginnie. And to my mother, Virginia Tatro, with deepest gratitude.

•

At least a dozen times in recent years, in reports of the proceedings of certain Congresses and scientific assemblies or in reviews of certain publications, I have read "Psychoanalysis is dead, at last defeated and finally abolished!" The answer to all this might be like that of Mark Twain in his telegram to the newspapers which falsely reported his death: "Reports of my death grossly exaggerated."

*Sigmund Freud - On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, 1914*

Dr. Ludwig urged us to let the story itself be our discovery. He even went so far as to joke with me: "Let's see, this is chapter ten we are discussing today." He urged me to be a good listener in the special way a story requires: note the manner of presentation: the development of plot, character; the addition of new dramatic sequences; the emphasis accorded to one figure or another in the recital; and the degree of enthusiasm, of coherence, the narrator gives to his or her account.

*Robert Coles - The Call of the Story*

When there are so many we shall have to mourn,  
 when grief has been made so public, and exposed  
 to the critique of a whole epoch the  
 frailty of our conscience and anguish,  
 of whom shall we speak?  
 For every day they die among us,  
 those who were doing us some good,  
 who knew it was never enough but  
 hoped to improve a little by living ...  
 if often he was wrong and, at times, absurd,  
 to us he is no more a person  
 now but a whole climate of opinion  
 under whom we conduct our differing lives.

*W. H. Auden - In Memory of Sigmund Freud*

## 1 INTRODUCTION

I disagree with the throng that would relegate Freud and his findings to the realm of those who believed that the Earth was flat or that mammals were spontaneously generated from piles of rags. These people who would do away with Freud (and their numbers have grown exponentially since the 1970s, as we shall see) would assert that their scholarship calls all of psychoanalysis, including the tremendous body of work by people who've gone far beyond Freud, into question. I also disagree with those people who accept Freud's doctrines wholesale, or try, through intensely close reading, to prove their validity. Either approach leaves us nowhere. Indeed, the argument is pointless. Why try to turn back the clock on years of inquiry or try to prove the absolute truth of what Freud himself called dogma (Outline, Preface)? Undoubtedly, there were questions left unanswered by Freud's lifework that even he was at a loss to answer after many years' reflection. My position is that it is far more productive to try to understand how and why Freud became one of the most influential thinkers of the last century, rather than asking whether or not he was right. My purpose in this book is to use narrative theory as an investigative tool for the study of a considerable piece of intellectual history: the making of theory in psychoanalysis.

In the introduction, I set up my premises, which are: 1) Narrative theory provides tools for understanding intellectual history through the making of knowledge, in this case, psychoanalytic knowledge; 2) Narrative concepts of time, authority, personal agency, and determinism are particularly useful when applied to psychoanalytic theory, because of the inherent discursive nature of psychoanalysis and because of the rising scientism into which it was born; 3) The enormity of Freud's project and the vehemence of the medical establishment's reaction against his work compounded his need for an appeal to scientism, which he made through narrative authority; 4) Re-configuration of inquiry from history to archive, applied to two types of narrative – psychoanalysis in the form of the case study, and reflection in the form of Freud's letters to confidants and two of his later meta-analytical works – provides insights into the making of scientific knowledge that far exceed what we have formerly had. My main interests here are specific to three areas, all of which I examine using narrative theory. I am interested in Freud

as author and as hero. I am interested in the specific case study that came to be known as Dora. And I am interested in the larger narrative, the master-narrative, if you will, of the creation of scientific knowledge. How does Freud (and on a smaller scale, Dora) fit into the master narratives of psychoanalysis and science? My first task will be to offer a working definition and history of narrative theory. My second task will be to problematize the making of psychoanalysis within its historico-scientific (which, as I will show, is inherently dependent on narrative) context in light of its having developed out of the work of Mesmer, which gave it a dubious origin. My third task will be to show how Freud used various narrative techniques to overcome the resistance with which psychoanalysis was met. My primary source is the case study of Dora (Ida Bauer), one of Freud's most famous case studies, a case that has been considered and re-considered by Freud scholars from a variety of perspectives. Freud used narrative to create this new genre, the genre of the case study. Case studies are particularly interesting as pieces of scientific data because of the knotty problems they present, figuring as they do as both narratives and as scientific evidence. On one hand, unlike quantitative studies, the subject comes alive and is singled out, rather than being obscured as one more number in a set of statistical findings. The subject has a voice. On the other hand, the voice is controlled by the researcher or author. While the voice of the subject is necessarily appropriated by the author because the author uses the case study to further knowledge and to make some point or other, the subject's voice is sometimes obscured by the author. In some cases, as in Dora's case, the subject is rendered speechless by the author's appropriation of voice. The *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria* (1905) is, in the Collier edition copyright 1963, 112 pages long, divided into five sections: 1) Prefatory Remarks, 2) The Clinical Picture, 3) The First Dream, 4) The Second Dream, 5) Postscript. The case study, and the two pieces published with it, "Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to Bisexuality" (1908) and "General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks" (1909) remains important for Freud scholars, psychoanalysts, and literary theorists who are interested in the case study as a genre. Because it is one of the pioneering case studies of hysteria, it has been a matter of discussion for feminists who concern themselves with issues of women and psychoanalysis. Because it was forever a quandry for Freud, it has been of interest to his various editors.

Ida Bauer was eighteen when she came to Freud, brought by her father who was both tubercular and syphilitic. She came to be known as "Dora" and that's how I will refer to her throughout this text. Dora had lost her voice and had a strong sense of being weary of life, going so far as to threaten suicide, when her father brought her to Freud. She was under his care, attempting the "talking cure" for three months before she broke off the treatment. Freud never felt that he had had the opportunity to treat her sufficiently, and he transformed her case into one that he hoped would speak to the world. The

question of why he failed with Dora was one of the questions he was still asking in his last year of life.

In addition to applying narrative theory to his case studies, I am also interested in what Freud wrote about his own work at the level of meta-analysis, which we get in his letters to Wilhelm Fleiss (Freud's closest friend, the Berlin ear, nose and throat doctor whom Freud met through Josef Breuer) early in his career, and which we get in his more self-consciously meta-analytical later works, *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* and *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*. These pieces, like case studies, are necessarily mediated. Our access to the letters is subject to manifold factors, both historical and contemporary. Without becoming an insider in psychoanalytic circles, as Jeffrey Masson did,<sup>1</sup> we have only those letters that have been published or that can be read in the Freud archives. Those texts have been released and suppressed by very careful consideration by those who would be the guardians of Freud's work and reputation.<sup>2</sup> This guardianship by Freud's daughter, and intended successor, Anna Freud, K.R. Eissler, The International Psychoanalytic Association, and the board of directors of the Freud Copyrights, was penetrated by Masson, but no one person could undo the huge and historical collaborative effort that has made such a strong case for the solidity of psychoanalysis.

The letters are mediated, not only by having been edited individually and subsequently published, but because Freud destroyed many of the letters he received. In the instance of his letters to Wilhelm Fleiss, we are left only with Freud's side of the correspondence. Freud's writing about his own work in the *History of Psychoanalysis* and *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* is also necessarily mediated - we get his analysis of analysis - looking at what he had to say about it is the point. Freud's work is also mediated by the issue of translation. Everything we have is translated into English from German. What I am about in this study is trying to see how an argument was made as strong as psychoanalysis was; to see how narrative informed, enlivened, authorized and solidified what began as a hunch about the value of the talking cure, into a scientific field of inquiry that, for many years, appeared to many people infallible. The mediation, then, is what interests me. It is through a consideration of the many layers of narrative on narrative, in both the psychoanalytic case study itself and in the narrative generation of scientific knowledge, that we make inroads into understanding the genesis and perpetuation of this by no means small piece of intellectual history.

---

<sup>1</sup>Masson, editor of the most recent, most complete collection of the Freud/Fleiss letters, ingratiated himself with K.R. Eissler and was appointed project director for the Sigmund Freud Archives in 1980, was fired in 1981, and in the meantime began publishing articles wherein he expressed his opinion that Freud had suppressed knowledge of adult sexual abuse of children to promote his own career [Masson, 1984]

<sup>2</sup>Many of Freud's personal documents were to have been made publicly available by an arrangement between the Library of Congress and Freud Archives in the year 2000, however in a recent conversation with Ivan Ward, Director of Education at the Freud Museum in London, I learned that the documents have been re-categorized this year and they will be released in groups, some in the year 2000, some in 2038, and some in 2052. Ward said that the list of documents is accessible only by arrangement with the Library of Congress.



## Psychoanalytic Precepts: Science, Philosophy, Fiction

To understand Freud's relationship as author/analyst to Dora as hero/analysand and how those narrative situations were affected by the issue of narrative time. I will consider Bakhtinian terms from *Art and Answerability* and the extension of Bakhtin's later work by Gary Saul Morson who adds concepts that advance our understanding of time and narrative, in stories wrought as literature and the stories of our lives. I will incorporate and build on the work of Paul Ricoeur, who has done the most thorough and integrated reading of Freud's work that I can find and I will look at what Freud had to say about his own work. Morson offers a detailed discussion of Bakhtin's term, 'theoretism,' that sheds light on many of the problems that were inherent in the task Freud set for himself, such as an overgeneralization by systems, and a refusal to see problems that might upset a narrative that fit with any pet theory. Morson writes, "Typically, the theoretist abstracts from human action all that is generalizable, then transforms this 'transcription' into a set of rules or laws, and finally, denies that anything of significance has been left out in the process" (*Narrative and Freedom*, p.21). Though Bakhtin uses the concept to apply to a number of approaches ranging from behaviorism to Marxism to structuralism, Morson's description of theoretism accurately describes what Freud tried to do and saw himself doing in the early days of his "discovery" of psychoanalysis.

What I am constructing is a type of narrative itself: I offer here a reading of psychoanalysis through a frame provided by narrative theory. My story is one that is first problematized from within a narrative framework and then built on the stories of others: Paul Ricoeur, Sigmund Freud, Peter Gay, Hannah Decker, Ida Bauer (Dora), Jeffrey Masson, and many other people who come to figure in this intersection between literature and psychoanalysis and psychoanalysis as literature. I am also indebted to the work of Philip Reiff and Steven Marcus, without whose observations I might never have begun thinking about Freud and narrative. With an almost Platonic notion of knowledge, Freud approached his discipline as if it was already there and all that he and others needed to do was uncover it. As we can see retrospectively, his was a long life and a large project, an ambitious project. In many ways, he wanted to see the unseen, make real what might have been real only in the mind of a patient to help them overcome it, and to bring to consciousness what which was unconscious, thus freeing the person who suffered from the hold traumatic memory had over them.

## Freud's Enormous Influence

Freud's effort to create a narrative came out of his struggle for recognition. His medical colleagues received his early findings with skepticism. When he was first presenting his findings at professional meetings, in the eighteen-nineties, he wrote of feeling so opposed, so reviled by other doctors, that his later reception by a psychoanalytic community that would study and practice his theories and techniques with little or no reservation, seemed not unlikely, but impossible. There are many sources from which I make this observation – Freud's letters, reports of biographers, his own writings which in later years, had as their primary focus the refutation of criticism he drew from Jungian, Adlerian and other circles – but one of the most striking is this passage from *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*:

I think that by narrating this history of its development I have shown what psychoanalysis is better than by a systematic description of it. I did not at first perceive the peculiar nature of what I had discovered. Without thinking, I sacrificed at its inception my popularity as a physician, and the growth of a large consulting practice among nervous patients, by inquiries relating to the sexual factors involved in the causation of their neuroses . . . Unsuspectingly, I spoke before the Vienna Neurological Society, then under the presidency of Krafft-Ebing, expecting to be compensated by the interest and recognition of my colleagues for the material losses I had willingly undergone. I treated my discoveries as ordinary contributions to science and hoped to be met in the same spirit. But the silence with which my addresses were received, the void which formed itself about me, the insinuations that found their way to me, caused me gradually to realize that one cannot count upon views about the part played by sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses meeting with the same receptions as other communications. I understood that from now onwards I belonged to those who have 'disturbed the sleep of the world,' as Hebel says, and that I could not reckon upon objectivity and tolerance. (*History*, p.55)

The American essayist and biographer, Joseph Wood Krutch, wrote of Freud in 1926, that, despite his detractors, "the influence of his chief conceptions is reflected more and more strongly in the writings of most of the important psychologists and psychiatrists. . . in the course of time they [Freudian conceptions] will probably become . . . a part of the mental equipment which every thinker takes for granted" (*New York Times*, May 9, 1926).

By the mid-1920's, Freud's was a household name (Gay, p.454). In the summer of 1924, according to Gay, Colonel Robert McCormick offered Freud \$25,000 or any amount he could name to come to Chicago and psychoanalyze Leopold and Loeb, the two young killers. January of 1925 saw an offer of \$100,000 from Samuel Goldwyn to commercialize his work into a story for the screen. Freud rebuffed them both. The problem for Freud in such offers and in such fame, was, as Gay sees it, an imprecision that he found galling. It stands to reason that if Freud's aim was to establish psychoanalysis as a hard science, he would not have been willing to commercialize himself or his ideas. At the same time, psychoanalysis was burgeoning into a huge international industry, however misinterpreted or misrepresented it might have been. Freud, was by this time, in his seventies.

Freud's effort to create a powerful narrative was successful, perhaps too successful. In the late twentieth century, we can't escape his hold over us. He is, as Auden wrote, no more a person, but a "whole climate of opinion under whom we conduct our differing lives" (p.595). The concepts he introduced into our collective consciousness are so pervasive that they are practically cliché. We call ourselves and others simply anal, leaving off, but implying, retentive or compulsive. We know what compulsive is. We talk about complexes - Oedipus, Electra, inferiority. We know what it is to be obsessive, even obsessive-compulsive. And we use these phrases without hesitation, without question, without raising what might be obvious objections to Freud's terms, and the assumptions behind them.

Even efforts to debunk Freud point to his enormous influence. Objections to psychoanalysis in general, and Freud's work in particular, have become a substantial part of what is written concerning psychoanalysis and the history of psychoanalysis. The recovered memory movement is the most recent, most current, product of a more than century-long look from the outside in - from the outside, an outside that is rational, logical, systematic, to an inside of the psyche that is suprarational, illogical, unsystematic. Frederick Crews' recent book, *The Memory Wars*, along with Ernest Gellner's *The Psychoanalytic Movement*, are examples of the kind of objections we now find to Freudian analysis.

Crews' book began as a *New York Review of Books* essay in which he attacked the essential assumptions of Freudian psychoanalysis and what he saw as its aftermath in the recovered memory movement. Crews bases his charges on the work of a host of other writers whose objections to Freud's work range from charges of a lack of scientific rigor to gross medical malpractice resulting from his faith in his own psychoanalytic theories. Crews' prevailing tone is reflected in this brief passage:

It is not recorded whether Freud ever expressed regret for having destroyed these four lives, but we know that it would have been out of character for him to do so. Advancing the fortunes of his movement was for him an imperative that overrode all others. As many

casual remarks in his correspondence reveal, he was indifferent to his patients' suffering and quite dismissive of their real-world dilemmas, which struck him as a set of pretexts for not getting down to the repressed fantasies that really mattered. Nor did he care very much, except from a public relations angle, whether those patients improved as a result of his treatment. (Crews, p.39)

Gellner's objections to Freud are more philosophical than Crews' somewhat practical ones: Gellner aligns Freud with Marx and uses him as an example of a system of cultural beliefs that fills the psychic or spiritual void left by the move away from religious faith. The tone of Gellner's polemic against psychoanalysis is not as relentlessly sarcastic in regard to Freud's character, but treats psychoanalysis itself as nothing short of philosophically ludicrous:

Psychoanalysis presents a picture of the human condition that is both original and enormously persuasive. Think of yourself bicycling through the streets of a city full of ferocious, careless and brutal traffic, and note that you are blindfolded, and absolutely incapable of removing the blindfold yourself. The situation really is too terrible to contemplate. Yet you must cycle on, for life leaves you no alternative. And you cannot, cannot remove the blindfold: the more you try, the firmer it is set over your head. In fact, it is more like some kind of dreadful, stifling, *cagoule*. . . imagine, as is only too likely, that you have already come up painfully a number of times against lamp-posts, traffic, other cyclists. Blindfolded by the *cagoule* as you are, you are not really to blame – but not only are you sore and bleeding, you have been roundly and vigorously abused for your inept and careless cycling, and several serious threats of prosecution are hanging over your head.

But despair not. Since about the turn of the century (how lucky one is to have been born so late!) a powerful *cagoule*-removing agency is available. It owns the patent and near-monopoly of *cagoule*-removal, and is only moderately expensive (at any rate if you consider the value and importance of the boon offered), though acutely jealous of anyone wishing to poach on its monopoly, but what of that? The *cagoule*-removing operation is not only mildly expensive, it is also somewhat protracted and energy-absorbing, and some nasty skeptical people have suggested that its efficacy is questionable, and indeed its practitioners themselves seem a bit shifty and evasive when making definite promises about the timing of *cagoulotomy*, but what of all that? (Gellner, p.72)

These books are only two examples of the scholarship that has been re-emergent since the 1970's (Crews, p.35) that vilify Freud.<sup>3</sup> In tone, they are consistent with each other, insidious and nasty. The list goes on in tremendous length, uncovering one objectionable practice after another within psychoanalytic practice and among psychoanalysts, ranging from the formation of various psychoanalytic societies to sexual intrigue and abuse.

There are those, however, who would seek to rescue Freud from the sea of negative criticism into which he has been cast. Crews calls Freud's biographers who don't take the same tack he does "loyalist" (p.35), but Freud still has champions, and, in some cases, their claims go far beyond loyalty. *Freud and Feminism*, by Teresa Brennan, is an attempt to claim Freud for feminists, by claiming that Freud was a feminist. Hers is a very complicated argument, wherein she defines masculinity and femininity, follows them out through Freud's work on hysteria, and concludes that Freud saw femininity in both men and women and sympathized with the predicament women are left in by their "natural" femininity. Brennan seems to work under assumptions of Freud's integrity to the same degree that Crews and others assume that Freud would not repent of destroying people's lives. Brennan does a very close analysis of Freud's work, always giving him the benefit of the doubt, doing what she can to explain his theories, rather than refute them. "It is understandable why Freud leapt from the formation of the ego to the working of the ego in adulthood and neuroses. He had argued that the ego requires attention to maintain it; it is a mass of neurons cathected by attention, and established on the basis of familiar pathways" (Brennan, p.116). I offer this example as a sample of Brennan's serious, sympathetic tone as it contrasts with those of Gellner and Crews.

## Narrative Layering and Hero-Worship

An exploration of Freud's work through narrative theory is appropriate because of the nature of the work itself. As scientific as he wanted to make it, as deeply rooted in philosophy as he understood it was, finally psychoanalysis comes down to the telling of a story. In most instances, we have in psychoanalysis, and in a case study, a many-layered narrative: an analyst relates stories of events from his or her life, describing symptoms, onset, history, people who figure in important ways; the analyst then helps to re-shape the narrative to try to gain insight into the presenting symptoms and

---

<sup>3</sup> These two examples don't begin to scratch the surface of long-standing and vehement anti-Freudianism. I cite them because they are so current and represent the latest wave of reaction against what the authors choose to see as Freud's legacy. Freud's work has been misappropriated and mocked by such a range of writers and scholars (Stephen Gatlin offers a number of examples in his book, *William H. Sheldon and the Culture of the Somatotype*) that it is common for theories to be ascribed to him and interpreted so loosely that it appears that the original work was never read. We are left with a host of deprecatory writings about Freud and his work that are based on information gleaned from sources that are secondary, tertiary, or sometimes even further removed from the original texts.

their possible causes, offering the story back to the analysand and re-receiving it with additions and modifications. In the case histories that Freud used to lay down the precepts of psychoanalysis, the multi-layered narrative becomes very complicated indeed.

Richard Webster points out, *Why Freud Was Wrong*, our cultural proclivity for hero-worship. As his title indicates, Webster is one who would vilify Freud. Webster's theory that Freud suffered from a Messiah complex is certainly corroborated by Peter Gay's account of Freud's childhood and the treatment he received from his family, but it is not sufficient to understanding the shortcomings of psychoanalytic theory. Neither does it take into account the considerable genius required to initially conceive of psychoanalysis. Narrative theory is useful not only for understanding the trans-action between the analyst and the analysand that happens as a part of Freud's talking cure, but also to shed light on the considerable philosophical bind Freud is left in because of his views of time and action.

I would suggest that the reason that scores of those people doing scholarship in psychoanalytic studies now want to prove Freud wrong on every count is precisely because he has been made such a giant in our thought, as Webster says. If we hold him up so high in our esteem, he is bound to fall hard. It has been written of Freud that he was throughout his life beset by the affliction of overestimation. Overestimation continues through the duration of this time after his death, as well, regardless of attempts to show how wrong he was. Despite the claims of those who say his ideas were exploded long ago, his work remains a fertile ground of inquiry for those of us who want to understand the thought and growth and impetus for psychological explanation as it has been. Pulling Freud down completely seems to me wrong. What do we gain by throwing away a century's worth of work? Trying to understand the construction of his work, the knowledge he tried to make, and perhaps, while we're at it, his persona, is more balanced, more accurate, and allows us to keep that from his work that is useful and good. By using narrative theory to look at psychoanalysis, we can begin to deconstruct the boundaries between science and literature. Almost since Freud's first use of the term, "psychoanalysis" in 1896 (Miller, p.172), psychoanalytic theory has been used to examine literature, but literary theory has not been used to examine psychoanalysis. Narrative theory is one genre of literary theory and it can be applied to a number of types of narrative. Indeed, many of Freud's early models of understanding human psychology came from literature originally. My aim is to look the other direction: I want to use narrative theory to explain and understand one small, but very influential, segment of intellectual history. The small segment is the inception of Freudian psychoanalysis, looking backward slightly to what is sometimes called "the prehistory of psychoanalysis" (Grosskurth, p.5), and moving forward through time up to some of Freud's last writing on the subject of psychoanalysis. We shall see

repeatedly through this exploration how far-reaching the influence of Freudian psychoanalysis has been and continues to be. Chapter two calls for a move from History to archive, a concept from Foucault's *Archeology of Knowledge* and examines determinism as a function of the temporal/narrative implication of causality. Chapter three provides an historical context for Freud's work, explaining how he made a place for himself in his time and how he was bound by the modernist constraints under which he worked. Chapter four begins the closer examination of Dora's case and Freud's narrative/interpretive authority in the writing of the case study. In chapter five, I discuss Freud's various problems with the publication of Dora, which includes his awareness of his responsibility for the protection of Dora's anonymity and for the promotion of his discovery of psychoanalysis. Freud acknowledges these problems in letters to Fleiss, and in the case study itself. Freud's work and the problems he faced in the early part of this century are important in themselves, as they figure in intellectual history.

But it is important to note that those problems he faced then are contemporary problems, too. In September of 1995, Susan Budd presented a paper at the Freud Museum Conference that read, in part,

A discipline whose subject-matter is private and intimate, and concerned with secrets, is constrained in its organization. In particular it is problematic as to whether it can ever allow for the full and clear statement of case material which will let us decide whether the theory which was used to decipher the clinical facts was adequate or not. And yet, whatever we understand 'science' to be, being able to clearly and openly describe the data on which our hypotheses are based is a central part of it. If psychoanalysis is to have any claim to be a science, we have to find a way of communicating case material.

Clinical accounts are central to the routine practice of analysis or psychotherapy, because they are the medium by which we are trained and in which we demonstrate our competence, but they are also the method by which we ask questions, communicate new ideas to each other and convey a new understanding. Often case material can become a new nucleus, so to speak, around which various stray and random observations can gather to form a new category or perspective which may in turn become the basis for a new theory.

We see in Budd's claims a one-to-one correspondence to what Freud argues about his publication of Dora's case study, but with a greater historical breadth and depth because of Budd's historical placement: Freud was looking forward into what he wanted psychoanalysis to be; Budd has the advantage of being able to talk about the practice of psychoanalysis and the making of psychoanalytic knowledge from an historical perspective that takes the present and the past into account, while attempting to

understand what conditions will facilitate the making of knowledge in the future. Budd's argument is the same as Freud's much earlier one and she has more evidence to base it on. This proof that the issues are still the same is crucial, but more important are the central underlying concerns that they share and what they say about the case study.

The three major underlying concerns with the presentation of case material and with the advancement of psychoanalytic knowledge are, as we see in Budd's remarks above: 1) Organizational constraints caused by the intimate/private nature of the subject matter; 2) Determination of the validity of interpretive theory; 3) The centrality to science of clear and open description of supporting data. Indeed, Budd has the historical perspective to confirm what Freud anticipated about case studies, as I discuss in chapter five, that they are essential to the work of psychoanalysis. Case studies are vital, Budd says, in education, evaluation and inquiry. They are the tools used for training analysts, they are the tools for measuring analysts' performance, and they are the tools for making new analytical theory. In Budd's estimation, presentation of case material is what makes psychoanalysis scientific. The overweening issue for Budd, as for Freud, is the scientificity of psychoanalysis. It is significant and remarkable that even though people think they know Freud and that they have finished with him, we are still grappling with the same problems he faced almost a century ago.

I would neither castigate Freud and reject Freudian theory and all the work by psychoanalysts of this century as Crews does, nor would I pay blind obeisance to the father as Brennan does. Rather, I want to explore Freud's work by using narrative theory as a frame for writing a piece of intellectual history. What is narrative and how does it function in psychoanalysis, both in the making of psychoanalysis as a cohesive body of knowledge and in the case study? While it is not my purpose to argue that psychoanalysis is or is not a science, I am interested in how Freud's claims to and desire for scientificity affected his work. I am particularly interested in how he used the case study – in this case, Dora – to promote himself and his work. My work here has implications for three distinct and important audiences: those working in rhetoric and literary theory who would want to examine case studies as a literary genre (Britton, 1995), those scholars of the history of science and in the rhetoric of science who want to study clinical discourse (Ward, 1995), and those clinicians who would consider using and publishing case material (Budd, 1995). There are implications for the patient in the appropriation of their narratives that go far beyond what the analyst might anticipate. In Dora's case, the irony is that her father brought her to Freud to cure her aphonia. Not only did Freud's talking cure fail to rid her of the hysteria that took her voice, but she was rendered forever speechless by his decision to sacrifice her for the advancement of psychoanalytic knowledge.



## 2 NARRATIVE DETERMINATION

Art by its very nature is not science, and science by its very nature is not art; both these spheres of the mind have something in reserve that is peculiar to them and can only be explained in its own terms.

*Carl Jung - On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry*

...time is implicated in theology, ethics, psychology, politics, and, of course, history. The same questions that may be asked about individual lives may be asked about societies or about humanity as a whole. Are there laws to history and does it tend to some goal? Or does history admit of many possible directions, the determination of which depends in part on contingency, chance or human choices: If history has a direction, can it be redirected? Do fundamental social alterations take place because of the gradual accumulation of small changes or by sudden leaps? The many answers that have been given to these questions have been closely linked to fundamental questions about the most important ways people have assessed the meaning of their lives and actions.

*Gary Saul Morson - Narrative and Freedom*

The hard line, essentialist arguments Jung makes in the passage at the beginning of this chapter exemplify the problems Freud faced, the notions at the heart of his dilemma. Of course, there is an art to science and there is always some *techne*, some science to art. I am interested in blurring the boundaries between science (psychoanalysis) and art (literature). While I won't look at literature through the lens of psychoanalysis, as has so often been done, I will analyze a psychoanalytic case study as if it were literature. Dora begins to look like a short story, a narrative form to which we can apply the same questions we would apply to any narrative. Narrative depends on time. I use these two epigrams to emphasize my position: I disagree with Jung and agree with Morson. The questions we ask about individual lives (in this case Dora's personal life and Freud's professional life) may be asked about societies (in this case the scientific community into which Freud wanted entrance and the larger realm of conscious thought and reference that he now inhabits). What I am trying to do here is to use

narrative theory to understand this very large, very important piece of intellectual history. Despite the (sometimes founded) claims against Freud and his work, it seems fairly obvious that he must have had something right for his influence to have been so far-reaching and so durable.

To consider the problem of narrative is to call into question a number of assumptions that narratives make. Narratives, whether they are literary, scientific, personal, or historical, depend on conceptions of time, sequence, history, legitimacy, and authority. Narrative theory also helps us ask and begin to answer questions about personal agency, causality, interpretation, real events and human perceptions of reality. Hayden White asks, "What kind of insight does narrative give into the nature of real events? What kind of blindness with respect to reality does narrativity spell?" ("Narrativity in the Representation of Reality" p.5). White's question is at the heart of the many questions I want to ask of psychoanalysis. Questioning narrativity's insight and blindness with respect to reality cuts both ways – especially when the question is applied to psychoanalysis. The dynamic force at the center of psychoanalysis is the natural tension between the narration of real events and the (perhaps unnatural) assignation of narrative meaning to those events. Time is central to everything else that follows from narrative: the past, the present, the future, the possibilities open to us in ethics, history, and conceptions of personality. The relevance for the study of psychoanalysis should be obvious if time comes to bear on conceptions of personality.

Time can be divided, for our purposes, into two categories – narrative time (or fictive time) and real time. Narrative time is the time of fiction, that created by any author, including Freud, Dostoevsky, any one of us (including an analysand) in relating the events of our lives, historians, and biographers. It is the time we invoke when we tell a story and it raises interesting problems.<sup>1</sup> I find the challenges raised by the representation and the function of time in the narratives I am here considering no less engaging than those of novelistic time (see the whole discussion of time and determinism below). A significant problem, particularly for Freud, is the mind's propensity to collapse time, to forget, or to mentally see events as all running together. I see narrative time as opposed to real time<sup>2</sup> in that real time is the time things actually happen to people in – i.e. I have been writing, according to my watch, for four hours this sitting. Real time is not what we could report in, because when we make narrative accounts, we are telling people about what happened, though we can't expect them to re-live

---

<sup>1</sup> I like to think about Virginia Woolf's narrative collapsing and distending of time in *To The Lighthouse* or *Mrs. Dalloway*, where the least of the action can be spread over the most of the novel, so that a whole novel can be occupied by only one day, or, as in the final part of *To The Lighthouse*, ten years may have passed in the turn of a page, effecting the death or other fate of major characters.

<sup>2</sup> I use the term with some reservation because of our differing perceptions of time as it happens – I am aware as I sit here writing, that the four hours since I began have elapsed as if they were only one; after becoming a parent my time perception accelerated by at least half – I cannot answer whether that is because so much of my time is absorbed in the care of my children or because of their rapid growth and development.

our lives with us in real time. Thus, simply by telling about time, we make real time fictive. The difference will reveal its importance in chapter six as we look at Dora's account of her experiences and symptomatology and at Freud's publication of his findings concerning them. The link with time and Freud's work, the way that these subjects, sequence, history, legitimacy and authority, are relevant in my examination of the case study and the making of psychoanalytic knowledge is narrative. When narratives are made, as in the writing of a case history, is when order or structure imposed by narrative sequence, history in the form of events leading up to and through time to a main event, legitimacy in terms of the story and authority on the part of the narrator become important. Sequence, while apparently dealing only with the order in which events happen, calls into question ideas of causality in representation. If we say A happened before Y, are we trying to establish, or even imply, a causal relationship? When we move in the realm of narrative (fictive, representational) time, we begin to speculate (even if only implicitly) about determinism and causality, so sequence becomes crucial. Freud was, despite his tremendous powers of observation, by no means a brilliant diagnostician. His ability to treat Dora was, in my opinion, clouded by scientism and ambition. If my claims are valid, then the sequence of events he reports concerning the case of Ida Bauer matters. The importance of sequence emerges when we look at Freud's diagnosis of Dora's symptoms in subsequent chapters. I raise the issue here only as a refinement in setting up my argument, which is that Freud's ability to effectively treat Dora was compromised by his aspirations for the scientificity of psychoanalysis, and that in some ways, what he called his failure with her may have been a function of the reductivity of narrative.

By History I mean a narrative account of related events intended to present a certain cohesive story about those events. Freud wanted, perhaps needed, History because of the imperative he felt to establish psychoanalysis as a hard science. Freud wanted to be making history, to be producing findings that would take their place as a part of history. What I am advocating in the second section of this chapter is archive. Naturally, our ideas of what a narrative is and what it means, what significance it has, depend on our conception of history: is history a true accounting of facts? Or is it a confluence of a number of factors leading to a discursive (often recursive) account of opinion and ideas? Or are there other options?

A part of what we're after with a critique that is written from the point of view of the narrative theorist, rather than the historian proving Truth, is legitimacy, a term that is smaller in argumentative scope than validity or verisimilitude (what we might be trying for if we could narrate in real time, if indeed our audience could tolerate it). Legitimacy, more than proof, is also what scientific work is about in the late twentieth century, though that might not have been the case a hundred years ago. Indeed,

the vehemence of Freud's effort to gain a scientific acceptance of psychoanalysis, and his writings about its scientificity indicate a concept of science that seems to want proof or Truth, again, he seemed to be about wanting to discover Newtonian laws that could be applied to the human psyche. We want legitimate, well-supported arguments given us by a narrator we deem reliable. Legitimacy is bound up in the questions asked by narrative theory – along with what we think the function of a history is, how we configure narrative time, and the causality implied (or not) by sequence, is also the question of the reliability of a narrator. Legitimacy then, moves us toward the question of narrative credibility or authority. Legitimacy is the problem of science.

Authority is what Freud wanted. Authority is what Freud got by aspiring to and incorporating scientism into his work, by co-opting the narratives of others, and by using those narratives to “prove” the validity of his larger master-narratives. The argument is almost a circular one at this point because I am claiming that narrative depends on the conception of authority, but that Freud's authority is based on his skillful use of narrative, and on his entrance into a field that was by nature constructed on narrative re- construction.

I have discovered, through reading both primary and secondary works, and through studying the cultural/scientific milieu into which Freud's work was born, that these five considerations come to bear strongly on Freud's work in general and on the Dora case specifically. These concepts must be applied if we are to understand not only Freud's significance historically, but ways we might understand his work today. Freud used narrative, which is in some ways determined by time and sequence, to create a history that he hoped would be transcendent, affording him scientific legitimacy through the appropriation of Dora's story to establish his author/ity.

## The Move From History to Archive

We can begin to work out the knots of the philosophical position we come up against with these issues of legitimacy and authority by moving from History to Archive. Our relationship to knowledge of any kind, in this case to the making of psychoanalytic theory, is transformed by this move. What I am considering is a whole system of statements that Foucault would call not history, but *archive*. When history becomes archive the difference is based in discourse and brings a new understanding of knowledge itself. This is a difference that can help us make sense of a Freudian legacy (or the inheritance of any codified, structuralist, systems-based knowledge, for that matter). From this point on, when I am referring to history that is written or otherwise constructed, I will use a capital letter H; when I

want to indicate history that is the past, as in events. I will use a lower-case initial letter. <sup>3</sup>Foucault's archive is defined like this:

The domain of statements [thus] articulated in accordance with historical *a priori*s, [thus] characterized by different types of positivity, and divided up by distinct discursive formations, no longer has that appearance of a monotonous, endless plain that I attributed to it at the outset when I spoke of 'the surface of discourse'; it also ceases to appear as the inert, smooth, neutral element in which there arise, each according to its own movement, or driven by some obscure dynamic, themes, ideas, concepts, knowledge. We are now dealing with a complex volume, in which heterogenous regions are differentiated or deployed, in accordance with specific rules and practices that cannot be superposed. Instead of seeing, on the great mythical book of history, lines of words that translate in visible characters thoughts that were formed in some other time and place, we have in the density of discursive practices, systems that establish statements as events (with their own conditions and domain of appearance) and things (with their own possibility and field of use). They are all these systems of statements (whether events or things) that I propose to call *archive*. (*Archaeology*, p.128)

The significance of this move from History to *archive* is tremendous in analyzing Freud's work or any scientific work because of the change it affects in our approach to knowledge. Consider the change Foucault advocates: rather than being a smooth, cohesive, homogenous, neutral narrative that moves through time in a linear fashion (which erases identity, diversity, difference, error and aberration), History becomes something far more interesting. The discourse and the concepts of time in history are changed, changing from a tidy linear narrative to an inclusive recursive narrative. It is no longer what we would even consider a dominant narrative, because its aims have been so changed. In the configuration of knowledge as *archive*, complexity is multiplied and difference is allowable, brought in and acknowledged, rather than being somehow factored out. This would render a reading of Freud (or any other systematic approach to knowledge-making), such as that done by Masson or others of Freud's detractors who seem to have so much at stake in proving him wrong, impossible. An agonistic reading is impossible if we re-position ourselves with Foucault because we are no longer reading for only what's right. We are reading instead, not as agonists or apologists, but as archivists who uncover pieces of knowledge, "thoughts that were formed in some other time and place," statements becoming events with their "own conditions and domain of appearance," and things with their "own possibility and field

---

<sup>3</sup>The distinction is Keith Jenkins', from his book, *Re-thinking History*.

of use.” We will see in later analysis how this move applies to Dora’s case which had its own conditions and domain of appearance, and how it blows the field of psychoanalysis wide open with possibility and potential fields of use.

Narration in the representation of reality comes to bear on psychoanalysis precisely because, however they may have constructed their own stories, analysands are real people, not merely characters in stories analysts tell. Analysands do become characters, however, given over, appropriated, written (often into case studies, but always in the analytical process) by the analyst as author. What I am offering here is a blurring of genres that helps in a writing of the piece of our intellectual history that is Freud and psychoanalysis – a look at a profession outside of, but not possibly separate from, rhetoric, through a lens that rhetoric (narrative) provides.

Our expectations of a narrative, of a story, encompass ideas about time, movement, change. Narratives differ from other types of writing in that we expect them to have a chronology – first there was this situation and then this event happened and in the end the situation (and possibly the person in the situation) is changed. More deeply embedded in narratives of all kinds are various controlling conceptions of time (fictive and real, as I’ve described above), sequence, or the order of events and how they imply causality, and what it is we talk about when we talk about history. That was then and this is now and here’s the difference. In that difference, in the explanation of what it is and how it happened is the lure of the story, is the story itself. The change is what makes the story. There are, for most of us, stories of our lives. Stories of our lives center on change over time and change is what moves them. Narratives are dependent, too on the narrator’s having some authority. We talk about whether or not a narrator is reliable and we mean what authority does this narrator have. Do we believe him or her? Do we believe the story he or she spins out? Do we think that the story is legitimate?

### **Determinism: the Shape of Narrative**

Freud chooses to re-structure Dora’s narrative so that it makes sense in the ways he wants it to. He makes very clear choices about what to put when, and then ultimately where, in his narrative. While these are generalizable narrative functions and I’ve been talking about them in a somewhat general way to clarify the position from which I’m beginning, what I want to focus on here is Freud’s use of time. The sections that follow in this chapter deal with: 1) narrative progression, or in other words, how a narrative builds and plays itself out sequentially, 2) multiple chronotopes or ideas of time and how they function with the telling of multiple stories, which is what a case history is because it is both the patient’s story and a part of a story told for other purposes by an analyst, and 3) how narrative

accounts work in the creation of scientific knowledge. While we may not have much control over some of the events of our lives, we begin to take them in hand and make what we want of them when we make them into stories. We can tell them in front- or backward chronological order. We can tell them all out of order. We can begin to make connections and draw parallels that exist for us retrospectively, that we are able to see through the telling. The narration, the pulling of experience into the shape of a story, requires an interpretive look back at the same time that it sheds light on the experience. The order in which we tell the stories of our lives, in which we perceive them to have happened, one event or circumstance seemingly leading inevitably or not to another event or circumstance, affects how we understand those circumstances. We tell our stories in a sequential structure, as if we believe that one thing caused another when a sequence may or may not have been causal. While there are sometimes actual causal relationships within sequences, that is not always the case, though the narrative structure may make it seem so. Inherent in this structuring of events through narrative is no small amount of determinism. Determinism in an indeterministic world is one seemingly inescapable shortfall of applying psychoanalytic theory (or any other closed system of theorizing) to real life. This is not to say that narrativizing has no value: it is to say that deterministic systems applied at too many levels may rob psychoanalysis of some of its potential healing power at the same time that they are part of what infuse it with its power to begin with. This is the necessary double-bind of interpretation.

Narrative theory has been being developed and defined for some time now, dependent on conceptions of time, of history, of story, of freedom and of determinism. It would be more accurate, perhaps, to refer to theories of narrative, rather than narrative theory, which would seem to imply that it is all of a piece. Of course it is not, it is made up of many pieces, woven and interwoven as any other good story would be. Despite having written first, Bakhtin is a relative newcomer to the discovery and making of narrative theory because he has so recently come to be studied. Preceding Bakhtin (not in chronologic time, but in the unfolding of the theory) are structuralists Tzvetan Todorov, Vladimir Propp, Viktor Shklovsky, Roman Jakobson, and Claude Levi- Strauss, who seek the meaning-making function of language in language itself. Following Bakhtin is Gary Saul Morson. In one of his finest pieces of writing, *Narrative and Freedom*, where he is working toward a greater definition of narrative, a greater understanding of our conception of time, Morson elaborates and extends a model of time and action based on ideas advanced by Bakhtin.

According to Morson, Bakhtin's indeterminism, his sense of the loose play of time, of a universe where possibilities outnumber actualities, is like William James' defense of indeterminism, where "law and some kind of lawlessness' rule . . . 'in motley alternatives'", except that Bakhtin's is argued

positively, rather than negatively (p. 10).

Bakhtin's thoughts on chronology and determinism, and the relationship of author to hero (for our purposes, read the analyst as author, the analysand as hero) follow three distinct stages. The first two have theological overtones: first, in "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Bakhtin uses the analogy of the relationship of the author to the hero as that of a person to the world and an individual to God. With these relationships, Morson claims, if Bakhtin could show a way in which a hero could be relatively free of the author who was his or her creator, he could suggest that there is a measure of individual freedom with respect to God or whatever patterns govern the world. Because the author, like an analyst, or another outside observer of the subject, enjoys an "excess of seeing" there can be no such freedom. This is where the subject of psychoanalysis, the analysand, is made into an object and subsequently trapped in the narrative the analyst constructs about him or her, and finally, is given over to the larger story of the making of scientific knowledge.

In *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, we see the second stage of Bakhtin's thinking. In his discovery of a solution to the deterministic bonds of narrative time in Dostoevsky's polyphonic novels, the position of author to hero changes. The subject or character is capable of surprising the author. The theological implications for this point of view, if they are extended and advanced, are that God truly gives individuals freedom of choice. In this case, God, and Dostoevsky (and if we apply it to psychoanalysis, Freud – the problem, though, is that Freud's narrative remains in the first category of Bakhtinian analysis, where he has absolute authorial power) exist in time the same way the characters do. Dostoevsky accomplished this in *Notes from the Underground* by changing his creative process to make it seem that he is simultaneous with his characters (Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, p. 250). Freud might have done this in the case studies, had he been more honest and less interested in building a body of knowledge. Re-reading the letters we see an intense sense of the present as Freud's thought unfolds, but the case studies, intended to advance theories he held prior to their publication (in Dora's case, prior to her treatment) work from a very definite sense of the past, of already having happened. It is important to point out here that Freud recognized the danger of wide extrapolation from a single case, but that recognition did not keep him from trying to find scientific proof for a number of theories in his analysis of Dora. It may be said that Freud knew that he was exploiting Dora by publishing her case, but that he was willing to sacrifice her to the cause of science.

In his third period of thinking about time, Bakhtin sets aside the relation of author to hero and concentrates on the varieties of temporality within the work. In "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes toward a Historical Poetics," Bakhtin opens up the possibilities of time so that



at any moment, at every moment, there are alternatives – there is not one reality, but a reality that is one of many possible realities. It is apparent how this progression of thought breaks the bonds of narrative and determinism, allowing new freedom for the individual. It is also apparent that a method of narration that would open the world of the individual is at odds with Freud's project – were he to write a story that offered individual freedom (in Dora's case, she defied him and wrote her own freedom, breaking off the analysis when she was finished, but not, Freud thought, cured) it might not show what he wanted it to show.

How we conceive of time bears on how we view not only our past and our present, but also our future, and the possibilities open to us in matters of ethics, History and conceptions of personality. Morson advocates a conception of open time, sideshadowing, not denying the possible value of closed temporalities, but saying that they are often adopted “by default, without a deep appreciation of more open alternatives...people frequently commit themselves to forms of argument, social concepts, or moral doctrines without realizing the consequences entailed and without making a choice among a range of possibilities” (p.5). Morson's greatest literary example is Anna Karenina. Morson suggests that the real tragedy of her character is that Tolstoy could see no other end for her than to dash her under a train and that we know that she will face a disaster from the moment she makes the fatal decision to leave her husband. Morson argues that we might have a different outcome for her as we do for the character of Lenin, Tolstoy's male character who gets to marry the woman he loves and live the happily ever after we might like for our heroine, if we understood her actions in a different way and had the opportunity to imagine different possible futures for her. The implications of Morson's argument for us as individual, accountable entities are great. Not only are there many choices for our lives in terms of our commitments to arguments, concepts and doctrines, but sideshadowing results in a higher level of accountability on our part.

Morson argues that even the third stage of Bakhtin's thought does not go far enough in granting the individual freedom, because it continues to rely on foreshadowing – a shadow cast, he says, by knowledge of a character's future. Morson goes beyond Bakhtin's work to explore sideshadowing. The concept of sideshadowing projects from the side the shadow of an alternative present. According to Morson, sideshadowing “allows us to see what might have been and therefore changes our view of what is” (p.11). Again, at least in what has been written, and in the ways it has been written, there is no room for multiple temporalities in the multi-layered narrative of psychoanalysis. Individual freedom would have gone against Freud's desire for closure, for consistency, for a closed and cogent story.

## Multiple Chronotopes, Multiple Story-telling

What does a story give us and where does it leave us? The question will be answered differently for different stories and within different genres. Of time, Morson says it would be useful to assume that there are a number of temporalities. So might it be useful to assume that there are multiple narratives, as there are multiple models of narrative, even in knowledge that is generated by an authorial aspiration to scientism. According to Joseph Rouse (1989), layers of narrative, which are inherent in the very structure of the scientific report, created by citations and reports of other scientific work, are what give scientific research its authority and its momentum. In post-structuralist terms, this creates a kind of intertextuality. In specifically Bakhtinian terms, the effect is the creation of *heteroglossia*. The intertextuality, the heteroglossic effects of Freud's narrative, is created by three layers of narrative: the story Freud needed or wanted to tell to prove his theories, the story of Dora, or Ida Bauer, and the larger, master narrative Freud was constructing, the story of how psychoanalysis is Science. Story-telling is divided in this conceptualization by point of view and by authorship and author/ity. We have very little of Dora's point of view in the case study and even then it is necessarily mediated by Freud's telling. We have Freud's point of view concerning Dora's story, concerning what it proves, and concerning how her story contributes to the larger science of psychoanalysis. Freud takes author-ship and author/ity, increasing his authority by his appropriation of Dora's story into his heteroglossic text. Essentially, Freud says that he is simply repeating Dora's story, so he's just telling us what she told him – simultaneously taking authority and absolving himself of the responsibility of the narrative because he is only the messenger.

Bakhtin suggests that we need multiple chronotopes – or models of time – for multiple genres of storytelling and, I want to add, for genres of multiple- storytelling. That is, several stories are being told here, as I've written above although they are necessarily mediated by Freud. Genres of multiple story-telling is a term that can be applied to psychoanalysis, in part because of the layering (including different points of view – the tension that drives the healing power of psychoanalysis – and different kinds of authorship – the patient is, in a sense, giving his or her story over to the psychoanalyst so that it can be re-written and understood in a new light to effect a desirable change [to, as Breuer said, change hysterical illness into ordinary unhappiness] which is the original point of the talking cure) of one story onto another. Genres of multiple-storytelling describes two of the genres I'm considering. There are three "genres" that interest me here: first, the story told to the analyst by the analysand; second, that of the psychoanalytic case study, or in other words, the story told by the analyst about the analysand; and third, other accounts (narratives, in most cases, histories) of psychoanalysis, which

take their place in the grand narrative of science.

Multiple chronotopes, again, models of time or conceptions of how time works, offer greater possibility for a character (or a human being). Time might be conceived as linear, which is likely, in a novelistic sense, to introduce an element of causality into events and actions, one action beginning an inexorable spiral to the next. Or time might be conceived as what Morson calls, "more open," where one action could have any variety of equal reactions. The multiple genres, or genres of multiple-storytelling, that I'm arguing are inherent in both the process of psychoanalysis and the reporting of psychoanalysis, if understood within this framework of multiplicity (heteroglossia, intertextuality, if you will) that allows for narrative sideshadowing, would open to a character like Anna Karenina, or a person like Ida Bauer (Dora), a whole range of unimagined possibility. Freud saw only one possible resolution for Dora: in his monolithic view of life and the world, Freud thought happiness for Dora would result from a marriage to Herr K., which Dora would have found completely untenable – a fate tantamount to being crushed by a train, but slower in its results. For Tolstoy and for Freud, re-conceiving time as Bakhtin and Morson do, could be the salvation of their heroines. This next passage elucidates the possible result of multiple chronotopes. Multiple chronotopes, as we would have with our multiple genres, would answer our questions about time in various ways: in narrative literature, as in psychoanalytic case studies,

everything points (or will turn out to point) to the ending and to the pattern that will eventually be revealed. When we finish reading such a work, we can see that each detail can be explained not only causally, by what happened before, but also retrospectively in terms of the completed structure. In rereading it, we may take pleasure in contemplating this double explanation of events. For that matter, even before a work is completed for the first time, experienced readers of fiction know that there will be no true irrelevancies and that all loose ends will be tied up in an effective conclusion. Thus some aspects of rereading are possible even during a first reading. In life, most people would regard it as futile to guess one's future by figuring what would make an effective story and would smile at someone who imagined himself invulnerable on a given occasion because otherwise his life would make no sense, but in reading literature this way of thinking is often justified and typically used. For this reason, we sense the artifice of time in narrative literature. In our own lives, most of us know by experience that there is never a point when all loose threads are tied together, at least not until the end of history or the Last Judgment. Real time is an ongoing process without anything resembling literary closure. (Morson, p.8)

There is dynamic, creative tension in Freud's appropriation and interpretation of patient narratives:

on one hand, because analysts are telling their experience, their real lives that happen in real time, there are always loose ends, often without the possibility of closure until some other real event happens, also in real time. On the other hand, there is power in treating real life as if it is a story. It is here that we come to the intersection of White's two questions, but with the emphasis necessarily placed on the insight narrative can give into the nature of real events.

### **Narrative Account, Scientific (objective) Body of Knowledge**

Understanding the configuration of the chronotope of any piece of work can help us understand how the author stands in relationship to it; for instance, we know that despite the compassion and affection with which Tolstoy tells the story of Anna Karenina, he knows and will report her fate. The same is true of Freud and his heroine, Dora. Of course, because she is not only a fictive character, the author cannot so decisively determine her outcome. Freud wanted to assume a kind of narrative and scientific objectivity. It is important that we understand his stance and the impossibility of it. I iterate the discussion of the concepts of time here to help underscore the narrative constraints within which Freud worked, but which he also exploited to try to prove his own scientific objectivity. The linear, causal chronotope within which Freud saw and reported Dora, which helped to establish those narrative constraints, have more to do with authorial control and determinism than they do with objectivity. That is to say, Freud used the narrative to try to show his scientific detachment and objectivity – I'm just telling you what the girl said – when what he actually put across was the idea that there was an inevitable (linear) end. Freud's linear concept of Dora made him see her as a girl who was in love with her father, her father's mistress and her father's mistress' husband. It made him see her as jealous and somewhat spiteful and it made him propose an unworkable solution to her problems. Once Freud had Dora fitting into the picture his system created of her, he could propose that she would no longer have hysterical symptoms if only the Zellenkas would divorce and she could marry the man her father had cuckolded. There are three kinds of time working in the actual case study, which we will look at in greater depth in chapter five. First, there is the order in which things happened to Dora; second is the order in which Freud learned of what happened for Dora; and third, there is the order in which he reported them. In the reporting, we see him exercising authorial control. At the point of therapy, everything becomes narrativized, so that nothing is happening in real time.

As we saw earlier, narrative time is not the same as real time, no matter how a story is told. In a narrative, fictive time takes over, no matter how true to life the storyteller's narrative sequencing holds. Stories do not, can not, hold to Aristotelian unities of action, time and place. In other words,

time must be collapsed by the narrative: it would be impossible for a story to actually occupy the same chronotope in which it happened. Our lives, no matter how comic or tragic or mundane, do not fit the model set out in the Poetics. When we begin to narrate them, they enter time as Ricoeur describes it. For Ricoeur, there is a contrast between the time of history and the time of fiction that can be understood and carried through on the basis of a broad phenomenology of time-consciousness. Fictive time is most useful to the analysis of the narrative of case studies, including the analyst's report of the analysand's account of (her) experience and the interpretation the analyst makes of the account. Ricoeur describes the difference between the teller, the telling, and what is told, thus:

Anticipating this great three-way debate between lived experience, historical time, and fictional time, I shall base my remarks on a noteworthy property of narrative "utterance": its ability to present, within discourse itself, specific marks that distinguish it from the "statement" of the things narrated. The result of this, for time, is a parallel capacity of being divided into the time of the act of narrating and the time of the things narrated. The discordances between these two temporal modalities do not stem from the alternative of either achronic logic or chronological development ... These discordances in fact present nonchronometric aspects which invite us to decipher in them an original - even a reflective - dimension of the distension of Augustinian time, one the division into utterance and statement is best suited to throw into relief in fictional narrative. (vol.2, p.5)

Time is expanded, distended by the story, opened up until it transcends itself and projects a world outside of itself, that Ricoeur calls, "the world of the work." In our three genres, we have several worlds of the work: first the world created by the report made by the analysand; second, the world surrounding the first, that of the analysis and interpretation made about the analysand, based on the narrative reported to the analyst; third, the world of analysis (narrative, reported, mediated yet again) or scientific knowledge-making, into which the first two are brought by Freud's aims, interests, and intentions. The writing of the three narratives into a scientific body of knowledge, the narrativizing upon narrativizing of lived experience is a part of what creates a stasis (despite its inherent dynamic tension) that becomes a kind of trap for the analysand. Walter J. Ong's description of what happens when stories move from oral to written telling applies to Freud's writing of client experience: "Writing separates the knower from the known and thus sets up conditions for 'objectivity', in the sense of personal disengagement or distancing" (p.46). Objectivity, personal disengagement, distancing, is precisely what Freud sought and claimed as the basis for the scientism of his work.

The scientism of Freud's work is what he based his authority on – Freud always wanted the title of scientist, always believed in science (Gay, pp. 533-5). And scientism is what necessitated Freud's need for authority. The legitimacy of Freud's work depended on narrative. Inextricably linked with the constructive and re-constructive narrative project of science are those conceptions already noted in this paragraph, legitimacy and authority, or, in other words a need for establishing credibility on the part of the narrator (in this case Freud). As I said earlier, more deeply embedded in narratives of all kinds are various controlling conceptions of time (fictive and real, as I've described above), sequence, or the order of events and how they imply causality, and what it is we talk about when we talk about history.

The intensely personal nature of the work, the small samples from which he drew such sweeping conclusions, and finally, Freud's passion for the work of progressing psychoanalytic knowledge, made his "proof" of its scientific value all the more necessary and all the more impossible. This discussion moves us from the problem of time, time which catches and traps the analyst and the analysand, to the problem of history and ultimately, to the problem of science.

### 3 THE PROBLEM OF SCIENCE: LEGITIMACY AS THE MEASURE OF SCIENTIFIC REASON

I am actually not at all a man of science, not an observer, not an experimenter, not a thinker. I am by temperament nothing but a conquistador – an adventurer, if you want it translated – with all the curiosity, daring, and tenacity characteristic of a man of this sort. Such people are customarily esteemed only if they have been successful, have really discovered something; otherwise they are dropped by the wayside.

*Freud, Letter to Fleiss dated February 1, 1900*

Towards 1890 Professor Charcot was at the apogee of his reputation and his power. He held the Faculty [of Medicine] bent to his grindstone. His doctrines, whose fundamentals had not yet been overturned, gave an impression of solidity and even majesty . . . No one anywhere in the civilized world could publish a book on diseases of the nervous system without seeking his approval, his *imprimatur*, in advance. The structure of the liver and the kidney obeyed him as well as that of the spinal cord. Physicians sent him patients with ataxia and cases of *paralysis agitans* from North America, the Caucasus, and even China.

*Leon Daudet, -son of Alphonse Daudet, Charcot's student and patient*

#### Rouse and Lyotard: Pulling Freud into the Postmodern

Joseph Rouse argues in, "The Narrative Reconstruction of Science," that narrative has a crucial function in the field of scientific inquiry. While his essay is a part of a much larger body of work by discourse analysts who were social constructionists, Rouse's observations about how scientific reports build on and remodel scientific knowledge are as valid as ever. Fundamental precepts of Rouse's argument are echoed by a number of other scholars (Kenneth Bruffee, Rom Harre, Jean Francois Lyotard) who advocate an approach to knowledge and knowledge-making that serve this inquiry well.

Rouse argues that while narrative opposes science on some important issues, it has been to literature and history as theories and laws have been to science. Both programs, Rouse says, try to legitimate

a form of knowledge as an “appropriate deployment of a general human capacity” (p. 180). Rouse’s consistency with Foucault’s call for a move to archive from history is apparent in these three claims: 1) “the intelligibility of action, and of the things we encounter or use in acting, depends upon their already belonging to a field of possible narratives;” 2) “we live within various ongoing stories, as a condition for our being able to tell them, or for doing anything else that can count as an action;” 3) “the intelligibility, significance, and justification of scientific knowledge stem from their already belonging to continually reconstructed narrative contexts supplied by the ongoing social practices of scientific research” (p.181). From these premises, Rouse rejects the unification of scientific knowledge, precisely the move we need for understanding Freud’s work without rejecting it wholesale.

Rouse deconstructs scientific narrative by pointing out how one scientific report is built on another, dependent on results of research done before, reporting on and expanding the findings of previous research, contextualizing the current research within the field. As Rouse says, “the intelligibility, significance, and justification of scientific knowledge stem from their already belonging to continually reconstructed narrative contexts supplied by the ongoing social practices of scientific research” (p. 181). While Freud was not dependent on the larger scientific community for funding or for the continuation of his research, he was, like any scholar, necessarily bound by the findings of those who had asked questions similar to those he was asking. In other words, science (like other disciplines that require narrative for their existence, such as history, anthropology, and certainly rhetoric) is ever and always involved in a story the narrator is in the midst of, because of the action of the experiment and the scientific report. This refinement of Rouse’s argument alters the controversy over art or science. Narrative, then, blurs the boundaries between art and science.

Rouse’s description of the process of the reconstruction of scientific knowledge through narrative is perfectly consistent with Lyotard’s claims about narrative which provide the starting point from which I will move to Freud’s texts. Lyotard writes, “in traditional narration the combination of multiple stakes – converting, informing, convincing, persuading, and so on – is concealed by the homogeneity of the story’s unfolding. The organic and (I would say) totalizing character of narrative does not lend itself to analysis” (*The Postmodern Explained*, p.47). Lyotard is saying that narrative has the capacity to erase the kinds of issues I am trying to make visible. I am classifying psychoanalysis as dependent on the conventions of what Lyotard calls “traditional narrative,” and I am arguing that, precisely because narrative obscures thorny issues, is a good reason to analyze it. All of the “problems” that I’m outlining here, <sup>1</sup> problems of time, history, and science, depend on narrative for their existence. As we look at

---

<sup>1</sup> I am (and I suppose it might be obvious, but I want to make it overt) using the term problem to indicate “problematic”.



Freud, we will come back to this point of the totalizing effect of narrative, but I would like to look at two more small, supporting arguments from Lyotard that help shore up all of the earlier arguments I have made in chapters one and two of this book. This passage from Lyotard will also move us toward the explication of Freud's texts in this third section. While we may not need to apply Lyotard's comments on capitalism to Freud's work, his observations about consensus correlate with Rouse's view of the making of scientific knowledge and certainly apply when we consider Freud's reception by his colleagues. Lyotard has this to say:

. . . it should be remembered that science and industry are just as open to suspicion with regard to reality as art and writing. To think otherwise would be to subscribe to an excessively humanist idea of the Mephistophelian functionalism of science and technology. One cannot deny the predominance of technoscience as it exists today, that is, the massive subordination of cognitive statements to the finality of the best possible performance – which is a technical criterion. Yet the mechanical and the industrial, particularly when they enter fields traditionally reserved for the artist, are bearers of something more than the effects of power. The objects and thoughts issuing from scientific knowledge and the capitalist economy bring with them one of the rules underwriting their possibility: the rule that there is no reality unless it is confirmed by a consensus between partners on questions of knowledge and commitment. (p.9)

Lyotard, then, would support the examination of scientific narratives, and argues that the rules that allow their existence have the same totalizing effect that narrative has. I want to indicate how interwoven these arguments now are - Rouse argues that narrative consensus allows for the production of science; Lyotard argues that consensus is necessary for the perception of the existence of reality, and that science and industry produce not only objects, but thoughts. We are approaching science and knowledge from a very different perspective than Freud did, it is clear. While it might seem that that would go without saying, I think it should be made overt. This difference, this postmodern difference, is at the heart of the outcry against Freud, and can be understood through narrative analysis. We must understand that what all of this aspiration to scientism was about for Freud was a desire for consensus and secondary to that desire, an urgent need to establish his own authority.

Freud's work was written within the context of, was indeed a product of, modernity – it is critical – as Lyotard (and Augustine and Kant) describes modernity – it elaborates finitude. The philosophical move from history to archive pulls our analysis of psychoanalysis into the postmodern. Postmodernity, as Lyotard sees it, is empiricocritical, making science a means of revealing reason.

Lyotard is not advocating a justification of science, but is suggesting that we question the making of knowledge from this vantage point. Legitimation (or authority) is what Freud's project was about, even up to the end of his life in his last piece of writing, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*. Legitimation is what we learn to look for from Lyotard:

The status . . . assigned to reason is borrowed directly from technicist ideology (the dialectic of needs and means, an indifference to origins, the postulate of an infinite capacity for "novelty," and legitimation by superior power). Scientific reason is not examined according to the (cognitive) criterion of truth or falsity, on the message/referent axis, but according to the performativity of its utterances, on the (pragmatic) axis of addressor/addressee. What I say has more truth than what you say, since I can "do more" (gain more time, go further) with what I say than you can with what you say. (p.63)

Elsewhere, Lyotard eschews what he calls "an excessively humanist idea of the Mephistophelian functionalism of science" (p.9). Lyotard is not, then, arguing that science is evil and we sell our souls to technology in exchange for its existence, but he is asking for an attempt at understanding how it functions. Lyotard claims that authority, or legitimation, is the measure of scientific reason, based on performativity. Performativity he defines as the ability of the speaker to do something with the narrative they have made. Through this ability to do something with their findings is the scientist's legitimation. How did Freud gain the authority he so desperately wanted? This is the question that concerns me. I will argue that he legitimated his project through narrative.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the centripetal force created by the dynamic tension between Freud's attraction to dubious scientific theories and his unshakable belief in the scientific validity of his own work. To solve the problem of using dubious scientific theories, Freud would have to create a narrative that connected those theories to the concept of science in his own place and time, as Rouse's and Lyotard's ideas suggest. To understand the significance of this act, we must understand some of the key scientific issues of his time. To that end, I will offer a brief history of pre-psychoanalysis. This explanation depends on several factors and raises the central philosophical issue of where this re-reading of intellectual history through narrative or discourse leaves us in terms of human potential. I will later argue that human potential (individual, collective intellectual, historical, and scientific) is infinitely widened by re-aligning our reading, but here I'm mainly suggesting that our approach to intellectual history matters.

The passage from Freud's letter to Fleiss, which is quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is a clear example of Freud's relationship to his work, his feelings about himself as a scientist, and not only the

vehemence with which he pursued his end, but his reasons for it. This seems to get at the heart of my claims here. Freud felt such a keen desire to be esteemed, to make his mark on the world and on the scientific world, that he would go to great lengths to “really discover something.” His comments here cannot, though, I think be read straight. Freud writes,

I am actually not at all a man of science, not an observer, not an experimenter, not a thinker. I am by temperament nothing but a conquistador – an adventurer, if you want it translated– with all the curiosity, daring, and tenacity characteristic of a man of this sort. Such people are customarily esteemed only if they have been successful, have really discovered something; otherwise they are dropped by the wayside.(p.397)

He protests his modesty in scientific things a bit overmuch. It is by temperament, he says, that he is a curious, daring, tenacious adventurer rather than a thinker, an observer, an experimenter. His tenacity, courage, and curiosity were what he was counting on to keep him from being dropped by the wayside. There is a kind of pride in what he is saying here. Freud sees himself as a discoverer of truth and knowledge, an adventurer into the unknown, but he reveals an intense desire to live beyond his life’s time in his work. The very desire to live on, to retain a kind of currency beyond the time he was living and working shows that he wanted more than he thought he might get – his desire, too, to make a real contribution to knowledge through his hard work is apparent. From this it is easy to see the source of Freud’s desire for scientism.

The several factors upon which my explanation of Freud’s scientism depends are: 1) the scope of the psychoanalytic project; 2) the dubious origins of the study of hysteria, including a history that traces the development of psychoanalysis from Mesmer’s earliest work through Charcot and on to Freud; 3) the intellectual Zeitgeist from which Freud came to study hysteria and into which he entered with his own findings; 4) whether we understand Freud’s work as art or science, and 5) that we recognize the role narrative plays in both giving Freud the authority he needed and in paralyzing his patients (at least in Dora’s case) to the point that their healing was impossible. In these five factors that I’ve set out, we can use Rouse’s rejection of the unification of scientific knowledge, which is consistent with Lyotard’s reconfiguration of history to archive, to provide the opposite pole for tension against Freud’s need for scientism.

When I first began this project, I used and understood the word problem to indicate problematic. I saw the configuration of problem as an heuristic device for historicizing, contextualizing and understanding Freud’s work as a part of the development of psychoanalytic knowledge in general and Freud’s failure with Dora more specifically. I have since come to understand my original problematics as prob-

lems with solutions. The problem of science or scientificity is actually, as I show in this chapter, the problem of legitimacy. The solution to the problem of legitimacy for Freud was to be had through narrative. Narrative gained for him the authority he needed – through the layering I’ve described earlier, and through the necessary appropriation of others’ narratives.

## Freud’s Newtonian Project

The end toward which we’re working is an understanding of the making of a whole piece of intellectual history that has had a profound effect on the way we think about our selves, our pasts, our possibilities, and our actualities. This sense of our selves and our human relationships and situations and potential has been influenced by Freud’s work and that of his predecessors for nearly a century now – it is far-reaching and long-lasting. Given the range and durability of Freudian influence, it is arguable that, despite the backlash against it, it will re-emerge.<sup>2</sup> Peter Gay has written that Freud’s project was Newtonian, an assessment that is consistent with many of Freud’s own statements. While aware of the creative aspect of his work, having been trained in general medicine and having moved in the world of Vienna’s General Hospital, Freud always, always, wanted to establish and promote psychoanalysis as a science. He refers repeatedly to his aim to discover with Dora “the intimate structure of a neurotic disorder and the determination of its symptoms” (*Dora*, p.7). In *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, Freud claims that the stress on the unconscious in psychoanalysis enabled it “to take its place as a natural science like any other” (p.108). In the brief preface to the *Outline*, Freud exonerates his readers not to judge it unless they are qualified: “The teachings of psycho-analysis are based on an incalculable number of observations and experiences, and only someone who has repeated those observations on himself and on others is in a position to arrive at a judgment of his own upon it” (p.1). These are only two small, but illustrative references. We will later look at more extended and more explicit passages where Freud makes a scientific case for his work.

As Peter Gay has observed, “His attempt to establish psychology as a natural science on the solid basis of neurology fits the aspirations of the positivists with whom Freud had studied, and whose hopes and fantasies he now worked to realize. He never abandoned his ambition to found a scientific psychology” (*Freud: A Life for Our Time*, p.79). In *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, written in the last year of his life, Freud wrote that the stress on the unconscious in psychoanalysis enabled it “to take its place as a natural science like any other” (p.108), a sentiment we can certainly see echoed in the

---

<sup>2</sup>Consider the resurgence we’ve had lately in Darwinism evidenced by the rise of evolutionary psychology – see Jerome Barkow, Joan Lockard, Robert Wright. Consider also the waxing and waning of the popularity of Freudian psychology over the past century.

movement toward hydraulisis (theories of drives).

Theories of drives and the notion of psychoanalysis as a natural science demonstrate the Newtonian nature of Freud's project. Gay outlines several other points of correspondence between the two thinkers (pp. 79-80): 1) "subjecting the laws of mind to the laws of motion;" 2) "seeking propositions open to empirical verification;" 3) the belief that while the nature of any subject might remain a mystery, that "should not prevent the scientist from recognizing its force and measuring its action." I would add that the very scope of Freud's ambitions for psychoanalytic theory is akin to the scope of the scientific laws, such as gravity, that Newton discovered. Also note Freud's attitude toward his work, that he was discovering scientific truth that already existed. Freud's job as a narrator was to narrate the science of psychoanalysis into existence.

### **Dubious Origins of Psychoanalysis Necessitate Scientific Justification**

Taking Chertok and deSaussure's argument<sup>3</sup> as a point of departure for my claims will help us see why Freud pursued the justification of psychoanalysis as a science with the intensity he did. Chertok and deSaussure's book traces what they call the "therapeutic revolution" from Franz Mesmer to (taking a necessary detour through the conduit of Jean Martin Charcot) Freud. I summarize these points of view here only to provide background of the intellectual Zeitgeist into which Freud's work was born.

In brief, Mesmer believed that there was a universal fluid that ran through the body which, when magnetized, cured various kinds of ailments. According to Mesmer, illness was caused by an uneven distribution of universal fluid. Mesmer<sup>4</sup> magnetized patients both through direct physical contact and through some sort of medium, such as glass tubes or bottles or metal shards partially submerged in water, so that the magnetism could be affected without his actually touching the receptor, except upon initially establishing "rapport." Mesmer established 'rapport' by various means, – for example by pressing his knees against those of the patient or rubbing the latter's thumbs against his own, while in magnetic passes his fingers lightly stroked part or the whole of the subject's body with a view to induce a 'crisis' (Chertok, p.5).

The crisis, or convulsive attack, it was thought, brought about a harmonious redistribution of the universal fluid, which then cured the patient. The method was called "animal magnetism" and was a forerunner of hypnosis. It became so widely practiced and so popular that it was a late eighteenth

<sup>3</sup>The book is rarely cited – I agree with Janet Malcolm that it is wrongfully neglected – see *In Dora's Case*, p.315.

<sup>4</sup>Mesmer is still reputed to be sexually irreproachable, according to Chertok and deSaussure. Objections to Mesmer's work are based on dubious scientific practice, not, as so many in the field of psychoanalysis who have been defamed, because of dubious sexual practice.

century parlor game. The foundation of Mesmer's ideas was the interest in scientific circles at that time in electricity and magnetism as they are understood in physics. Mesmer believed that he was propounding a physiological theory that explained their manifestation.

Magnetism, which later became somnambulism, and finally, hypnosis, has in common with psychoanalysis, as Chertok and deSaussure show, the primacy of the object relationship. By the time Freud inherited Mesmer's legacy through Charcot (Chertok, Erikson, Gay, Marcus, Masson), it had evolved into a far more scientific theory and practice, but not all of the stigma that had originally caused two royal commissions to be appointed for its study had fallen away. Indeed, one reason for the ill reception at the turn of the century for any work on hypnotism, hysteria, or anything else that might be said to have its origins in psychogenesis, is because of its association with Charcot.<sup>5</sup>

### Mesmerized, Hypnotized, Psychoanalyzed: From Charcot to Freud

Richard Webster has called the relationship of Freud and Charcot crucial to understanding, not only the development of twentieth-century intellectual culture, but one of the "most important episodes in the entire history of modern medicine" (p.55). Webster makes this assertion, which is undoubtedly in keeping with the claims Chertok and deSaussure made some twenty years prior, because, as he says, modern neurology and modern psychiatry have developed in the way that they have largely because of Charcot's work on hysteria at the end of the nineteenth century, and the way in which it was received and developed by Freud. Charcot was the pre-eminent neurologist in the world at the end of the 1880's, having established himself as a researcher and lecturer who had great vision as well as insight into the less visible workings of the neurological and physiological connection in humankind.

It is widely recognized that Charcot's major discoveries were all completed by the end of the 1870s, before Freud went to Paris to work with him. The connection between Mesmer's "discovery" of the link between emotion and physical symptoms and Charcot's later work in hysteria is plain, regardless of the changes the theory went through in being passed on. It is easy to see, too, what would attract Freud to such ideas, given as he was, even up to the end of his life, to wanting to prove the mind/body connection.<sup>6</sup> We have two important things at work here which bring about the centripetal force<sup>7</sup> that

<sup>5</sup>Charcot's later work, which included such travesties of treatment as the hanging of Alphonse Daudet in an effort to "lengthen his nerves" in order to alleviate the symptoms of syphilis, was characterized by tragic hubris.

<sup>6</sup>I am well aware that there are scores of people who would argue with me about Freud's promoting a mind/body connection (Hale, Szasz, Sheldon), but again, I say that Freud's harshest critics are often arguing against secondary and tertiary interpretations that get set up as straw men, rather than with Freud himself. Freud's letters, diary, and numerous published texts, including the Dora case study, show his interest in mind/body integration. I'll not take on those who claim that he favored a disintegrative model here.

<sup>7</sup>See Derrida's discussion of the center in "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences"

drove Freud's work and its justification: Freud's attraction to theories that had dubious connections, and his absolute belief in his ability to prove the scientific validity of his work.

In 1885, when Freud was twenty-nine years old and just finishing his medical studies, he went to Paris to study with Jean Martin Charcot, France's most illustrious neurologist, defender of hypnosis, and researcher into hysteria. Up to ten years before the end of his life, Sigmund Freud regarded Jean Martin Charcot as a man of genius, a great researcher, and his most valuable teacher. We have no indication that Freud changed his mind. In his "Postscript to a Discussion on Lay Analysis," written in 1927 as a piece of *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*, Freud continues to refer to Charcot's sound teaching. "I learnt . . . to follow the unforgotten advice of my master, Charcot – to look at the same things again and again until they themselves begin to speak" (p.56).

Charcot discovered the lobular structure of the lung, liver and kidney, helped piece together almost the entire pathology of multiple sclerosis, introduced routine temperature-taking into everyday hospital practice, and contributed significantly to the charting of the human brain, identifying the centers which control different parts of the body and particular physiological functions. Ernest Jones, in his biography of Freud, writes of Charcot, "to have been a pupil of his was a permanent passport to distinction" (V.I, p.227). However, I would suggest that an association with Charcot opens researchers and their work to particular questions of charlatanism. It has been suggested that the quantity and quality of Charcot's early discoveries have prevented the widespread knowledge that his later research in nervous disorders was largely speculative, and sometimes faked. At the time that Charcot was studying hysteria, Webster asserts, he "maintained his medical pre-eminence in Paris by fear and charisma rather than by making new discoveries" (p.55).

A description of Charcot's lectures about and experiments in the study of hysteria, which involved hysterical subjects from *La Salpêtrière*, is not far removed from the methods used by Franz Mesmer in his experiments a century before with animal magnetism. Charles Bernheimer describes them like this:

The demonstrations at the famous *lecons du mardi* were immensely successful spectacles, at least for the professional men who, like Freud, crowded into Charcot's clinic to gaze, with some of the master's own scopophilia, at the coached performances of his specimen hysterics. The sexual politics of the situation are dramatically revealed in a well-known lithograph, of which a copy hung in Freud's consulting room, that shows an attractive young female patient leaning back into the arms of Charcot's disciple Babinski, the top of her dress down around her waist, her bodice exposed and shoulders bare, while Charcot, standing stolidly next to her, lectures to his attentive male audience. (p.7)

The setting is clinical, though maybe more like a Tuesday afternoon salon than a medical school lecture. The issues are the same as those that caused concern for the royal inquisitions into Mesmer's magnetism: potential sexual abuse, a possible (perhaps likely, perhaps inherent) victimization of the patient under the guise of the search for a cure, sexual inequality in the fact that the hysterics were usually women, and finally, the pure spectacle of the treatment.

Webster speculates about Charcot's influence by Mesmer, but his cautious assertions are nowhere near as clear as those by Chertok and deSaussure. I am inclined toward the stronger claims of Chertok and deSaussure, in part because of the similarities with magnetic (hypnotic) method, but also because of the correspondence between Bernheimer's description and the findings of the much earlier French Royal Commission. Crucial to my argument here, though, is the desperate situation for Freud in proving the scientific validity of his work, largely because of his associations and the history out of which the study of hysteria came. Webster describes the situation thus:

. . . by the middle of the 1880s, just before the time Freud arrived in Paris, Charcot found himself wrestling not with one but with a number of unsolved unscientific problems which were all related to the central enigma of 'hysteria', and which were all extremely difficult to explain in neurological terms. One of the most difficult and long-standing of these problems concerned Charcot's experiments with hypnosis which he had begun in around 1877. At that time the phenomenon of hypnosis was in medical disrepute after the wildly speculative theorising of Franz Anton Mesmer and his ideas of 'animal magnetism' at the end of the eighteenth century. The exact reasons why Charcot started his experiments are not clear. One possibility is that he was influenced by the physiologist Charles Richet, who was one of the few contemporary scientists who had taken the subject seriously, and who had insisted that the phenomenon of hypnotism was a genuine one in which there could be no question of simulation. Another possibility is that Charcot was responding directly to the work of the neo-mesmerist Victor Burq who believed that hysterical patients could be directly influenced by magnets and metal bars and whose work had been authenticated by Charcot himself. A third possibility is that Charcot's interest in hypnotism was a natural outgrowth of his interest in *la grande hysterie*. For a number of his hysteriques frequently lapsed into spontaneous somnambulism, a state which appeared to be preceded by a definite external stimulus. . . . It may well be that, noting the apparent susceptibility of his 'hysterics' to external stimuli, Charcot began to experiment with various means of hypnosis to bring about altered states of consciousness deliberately. (p.61)



Many commentators besides Webster, Chertok and deSaussure have thought and written about the tie between Charcot's work and Mesmer's, some drawing a much closer connection, and disputing all of Freud on the sole basis of the inheritance he gained from those two earlier inquirers into the mysteries of the human mind. Webster's subtly argued point is that those who would take the view that all of Charcot's experiments in hypnosis were nothing but exercises in suggestion, are ignoring Charcot's clinical descriptions and the accounts of numerous impartial observers. I wish to show that Charcot's debt (and subsequently Freud's) to Mesmer is greater than Webster is willing to claim. I also want to say that while this viewpoint throws Freud's need for scientism into greater relief, if we understand history and the making of knowledge, as archival, rather than historical, we can consider validity without looking so hard for universal truth.

### **Hypnosis and Hysteria: Medicine or Witchcraft?**

While it may do to argue that medical knowledge, especially in neurology and neuropathology, has been accrued through hit and miss, postulation and proof, often one step forward and four back<sup>8</sup>, a careful look into Renaissance medical texts will show that, in 1778, when Mesmer went to Paris and was promulgating his theory of magnetism, established medical thought was not so far removed from magic. This may help to account for the vehemence with which his contemporaries within the medical establishment reacted against Mesmer, in addition to the kinds of objections his subject matter naturally raised.

The description of Mesmer's method above becomes more apparently similar to Charcot's method when we look further into what happened with those who watched and would take magnetism beyond where Mesmer might have left it: I am interested here in the dissemination and proliferation of theory and practice, as much as I am in showing the close relationship of the original practices. I am ultimately interested in demonstrating the importance of understanding the proliferation (and perpetuation) of theory and how it gains its authority, in the case of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Here, though, I want to confine my comments to the parallels between the parlor games of Mesmer and the clinical demonstrations of Charcot, both a part of Parisian medical society, a little more than a hundred years apart.

For Mesmer, there was an exchange between him and his patient of "magnetic fluid." The dynamic of an exchange between doctor and patient was in radical contrast to the medical practice at the

---

<sup>8</sup>See, for example, the works of Henri Ellenberger, W.G. Lennox in the *Annals of Medical History*, or Henri Gastaut in *The Epilepsies: Electro Clinical Correlations*.

time, which treated patients as inanimate, and perhaps, as Chertok has suggested, the interpersonal dynamic foreshadows the interpersonal relationship between psychoanalyst and psychoanalytic patient. For Charcot, the patient is less involved, ostensibly far more subject than object.

Mesmer had graduated from the University of Vienna as a Doctor of Medicine, but had been forced to leave Austria because of the eccentricity of his doctrines and practices. The contempt with which the therapeutic relationship was received by the medical profession at that time was largely due to the fact that it had previously been linked with religious concepts, magic, and even witchcraft (Chertok).

After Mesmer's initially having magnetized patients, they would magnetize others. In Mesmer's own words, animal magnetism "must in the first place be transmitted through feeling. Feeling can alone render its theory intelligible" (Mesmer, 1781, p.25). No charge of sexual misconduct was ever leveled against Mesmer, but the same is not true of all magnetists. Chertok and deSaussure write:

The magnetist neophytes induced convulsive attacks, as well as transference-love to which they responded on occasion by forms of acting out, some amateur therapists even going so far as to have sexual relations with their female patients. These facts were known to the police, and were in conflict with the conventions of the aristocratic and bourgeois establishment. Thus it would seem that when Louis XVI decided to appoint the commissions to which we shall presently refer, he did so not at Mesmer's request alone, but in all probability under pressure also from these sectors of society. The question of "erotic complications" received particular attention on the part of one of the commissioners, Bailly, whose "Secret Report" emphasized the dangers of eroticism in the practice of magnetism. . . . these complications, about which Mesmer kept silent but which were being discussed all around him, only served to strengthen the resistance of the scientists and the unconscious motivations of the fiercest opponents of mesmerism. (p.8)

Two commissions were appointed, one consisting of five members of the Academy of Sciences and four members of the Faculty of Medicine; the second consisting of five members of the Royal Society of Medicine. The first of their findings that I want to mention here is important because it confirms Chertok and deSaussure's conclusions about the object relationship in mesmerism; the second is important because it helps to further establish the link between the continuations of magnetism and the progress made on Charcot's findings.

As far as both commissions were concerned, the effects of magnetism were imaginary: "The imagination without the magnetism produces convulsions, and . . . the magnetism without the imagination

produces nothing” (Rapport, 1784a, p. 77). Chertok and deSaussure conclude, and I agree with them, that the commissioners were not aware that they were observing, “the reality of interpersonal psychological interaction – quite specifically, the object relationship, nor that they had in fact drawn up the very first scientific documents on experimental psychology” (p.9). *The Secret Report* by Bailly contains the following statements:

The women are always magnetized by men . . . They [the women] possess charms enough to affect the doctor; they enjoy good enough health to be liable to be affected by the doctor: thus the danger is mutual. The long continued proximity, the inevitable physical contact, the transmission of individual heat, the glances exchanged, as Nature’s well-known ways and the means that she has ever devised to bring about unfailingly the communication of the sensations and the affections. The man who is magnetizing generally has the woman’s knees clasped between his own; the knees and all the lower parts of the body are, consequently, in close contact. The hand is applied to the hypochondriac regions, and sometimes lower down, to that of the ovaries . . . It is not surprising that the senses are inflamed. (1784c p.27)

The impossibility of proving the scientism of psychoanalytic knowledge is what I (and scores of others) see in looking back. Psychoanalysis as a hard science seems inappropriate to me, anyway, dealing as it does with the very human stuff of dreams, memories, anxieties, and somatization. The human stuff seemed to Freud measurable, quantifiable, curable. And how else could it have appeared to him? Without this perception of psychoanalysis as hard science, it is likely that he could not have gone on, pushing the boundaries of knowledge beyond the work of Josef Breuer, Jean Martin Charcot, Valentin Magnan (Masson, ch.2), and far beyond work in fluidism and magnetism that was originally handed down from Franz Mesmer (Chertok and de Saussure).

Freud treated his scientific heritage in *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* and had this to say:

In the year 1909, when I was first privileged to speak publicly on psychoanalysis in an American University, fired by this momentous occasion for my endeavors, I declared that it was not myself who had brought psychoanalysis into existence. I said that it was Josef Breuer, who had merited this honor at a time when I was a student and busy working for my examinations (1880-1882). Since then, well-intentioned friends have frequently repeated that I then expressed my gratitude out of all due proportion. They considered that, as

on previous occasions, I should have dignified Breuer's "cathartic procedure" as merely preliminary to psychoanalysis itself only began with my rejection of the hypnotic technique and my introduction of free association. Now it is really a matter of indifference whether the history of psychoanalysis be considered to have started with the cathartic method or only with my modification of the same. I only enter into this uninteresting question because some opponents of psychoanalysis are wont to recall, now and then, that the art of psychoanalysis did not originate with me at all, but with Breuer. Naturally, this only happens to be the case when their attitude permits them to find in psychoanalysis something that is noteworthy; on the other hand when their repudiation of psychoanalysis is unlimited, then psychoanalysis is always indisputably my creation. (p.1-2)

I cite this passage here to show that Freud recognized his debt to Breuer and to support my assertion that he felt opposed by colleagues and by a scientific community. Freud traces the history of psychoanalysis from his work with Breuer, through various stages and changes, including the point at which he parted ways, theoretically and practically, with Breuer. Regression is the theoretical schism for the two physicians, and the case that caused the fissure was the case we'll examine, that of Dora.

This passage merits consideration too, though, from a narrative perspective. Freud is the narrator and his story is the story of the origins of psychoanalysis and who should get the credit or the blame for it. In some ways it would seem that Freud would be the most likely, most reliable narrator and in other ways it seems that he might be the least reliable narrator because of his position at the end of the passage. Consider Freud's defensive position at the end of the passage - when opponents of psychoanalysis offer unlimited repudiation of it, then it is his creation; when there is something noteworthy in it, it is attributed to Breuer. Whether or not this was actually the case is unimportant. It is important only insofar as it is a story that Freud is constructing about his work. What is the story he tells and what in it is important? The story is not only the story of who is responsible for originating psychoanalysis, but of how it was originated and received, and how Freud, the narrator, feels about its reception. He doesn't care, he says, whether psychoanalysis started with the cathartic method (the talking cure) or his modification of it. He's saying he doesn't care how or when. He cares only who the opponents of psychoanalysis say brought it into being and he seems to care if those in opposition are finding that which is noteworthy or if they are repudiating it. The overlying theme is the development and reception of psychoanalysis. According to Freud in this passage, this story about the attribution of credit for bringing psychoanalysis into existence (notice the shift of metaphor here, so that Freud is no longer an adventurer, but a midwife), he is fighting a hostile world. Freud's story goes, here anyway, that

in 1909, Freud gave Breuer credit for the birth (as opposed to the discovery) of psychoanalysis. Freud claims that people have said his gratitude to Breuer (which he has not reported expressing, but merely implies) was disproportionate. The story here seems not to be about the origins of psychoanalysis as much as who gets the credit for it and how that credit is given depending on the merit ascribed to the theory. Freud seems to be saying that any encomium is directed to Breuer, while Freud gets panegyric only. The matter of time is treated in retrospect as sequential – an organizing effect of narrative – but not in exact chronological order. As it is told, Freud gave Breuer credit in 1909 for having brought psychoanalysis about in 1880-1882. Since 1909, friends urged Freud to consider Breuer's work a part of the pre-history of psychoanalysis and to locate the beginnings in his own (notice the authority he both takes and gives away here – he is again, supposedly only reporting what others have told him, but by giving very specific examples of his theories, he undermines his supposed modesty and makes his claim to origination all the stronger) rejection of the hypnotic technique and his introduction of free association. Notice that Freud terms psychoanalysis an “art” in this passage. There is a very heavy component of cause and effect here – the cause of the origins of the art of psychoanalysis and the cause for how credit is given and the cause for how and why Freud is telling it this way.

Philip Rieff makes an elegant argument in the introduction to the 1963 edition of *Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria* wherein he claims that it doesn't matter whether we consider Freud's work science or art: “It matters little whether Freud's case histories are called science or art. Freud's interpretative science was itself, in practice, an art, aiming at a transformation of the life thus interpreted. All such strategies of moral interpretation – whether called art or science or religion – are characterized by their transformative function.” (Rieff, p.xii) As lovely as it sounds, it is an argument which I think would not have satisfied Freud.

## The Psychoanalytic Project

Over the course of his life and work, Freud saw his project in various ways. Sometimes, by his own recognition, he was a humble teller of stories, a man who constructed short stories as a novelist would. In *Studies on Hysteria*, which he wrote with Josef Breuer, Freud wrote, “it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science (p.299).” Other times, he wrote about his work as the discovery of science, hard science:

Whereas the psychology of consciousness never went beyond the broken sequences which were obviously dependent on something else, the other view, which held that the psychical is unconscious in itself, enabled psychology to take its place as a natural science like any other. The processes with which it is concerned are in themselves just as unknowable as those dealt with by other sciences, by chemistry or physics, for example; but it is possible to establish the laws which they obey and to follow their mutual relations and interdependences unbroken over long stretches – in short, to arrive at what is described as an ‘understanding’ of the field of natural phenomena in question. This cannot be effected without framing fresh hypotheses and creating fresh concepts; but these are not to be despised as evidence of embarrassment on our part but deserve on the contrary to be appreciated as an enrichment of science. They can lay claim to the same value as approximations that belongs [sic] to the corresponding intellectual scaffolding found in other natural sciences, and we look forward to their being modified, corrected and more precisely determined as further experience is accumulated and sifted. So too it will be entirely in accordance with our expectations if the basic concepts of the new science (instinct, nervous energy, etc.) remain for a considerable time no less indeterminate than those of the older sciences (force, mass, attraction, etc.) . . . . Every science is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since our science has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here. (*Outline*, p. 15-16)

The *Outline* offers a very different view of psychoanalysis than the *History* does – so different that it might be said to have been written from a different point of view despite it being Freud. The previous quotation shows Freud calling psychoanalysis an “art” and he describes it as something that has been brought forth into being. In this passage, because (n.b. causality) the psychical is considered unconscious in itself, psychology can take its (Freud almost seems to imply “rightful”) place as a natural science like any other. In this case, Freud is not so overtly placing himself in opposition to those who would or would not receive him, as he is in the previous passage, but he is writing a similar kind of narrative, a narrative that attempts to establish a scientific (rather than artistic) basis for his life’s work and to show where and how it takes its place in the larger narrative of science. It is the grand narrative of not only psychoanalysis, but science, that Freud is taken up with here. The sequence he describes is one that begins with the view that the psychical apparatus is unconscious and therefore the study of it can be treated as a natural science. Once we establish that psychoanalysis can be considered a natural science, like chemistry or physics, from there real meaning, real knowledge can be made. While

psychological processes may be unknowable, they follow certain laws, have reliable interdependences, offer themselves to our study if we can come up with new concepts and new hypotheses with which we can enrich science. But in Freud's sequence, the generation of knowledge is not static – it is “modified, corrected, and more precisely determined” as we accumulate and sift further experience.

A history that can be traced back to such unlikely and unorthodox methods as mesmerism, coupled with his sincere desire to relieve human suffering, left Freud in a delicate position when it came to trying to prove the validity of his theories - - theories often based on hunches and almost always grounded in his firm belief in the mind-body connection. My point here is that narrative, and pursuant to narrative, narrative time, is a part of the tight argument Freud wished to make, an argument so tight that it became a trap from which he (and his patients) could not escape.

The narrative(s) Freud constructed, because of his perceived need to produce an irrefutably scientific body of knowledge, trapped his patients in a closed system, from which they could not escape, within which they could not heal. My argument is that the aim toward scientism, which produced a body of knowledge created within a structural system that bound both the knowledge itself and its potential for healing people, can be located in the narrative system Freud imposed to establish his authority. I use the work of Joseph Rouse and Jean Francois Lyotard to discuss narrative, the nature of knowledge, and the narrative construction of science, and will later focus on Freud's narratives from *Dora* and the *Outline*. The dilemma for Freud at the turn of the century is precisely the dilemma that Susan Budd describes in her recent *fin de siecle* paper. Budd says, “Perhaps neither therapists nor intellectuals take seriously enough Freud's self-reflectiveness and self-doubts, which he expressed when he said that his case material read like a novel rather than a scientific treatise” (p.35). He is caught in the ambiguity of his own creation: he understands that there is some art (creation or artifice) in the knowledge that he so desperately wants to connect to the narrative of science. The dilemma is that of the case study, which is using qualitative data to make claims for a discipline being a part of a field that usually requires quantitative data. The crux of the problem is using one human subject to move knowledge forward for all of humankind. Even Freud had his doubts.

#### 4 THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY AND THE PROBLEM OF HERO

*Nicht kunst und Wissenschaft allein, Geduld will bei den Werke sein!* (Science will not suffice, nor Art, But Patience, too, must play her part!)

*Goethe - Faust, Part I*

. . . the capacity to formulate new rules (axiomatics) appears whenever the “need” is felt. Science would be a means of revealing reason, reason itself remaining the *raison d’être* of science.

*Jean Francois Lyotard - The Postmodern Explained*

The author’s consciousness is the consciousness of a consciousness, that is, a consciousness that encompasses the consciousness and the world of a hero – a consciousness that encompasses and consummates the consciousness of a hero by supplying those moments which are in principle transgredient to the hero’s consciousness and which, if rendered immanent, would falsify this consciousness.

*Mikhail Bakhtin - Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity*

The purpose of this chapter is to build further on the arguments established in the first three chapters and the introduction. Having shown that Freud was aware of the artistic or creative aspect of his work, but felt the necessity of proving its scientific validity, I will turn now to a discussion of how he used and appropriated narrative authority to do so in the Dora case.

#### Narrative Authority, Interpretive Authority

Freud argued that making an interpretation before being presented with a significant amount of data is wrong-headed. In *Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis* (1912), Freud advised: “It is not in the least our business to ‘understand’ a case at once: this is only possible at a later stage, when we have received enough impressions of it. For the present we will suspend our judgement and give our impartial attention to everything that there is to observe . . . The most



successful cases are those in which one proceeds, as it were, without any purpose in view, allows oneself to be taken by surprise by any new turn in them, and always meets them with an open mind, free from presuppositions” (p.114). I am not the first to assert that there were times when Freud suspended the gathering of phenomenological and historical data in order to speculate prematurely or to prove some pet *a priori* theory (Wallace, Decker, Freud). Proving pet *a priori* theories is what hurts the Dora case, and it is also a part of what makes Freud’s reach for validity (authority) so strident. The Dora case needs to be contextualized within the claims I’ve set up in previous chapters. As we read Dora, we need to bear in mind that hers is the classic case of hysteria in Freudian theory. Breuer’s case of Anna O. preceded Dora and the two have long been linked in the literature concerning hysteria.<sup>1</sup> I focus on Dora, however, because she is Freud’s quintessential example of an hysteric. We must also remember the research on hysteria which Dora’s case grows out of – that of Charcot and Mesmer. The main claims I’ve set up in previous chapters are these: 1) Narrative theory provides tools for understanding the making of psychoanalytic knowledge; 2) Narrative concepts of time, authority, personal agency, and determinism are useful when applied to psychoanalytic theory, because of the inherent discursive nature of psychoanalysis and the rising scientism into which it was born; 3) The enormity of Freud’s project (which I’ve previously called, “Newtonian” borrowing the assessment from Peter Gay) and the vehemence of the medical establishment’s reaction against his work compounded his need for an appeal to scientificity, which he made through narrative authority; 4) Re- configuration of inquiry from history to archive provides insights into the making of scientific knowledge that exceed what we have formerly had, because it allows the artistic and scientific to co- exist.

To contextualize the Dora case within these claims, I will use narrative theory to understand Freud’s treatment of Dora and show how it was affected by Freud’s aspirations to scientism and the hostile intellectual environment into which he presented his work, and how he used narrative to gain author/ity.<sup>2</sup>

## Dora’s Case History

Freud expressed misgivings about the limitations of *Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, in his prefatory remarks to the case history (Collier edition, pp.6-7) which I later elucidate. The misgivings, however, do not diminish his authority; rather, they act as an *apologia*, giving him more authority, because he anticipates arguments against his claims and answers them before they are made by those

<sup>1</sup>Freud linked the two cases in History of the Psychoanalytic Movement in his discussion of regression.

<sup>2</sup>Precisely what I am arguing for is an historicization of Freud’s work opposed to what he tried for which was a positivization of his work – for a thorough discussion of the difference, see *Historiography and Causation in Psychoanalysis* by Edwin R. Wallace, IV, p. 29 and following.

who would refute him. The hesitation he described ranges wide, encompassing the sexual nature of the case, the reception he expected from the public and his colleagues, the foray into uncharted territory that any inquiry into neurosis necessarily was at the turn of the century, and the problem of attempting to draw far-reaching conclusions from a single case. Freud's awareness of where the case falls short did not prohibit him from making broad claims about Dora and the treatment of hysteria within his narration of the case, as a close examination will demonstrate. Some of his claims were made when the case was presented and some were made in his correspondence with Fleiss, but they were essentially the same including his diagnosis of Dora and his assessment of the implications of the diagnosis. In letter to Fleiss dated January 30, 1901, Freud wrote:

...bisexuality is mentioned and specifically recognized once and for all, and the ground is prepared for a detailed treatment of it on another occasion. It is a hysteria with tussis nervosa and aponia, which can be traced back to pronounced sucking tendencies, and the chief issue in the conflicting mental processes is the opposition between an inclination towards men and towards women. (Origins, p.327)

This passage will support a later contention I'll make, but for now, suffice it to say that this is an example of a far-reaching claim that Freud made about the case.

Freud did not consider his treatment of the patient who came to signify as "Dora" successful (C. p.7), in part because she ended it abruptly after only three months. Many other writers and theorists have speculated about how exactly Freud failed Dora, and even his champions find it necessary to try to account for the shortcomings in Freud's psychoanalytic treatment of Dora, if not in his narrative treatment of her ( Brennan, Decker, Deutsch, Frank, Reiff). Because Freud so clearly had his own ideas not only about what happened to and for Dora, but had his own agenda for what she could help him prove, in writing her as hero, he rendered transference and countertransference, which he thought were necessary for her recovery, impossible. His narrative treatment of her falls short because of how he appropriated her story, layering it within his larger narrative to prove his case for the scientific validity of a number of his theories he knew were unprovable with Dora.

Freud was aware of the paradoxical nature of his claims, showing his aim to scientificity and the limitations of the case simultaneously. He writes, "everything tends to show that ... we shall be driven by the study of neuroses to assume the existence of many new things which will later on gradually become the subject of more certain knowledge" (C.p.5), prefacing what he calls the incompletenesses of the case. The three kinds of incompleteness Freud acknowledges are 1) incompleteness of analytic results,

2) the omission of the processes of interpretation to which Dora's associations and communications were subjected, and 3) the incompleteness in the presentation of one case as explicative of all of the questions arising out of the problem of hysteria. In discussing the limitations caused by these kinds of incompleteness, Freud writes that a single case cannot give an insight, "into all the forms of internal structure of the neurosis, into all the possible kinds of relations between the mental and the somatic which are to be found in hysteria. It is not fair to expect from a single case more than it can offer" (C.p.7). There is a tension in Freud's disclaimer that supports my argument. He seems to be saying that he wants to discover the structure, to codify, to classify and systematize "all the forms of the internal structure of the neurosis" and "all the possible kinds of relations between the mental and the somatic" in hysteria. Though all this reads like analysis rather than narrative, it is analysis that supports the narrative he creates. This is a justification of his contribution to the larger master narrative.<sup>3</sup> We can see that he so wanted to discover and document "certain knowledge" that my claims about his aspirations to scientificity are well-founded.

In *Dora*, Freud makes a rhetorical move that shows his desire to contribute to scientific knowledge of neurosis and his faith in the potential of Dora's case to do so. His is a delicate position – as I've said, he knows the case is limited, but the stakes are high –and his move here is subtle. Appropriation of Dora's narrative is the primary mechanism by which Freud gains authority in this document, but other, smaller moves contribute to making his case stronger.

No doubt this case history, as I have so far outlined it, does not upon the whole seem worth recording. It is merely a case of "*petite histerie*" with the commonest of all somatic and mental symptoms: dyspnoea, *tussis nervosa*, aponia and possibly migraines, together with depression, hysterical unsociability, and a *taedium vitae* which was probably not entirely genuine. More interesting cases of hysteria have no doubt been published, and they have very often been more carefully described; for nothing will be found in the following pages on the subject of stigmata of cutaneous sensibility, limitation of the visual field, or similar matters. I may venture to remark, however, that all such collections of the strange and wonderful phenomena of hysteria have but slightly advanced our knowledge of a disease which still remains as great a puzzle as ever. What is wanted is precisely an elucidation of the commonest cases and of their most frequent and typical symptoms. (C.p.17)

---

<sup>3</sup>Roy Porter claims that there was such a therapeutic nihilism in the treatment of any psychological disorders in the nineteenth century that Freud's success was partly due to his imposition of a system.

This professional demonstration of Freud's ideas about what his study was about is supported also by his more personal correspondence with Fleiss. About Dora's case Freud wrote, "[the case] has opened smoothly to my collection of picklocks" (*Origins*, p.325). This is from a letter that was written at the time that Dora was actually in Freud's care, working at affecting the talking cure. It was written in mid- November, at the midpoint of her treatment. Implicit in both statements, the public and the private, concerning the case, is the evidence that Freud had very set ideas not only about what the case would reveal, but how to go about getting it to reveal what he wanted. Freud himself wrote that the case histories read like short stories:

I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other neuropathologists, I was trained to employ local diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science. I must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference of my own. The fact is that local diagnosis and electrical reactions lead nowhere in the study of hysteria, whereas a detailed description of mental processes such as we are accustomed to find in the works of imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few psychological formulas, to obtain at least some kind of insight into the course of that affection. (*SE*, 2:160)

A re-reading of Freud's narrative treatment of Dora, through a frame provided by literary criticism, offers insight into the case and facilitates an understanding of how Freud's desire to impose a system (his ideas about the aetiology of hysteria) on the story of Dora impeded his ability to treat her. The function of narrative in the making of scientific consensus (Rouse) and the legitimization of knowledge (Lyotard) applied to the historicized case study help to explain how Freud, rather than Dora, becomes the central character (Marcus) in a multi-layered narrative. Dora relates her story to Freud; Freud relates it back to her; Freud then writes the case study in which he tells his version of her story accompanied by what he says he told her in response, and releases this narrative five years subsequent to the treatment in a professional journal, *Monatsschrift für Neurologie und Psychologie*.

### Fragment of an Analysis

The case of Dora is one of Freud's five famous case histories written before World War I – which also include Little Hans, the Rat Man, Schreber, and the Wolf Man – that became exemplary cases used to train thousands of psychoanalysts all over the world, through the duration of the twentieth century.

Dora's case history can be analyzed as a short story. We can consider character, plot, point-of-view, and the narrators and their reliability. But first,

Here is a brief version of the story of Dora as it has been generally re-constructed by those interested in this inquiry, a body of theorists and scholars that includes psychoanalysts, literary and cultural theorists, and historians (Bernheimer, Decker, Deutsch, Reiff): As an adolescent girl, Dora is taken by her father to Freud for treatment of a loss of voice and a nervous cough. Dora is intelligent, passionate, engaged in her world, and her cough has no basis in physical ailment, according to Freud. She is the daughter of a wealthy textile manufacturer who is syphilitic. Though Freud writes that he does not consider heredity to be the only cause of hysteria ("Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses" *Early Psychoanalytic Writings*, Collier Books edition BS 188V), he says he sees a "strikingly high" percentage of patients psychoanalytically whose fathers were syphilitic. He says that his experience as a neuro-pathologist drove him to the conclusion that "syphilis in the male parent is a very relevant factor in the neuropathic constitution of children" (C.p.14).

Dora's father, Herr Bauer, is tubercular secondary to the syphilis and her mother suffers from gonorrhoea contracted from her father. Dora is not as close with her mother as she is with her father. She is sister to a bright, promising brother, one year her senior, Otto, to whom she is devoted. From the time Dora is six years old, until she is seventeen, which is when her treatment with Freud begins, the entire Bauer family lives in a health resort. The resort in which the Bauers live is Meran in Austrian Tyrol,<sup>4</sup> full of middle-class and wealthy Jewish invalids, who combine recreation with restoration, ostentatious evening constitutional with conscientious daily cure (Decker). She grows up in a closed, wealthy, Semitic community that is centered on the treatment of illness, and she receives various treatments for her own ills, including hydrotherapy and local application of electricity. (C.p.15)

Decker describes Dora's diagnostic history thus:

Dora's imperfect health stretched back to her childhood. In addition to the usual children's diseases, she had had a series of physical problems from the age of six or seven, when she began to wet her bed. The enuresis had stopped shortly before her eighth birthday but had soon been replaced by a shortness of breath and the now-familiar cough and loss of voice. After a while they too went away. But at twelve, she began to suffer from migraines and the cough returned, this time to remain stubbornly throughout her adolescence. A typical attack usually began with a complete loss of voice and meliorated into hoarseness.

. . . In addition to the chronic cough and hoarseness, she frequently suffered from gastric

---

<sup>4</sup>Now northern Italy.

pains,' constipation, and a vaginal discharge she referred to as a 'catarrh.' Her menstrual periods were very irregular, sometimes accompanied by 'violent pains.' At sixteen she was struck by high fever and right-sided abdominal pain, which was diagnosed as an attack of appendicitis. <sup>5</sup> When she recovered she found herself unable to walk normally and dragged her right foot. Climbing stairs was particularly difficult for a number of months, and even during the time she saw Freud her foot occasionally dragged.(p.5)

All of this symptomology is later (co-opted and) explained by Freud as support for his account of the sexual aetiology of Dora's hysteria.

### Dora's Family Circle

Crucial players in Dora's story are Dora, to some extent, her brother, her father, her mother, Frau Zellenka who is her father's nurse/mistress, Herr Zellenka who is her father's friend and husband to Frau Zellenka, and to a lesser degree, the Zellenka's two children. Philip Rieff, in the introduction to the Collier edition of the Dora case, describes the two families as an "unholy circle"(C.p.x). Rieff's assessment seems to come from the emotional/sexual situation between the families and the role Dora understood that she was being asked to play. Before we consider what scholars have pieced together of Dora's history, let's look at the situation at the time of Dora's treatment, as Rieff describes it. Rieff says that it's not just Dora who is sick, but the whole milieu in which she and her family lived was sick (C.p.xii) and suggests that Freud's failure may have been because the problems were endemic and would have required "Milieu" therapy that would have involved a revolution in the larger culture. Rieff claims that Freud saw all the players as victims of their milieu: "the sick daughter has a sick father, who has a sick mistress, who has a sick husband, who proposes himself to the sick daughter as her lover. Rieff seems to be understanding the situation as one where Herr Zellenka is a kind of viable suitor for Dora. Freud (and by his account, Dora), however, explains the dynamic as one of commerce: Dora's father is willing to trade his fourteen-year-old daughter for Zellenka's wife. Bauer seems to be saying, "you can sleep with my daughter if I can sleep with your wife." While I am not likely or willing to adopt the stance Jeffrey Masson affects in *The Assault on Truth*, wherein he brings forward exhaustive evidence of the sexual perversions and abuse Freud witnessed as a student of Charcot's, working in the Paris Morgue, reacting with a puritanical outrage, I am asking that we adopt a level of skepticism toward Freud's conclusions about Dora, and subsequently about the other players in this drama.

---

<sup>5</sup>Freud later re-diagnosed this appendicitis attack as an hysterical pregnancy.

When Dora is six, her father is forced to begin what turns out to be a two-year stay at home and he turns a substantial part of his daily physical care, including light nursing duties, over to her, making her not only his nursemaid, but also his confidante. Consider the implications of this shift in their relationship. Dora is six years old when she becomes her father's nurse. She takes care of his daily needs such as his washing and his bed linens and taking him his meals. And he begins to confide in her. At first these confidences concern his business and financial dealings, but they soon extend to confidences about his relationship with her mother. Dora's father tells her how joyless their marriage is and seeks to enlist her sympathies.<sup>6</sup> This father/daughter relationship might not seem so unusual if Dora had been twenty years older than she was at the time, but remember, when she first becomes his nursemaid, beginning the dynamic in the relationship that will later require her collusion in his extramarital sexual arrangement, she is six years old.

This relationship continues for six or seven years with what is later reported to Freud as the first of Dora's hysterical symptoms presenting as a cough at eight, also a symptom of her father's tuberculosis. This is the same time that Philip Bauer's recuperation comes to an end and he returns to his work and travel looking after his textile mills. Dora begins to display the other signs of nervous disturbance at this time, as Decker describes them, including late-onset bed-wetting, a problem most biographers ignore. Decker notes that Dora begins wetting the bed at precisely the time her brother desists. Dora reports that her incidences of the usual childhood diseases were as a rule contracted from her brother who would have a slight case and then she would follow suit with a much more severe form of it. It is interesting to note that she seems to "catch" bed-wetting from him as well.

Herr Bauer reports to Freud that Dora additionally undergoes at this time a complete transformation of personality. Noting Bauer's agenda for Dora's analysis, his motivation for bringing her to Freud in the first place,<sup>7</sup> and my earlier call for skepticism regarding all the players in this Freudian family drama, we must ask how reliable Bauer is as a narrator of Dora's varied emotional states. Even Freud was skeptical of Bauer's reports concerning Dora. Bauer describes Dora as having inherited his obstinancy and requests that Freud "Please try to bring her to reason" (C.p.20). Freud writes: Her father's words did not always quite tally with this pronouncement; for on other occasions he tried to

---

<sup>6</sup> these dynamics are well- documented. We see them, of course, in the case study, but they are often discussed by other scholars (Decker, Rieff, Marcus) and it always strikes me that these words are written and read over and over again without anyone seeming to want to convey how absolutely outrageous this is, that Dora, at such a tender age, was exposed to these very adult concerns. It supports Rieff's claim that the therapy with Dora might have failed because the problem was a much bigger one than could be solved in three months and in treating Dora only. I would at least say that the problem – hysterical presenting symptoms that seemed to have no physical cause – was not so much Dora's problem as it was a problem with her father and the larger family.

<sup>7</sup> in the next chapter I'll discuss how Bauer's intentions for Dora's analysis impeded her healing, but at this point, I'll just say that Bauer wanted Freud to dissuade Dora from the resistance she was giving him concerning his affair with Frau Zellenka

put the chief blame for Dora's impossible behavior upon her mother - - whose peculiarities made the house unbearable for everyone. But I had resolved from the first to suspend my judgement of the true state of affairs till I had heard the other side as well (C.P.20). Where Dora has hitherto been what he describes as wild, she becomes, at eight, quiet and obedient. Freud and Decker describe Dora at this juncture as changing in her personality from masculine to feminine; Decker explores Dora's relationship with her brother, presenting family photographs alongside other evidence, to conclude that until Dora became subdued (feminine), she and Otto were inseparable and equal. Freud uses Dora's altered eight-year-old personality as evidence to bolster his theory of what would later be called an Electra complex by psychoanalysts who followed him, but what he himself described as the oedipal phase of personality formation. I'm not sure what conclusions to draw from this discussion of Dora's first presenting symptoms, except that they form the foundations of the diagnosis Freud makes ten years later when Dora first comes under Freud's care. Were I in Freud's position, I would make an inquiry into the coincidence of Dora's first bout of *tussis nervosa* and her father's recovery from a rather severe bout of tuberculosis. Freud uses this to make some suggestions concerning Dora's inherent bi-sexuality, but that's as far as he goes. The symptoms are given as a part of Dora's medical history by her father, but they are relegated to the past and not the main concern at the time of the inception of Dora's treatment. Dora does not make her own report on the onset of these symptoms.

When Dora is twelve, her father takes the advice of his friend, Hans Zellenka (Herr K. in Freud's account), to consult Freud. Herr Bauer subsequently follows Freud's advice to let himself be attended by Zellenka's wife, with whom he begins an affair. Through a number of circumstances, Dora comes in increasing contact with Herr Zellenka, while her father is in Zellenka's wife's intimate embrace (Decker, Freud, Bernheimer). No effort is made in either family to hide Herr Bauer's affair with Frau Zellenka: the two share adjoining rooms on a family holiday; the affiliation is a common topic of discussion for Dora and Otto. However, whereas Otto expresses his happiness over his father's finding a companion, Dora is disgusted with her father for his unfaithfulness to her mother and the family.

While Frau Zellenka is cloistered with Herr Bauer, Dora shifts her care of her father to the care of the Zellenka's two children and the two women subsequently form a close friendship. Dora, at this point in her very early teens, becomes Frau Zellenka's confidante. Formerly, at her father's bedside, Dora learned particulars about his business, his worries over his health, his dissatisfaction with her mother. Now, within her friendship with Frau Zellenka, Dora begins reading the popular sex manuals of the day, particularly the works of Mantegazza, who stresses an ideal, romanticized love; in Frau Zellenka Dora has a partner with whom to discuss emotions and the emancipation of women (Decker), and hears at



length about Zellenka's dissatisfaction with her husband. Dora's contact with the Zellenkas is crucial because it forms the basis of Freud's theorizing about her specific symptoms as well as his extrapolation to form a number of his foundational ideas about hysteria and sexuality formation in the personality. From Dora's friendship with Frau Zellenka, Freud forms the basis of his theory that "masculine" or gynaecophilic (etymologically, "woman-loving") currents of feeling are typical of the unconscious erotic life of hysterical girls.

Freud's ultimate conclusions about Dora, which he reaches primarily through dream-analysis, are that she is in love with Herr Zellenka. Freud calls Zellenka an "imposing figure" and imagines that Dora must be attracted to him (C. p.22). Indeed, their relationship has been a close one before the period of Dora's treatment with Freud, as Dora has cared for the Zellenka children, taken long and frequent walks with Herr Zellenka, and received flowers from him every day for a year, in addition to other gifts. Scenes between the two of them have transpired that were not as seemingly-innocent, though. On two occasions, Zellenka makes advances to Dora that she seems to find untenable. While Freud sees Dora's reaction as a sure symptom of hysteria, we might read it somewhat differently, and surely she did, too. Certainly these episodes came to figure in her imagination (as revealed in her dreams) in a negative way. Dora has a recurrent dream that,

A house was on fire. My father was standing beside my bed and woke me up. I dressed myself quickly. Mother wanted to stop and save her jewel-case; but Father said: 'I refuse to let myself and my two children be burnt for the sake of your jewel-case.' We hurried downstairs, and as soon as I was outside I woke up.(p.56)

## Dora as a Short Story

Steven Marcus has argued that case studies should be read as a literary genre in their own right:

What I have been reiterating is that the case of Dora is first and last an extraordinary piece of writing, and it is to this circumstance in several of its most striking aspects that we should direct our attention. For it is a case history, a kind or genre of writing – that is to say, a particular way of conceiving and constructing human experience in written language – that in Freud's hands became something that it never was before.(p.65)

Marcus continues:

It is next to impossible to tell whether Freud is up to another of his crafty maneuverings with the reader or whether he is actually simply unconscious of how much of a modernist

writer he is. For when he taked to describing the difference between himself and some hypothetical man of letters and writer of short stories he is in fact embarked upon an elaborate obfuscation. That hypothetical writer is nothing but a straw man; and when Freud in apparent contrast represents himself and his own activities he is truly representing how a genuine creative writer writes. This passage, we must also recall, came from the same pen that only a little more than a year earlier had written passages about Oedipus and Hamlet that changed for good the ways in which the civilized world would henceforth think about literature and writers.

Marcus writes that his assumption and conclusion is that Freud is a great writer and that Dora is a great work of literature. According to Marcus, it is both an outstanding creative and imaginative performance and an intellectual and cognitive achievement, that should be examined from the point of view of literary criticism. I agree with Marcus that Dora's case study should be considered like we might consider a piece of literature. To that end, I suggest that we look at Character, Plot, Point of View and Narrator.

The characters here, as Freud writes it, are: Dora, the sick daughter, a teen-aged girl who is in turmoil over her father's behavior, but is still very devoted to him; Herr Bauer, Dora's father, a syphilitic man who denies his extramarital sexual activity, despite the obviousness of it; Frau Zellenka, Bauer's mistress and nurse, formerly Dora's friend; Herr Zellenka, husband of Frau Zellenka. Bauer's cuckold and would-be suitor to the teen-aged Dora. Minor characters are Dora's mother, her brother, and the Zellenka's children, though they figure only peripherally.

Among the main characters, Dora seems to be the only one who behaves in an honorable manner. Dora's only questionable action seems to be accepting gifts and attention from Herr Zellenka without any thought of what the implications or expectations might be, though this might be understood as her parents' responsibility. The problems with the other characters are central to understanding Dora's one questionable action. Of course, Dora is a child, though this is something Freud seems unable to see, and her accountability should not be as great as those adults around her.

Dora's father, who wants her to quit making trouble (threatening suicide, trying to get him to break off with the Zellenkas, exhibiting a general malaise) for him, wants mainly to continue his affair in peace. In addition to his extramarital activity, he is dishonest in his dealings with Dora and with Freud. We know little of Frau Zellenka, except that she seems to have no problem being involved with Bauer in the way that she is and she has no problem leaving her children in Dora's care for extended periods of time to make her involvement with him possible. Herr Zellenka, if we believe Dora's accounts of his

overtures to her, is a philanderer and a liar. When Dora tells her father of Zellenka's advances and Bauer confronts him, Zellenka denies it, saying that Dora made the story up and Bauer believes him. Our only reliable character is Dora. Dora rarely speaks, as I'll show in the next chapter, but Freud gives us to believe that most of this story is hers. Freud is our narrator, and his reliability will be considered later. but he is in some ways a minor character, too. Freud is the one who writes this narrative, and we see these characters as he would have us see them.

We come in on this story when it is already in its denouement, though it is not resolved. This story begins with Dora's beginning to nurse her father in his tubercular stage when she is six. At eight we have the onset of her first hysterical symptoms, soon after we have the introduction of Frau Zellenka, and the complication of relations between her and Bauer with a displacement of Dora. From there the characters are caught in a thickening plot that results in Dora's illness. Simply put, Dora nurses her father as a child, she is displaced by a woman with whom he has an affair; the woman's husband seizes opportunities to exploit Dora and to suggest himself to her as a lover; Dora is traumatized by his overtures and disapproving of her father's affair at the same time that she feels her father is using her as a kind of currency with which to buy cuckolding rights to Zellenka. The subsequent action is the reaction of Dora's body to this psychic state of affairs.

Dora's body reacts by the somatization of her frustration with her parents for not hearing her, she experiences the hysterical symptom of a loss of her voice. Enter Freud. Freud's action is very little. It is significant that he is involved because without him we wouldn't get the story, and because it shows Bauer's move to control his daughter's behavior and to try for absolution. It seems that Bauer wants Freud to approve of his behavior and that by bringing him into his confidence he hopes to change Dora's behavior. What happens both in terms of Dora's treatment, and in terms of plot, is virtually nothing. Dora is sick when she comes to Freud and leaves sick, too. Except that Freud effectively steals her voice a second time, he does nothing for her. Dora, then, has lost her voice because of the situation with her parents, and she has lost it again, because Freud appropriates her story, thus robbing her of all possibility of speaking for herself. It is imperative that we understand how this co-optation of Dora's history functions: think of the charting a medical practitioner does for any patient. The history taken and charted is recorded as fact - of course the internist (or other health professional) has only earlier records and the patient's account - sometimes the corroboration of a parent, spouse, or other caretaker - and the presenting symptoms, on which to base an assessment. In this way, the patient's story becomes less narrative and more history. I intend the term "history" in this case to function, not

as archive, but as a factual accounting of the past.<sup>8</sup> A patient's medical history is structured to appear irrefutable, as it is employed by examining medical personnel.

When Freud makes the narrative move of repeating Dora's history, then, his story is to appear irrefutable at two levels – he gains authority by recounting her account and the move is that of the master story-teller: I'm telling you this as it was told to me. Freud used Dora's case to try to prove some of his own pet theories, namely: 1) Interpretation of dreams can be used to remedy neurosis. 2) Instinctual infantile sexuality – sexual impulses operate normally in the youngest children with no need for outside stimulation. 3) The deleterious effects of masturbation on mental health. 4) Bisexuality as an indication of neurosis is useful in psychoanalytic treatment. 5) Primary and secondary gains for the patient from hysterical illness. Dora is told from Freud's point of view, and to a lesser degree, Dora's. Though Freud claims that, "like a conscientious archaeologist I have not omitted to mention in each case where the authentic parts end and my constructions begin" (p.7), he has omitted to mention which parts of the story are his and which are hers. Except for some of his notions about her unhealthy, "hysterical" reaction to Zellenka's advances, the whole story is written in great sympathy with Dora, so it is somewhat difficult to talk about point of view.<sup>9</sup> Freud's point of view reigns. He becomes in every way the author of Dora and of Dora's narrative and his ideas gain primacy. This will become clear as you look at the later discussion of the analysis where Dora gets so little chance to speak and of the dream analysis. It is clear, however, that for the most part, Freud puts forward Dora's point of view, believes her experience, far more than he believes her father's. The tension, the disbelief he has, that seems to come from his ideas about her unconscious desires, is particularly apparent in the exchange that we later examine, where Freud believes that Dora's every utterance means the opposite of what she says. Again, this feature of the text, point of view, is colored by Freud's desire to prove his theories – in this case, his theory of the unconscious. This calls Freud's reliability as a narrator into question.

Freud is the primary narrator for Dora's story and as we've established, it is through narrative that he gains authority and his ultimate goal of scientific legitimacy. Dora is, after all, Freud's case study; she is his patient. It is easy to see, when we look at the threads of justification and understand Freud's sense of obligation to medicine and the current and future good of the world, how and why he appropriated Dora's story to become not only its author, but also its narrator. Freud, despite his sympathy with

---

<sup>8</sup>One of the most useful concepts in Keith Jenkins' *Re-thinking History* is the distinction between "history" and "the past." The past is what happens in what I have referred to in an earlier chapter as "real time," that we can never hope to recover, and "history," which entails various narrative or chronological (and I would throw historiography into the pot for flavor) accounts of the past.

<sup>9</sup>Though the sympathy with the main character is different, I find the relationship of Freud to Dora not totally unlike the relationship of Quentin and Thomas Sutpen in *Absalom, Absalom!* where there are dual protagonists – Dora has a story and Freud has a story and in telling hers, Freud puts forth his own

Dora and his desire to heal her, occupies the largest part of the account. Freud's perceived duty to science, which caused him to sacrifice one patient, Dora, for the greater good of those who might suffer hysteria after she had gone on to other things, is what makes him write in the first place, and what makes him an unreliable narrator. Because he has so much to prove (as I've said before) he can't be trusted. Freud blamed his shortcomings in the treatment of Dora on his inability to effect a satisfactory transference of her feelings for Herr K. to himself. To support my contention that Freud's becoming the protagonist in the narrative is the reason for his failure with Dora, we return to Marcus, who writes that the demon of interpretation has overcome Freud (p.84):

As the case history advances it becomes increasingly clear to the careful reader that Freud and not Dora has become the central character in the action. Freud the narrator does in the writing what Freud the first psychoanalyst appears to have done in actuality. We begin to sense that it is his story that is being written and not hers that is being retold. Instead of letting Dora appropriate her own story, Freud became the appropriator of it. The case history belongs progressively less to her than it does to him. It may be that this was an inevitable development, that it is one of the typical outcomes of an analysis that fails, that Dora was under any circumstances unable to become the appropriator of her own history, the teller of her own story.

If we use Bakhtin's claims about the relationship of author to hero, we come to understand Freud as trying to write the story of Dora, the hero. We see him inscribing her story with his own, rather than letting her story stand on its own. This reading adds a dimension to the understanding of the failure of transference: Because Freud so clearly had his own ideas not only about what happened to and for Ida Bauer, but also had his own agenda for what she could help him prove, in writing her as hero, he rendered transference and countertransference, which he thought were necessary for her recovery, impossible. Several critics have argued that Freud was, in many ways, working out his own hysteria in his speculations about hysterical symptoms and their causes as exhibited by Ida Bauer (Bernheimer, Kahane, Marcus). If so, Ida Bauer may have been avoiding conquest, struggling for her own life outside of Freud's inscription, which, if we take Freud's word for it, she clearly rejected.

In these pages, I have used narrative theory and historical inquiry to examine one of Freud's most important works so that we might understand something he never understood, to take advantage of an historical vantage point that allows us to reconfigure history as archive and subsequently helps us understand the role Freud's ambition to scientism played in his treatment of Dora's case history. I have also argued, along with Budd and Marcus, that the case study is a genre, and that genre is unique

in terms of the narrative constraints and considerations it invokes. It is my goal to contribute a fresh and useful approach for historians and rhetoricians of science and to raise new questions for analysts who work with case studies, thereby making a significant contribution to intellectual history. While I hope to offer something new, my arguments are built on the work of scholars who have considered the problems Dora raises. In *In Dora's Case: Freud - Hysteria - Feminism* (1985), an anthology of essays concerning the case study of Dora, which includes the commentary of some of the finest contemporary thinkers in these three areas, virtually every essay mentions Dora's ending her treatment with Freud. It is an important point, rightfully a part of these scholars' examinations of the case, pointing to her refusal to be appropriated as Freud would have had her be - quite possibly indicating her rejection of Freud's (diagnosis) interpretation altogether. Much has been made of Dora's juxtaposition of herself and a governess, though Janet Malcolm compares Freud to a governess who has been given notice to be let go. Malcolm's analysis gets the service relationship right, I think, in that Freud was there to be of service to Dora. Freud's description of her letting him go, however, shows his tenacious control over the conversation and situation. We'll look at that now, returning later to look at his interpretation of Dora's account of the governess.

Freud writes:

She opened the third sitting with these words: "Do you know that I am here for the last time today?" - "How can I know, as you have said nothing to me about it?" - "Yes. I made up my mind to put up with it till the New Year [Freud notes that the date was December 31]. But I shall wait no longer than that to be cured." - "You know that you are free to stop the treatment at any time. But for to-day we will go on with our work. When did you come to this decision?" - "A fortnight ago, I think." - "That sounds just like a maidservant or a governess - a fortnight's warning." (*Dora*, pp. 96-7)

In this passage the struggle, the very real struggle, between Freud and Dora is apparent. For Freud it is a struggle to go on with the therapy; for Dora, it is a struggle to resist Freud's writing her into his own narrative.

From the first stage of his thinking about narrative creation, Bakhtin's observations about author and hero apply to Freud and Dora. To develop his discussion of the relationship between the creator, the author, and the created, the hero, Bakhtin describes the hero as removed from "the open unitary and unique event of being" at the same time that the author is in a state of what Bakhtin calls "being-outside".

This relationship, according to Bakhtin, places the hero on a plane of existence “where the hero himself is incapable of being born for himself and through his own power; or in other words, it invests or embodies the hero in that new flesh which is not essential and does not exist for the hero himself” (p.14). Bakhtin goes on to say that “the author’s position of being situated outside the hero is gained by conquest, and the struggle for it is often a struggle for life” (p.15). In other words, Dora, the hero, is in a state of being-outside, where she is on a plane of existence where she is incapable of being born for herself and through her own power, which we might translate for our purposes, to transference. She is incapable of transference because of her position as a creation of Freuds. Freud is situated outside of Dora by conquest, by the conquest that ends in his taking her story and her voice. Bakhtin’s concepts help us understand Freud and Dora’s positions, Freud as creator and Dora as created, or to use Freud’s own term, Freud as conquistador and Dora as she who is inevitably (from the same Latin derivation) conquered. Thus far, we have looked at only the most basic factors and events that come into play in Dora’s history. Dora’s close contact with Herr Zellenka, his treatment of her (which includes two episodes of his making overt, physical sexual advances to her), her parents’ attitudes toward her, her changed educational prospects as she enters adolescence, combined with her emergent sexuality, her dreams, and the somatization of her sociopsychological environment figure prominently in Freud’s case study (we see from this Freud’s ever-present aim of holistic treatment, which, unfortunately, was thwarted by his own ambition).

Each party involved in the story has an agenda prior to the inception of Dora’s analysis which necessarily affects the outcome of the treatment. Dora’s father brought her to Freud in the hope that Freud would convince her to accept his affair with Frau Zellenka, which he represented to Freud as a figment of Dora’s imagination (despite the fact that the affair was conducted openly). Herr Bauer wanted, also, for Dora to quit threatening suicide and to begin acting in a more pleasant manner at home; the hysterical symptoms are the obvious reason for Dora beginning treatment, but her threatened disruption of her father’s life seems to determine his agenda. Freud recognizes that Dora has her own goals for her therapy: She wants Freud to recognize the injustices she has suffered, to tell her father that the incidents of Herr Zellenka’s sexual advances on her are real, and to persuade Herr Bauer to break off his affair with Frau Zellenka.

What Freud wanted to accomplish with the psychoanalysis of Dora/Ida Bauer is quite distinct from Ida’s goals or those of her father, arising from his professional concerns at the time. Conscientious practitioner that he was, Freud wanted first and foremost to rid Dora of her hysterical symptoms, to help her discover the unconscious source of the physical ailment, thereby eradicating it. What compelled

Freud beyond Dora's cure, however, was his desire to find an exemplary case that would help him prove the validity of *The Interpretation of Dreams* as well as several other theories he was eager to prove.

Decker concludes that the lack of agreement between Freud and the Bauers, father and daughter, on what the treatment should accomplish, precluded satisfactory resolution from its inception. Decker provides a detailed historical reading of doctors' attitudes toward their hysterical women patients at the time and situates Freud within the discussion, as yet another angle from which to approach this rich, complex case study. While she recognizes Freud's shortcomings, Decker presents Freud as a physician who was limited by his own gaze, by his situatedness in history at the turn of the century, by his masculinity and age and perceived frailty, by his sense of his own Semitism, and finally, by his sympathy for Herr Bauer's sexual predicament. Decker makes clear what she believes are the reasons Freud failed in his treatment of Ida Bauer, namely the misogyny and anti-Semitism of the time period, the complicated family dynamics he could not have known, and his overriding desire to prove his many points. It is in this final claim that the concepts of author and hero can be brought to bear: From the case study itself it is clear that Freud had his own ideas about Dora/Ida's experience and his own use to make of the narrative he appropriates and circumscribes in his inscription. It is my intention to show that the move from history writ large, to archive, in the Dora case, would have had for her and for her good and well-intentioned doctor, a more successful outcome. If Freud had seen Ida Bauer more as a person and less as a potential legitimator of his work as science, if he had listened to her story without laying his interpretive grid over it, if it had been possible for him, in his time, to conceive of history as archive, rather than as a deterministic means to his pre-determined end, he might not have reached the end of his life still asking how he had failed her, still wondering, "What does woman want?"

Joseph Rouse claims that scientific knowledge is constructed and re-constructed through narrative (p.181). Jean-Francois Lyotard says that the problem of legitimation of knowledge for science has come to be not a problem, but a problematic, a "heuristic driving force" (*The Postmodern Condition*, p.27) and that legitimation is achieved through narration. Freud has several types of author-ity on which to draw as he gives his version of Dora's story, including his role as relayer of a received narrative. The fact that the patient has entrusted him with her tale and that he is then just telling what he was told doubles the authority of the truth of the narrative. Freud then layers a psychoanalytic narrative over Dora's and attempts to give it back to her. His theory of the subconscious, of repression of 'truth' is perhaps the most incontrovertible authority Freud invokes. At this point, he becomes the author. Dora rejects Freud's reading and subsequent writing of her story, rejects the role of hero who cannot live if s/he is consummated by the consciousness of the author, and finally refuses to be his subject. Steven



Marcus writes, "Instead of letting Dora appropriate her own story, Freud became the appropriator of it. The case history belongs progressively less to her than it does to him" (p.85). In ending therapy, in her rejection of Freud's hypotheses, Dora/Ida Bauer fights being written by Freud.

A look at Freud and Dora from within a lens offered by Bakhtin's concept of Author/Hero, brings the problem of Freud's failure with Dora into new light. Applying this simple concept from literary criticism to a case study in psychoanalysis opens new avenues for exploration because it reveals exactly how a careful doctor, by appropriating a patient's narrative for his own ends, touched her, but did not heal her. It is here that we begin to understand that Freud would consummate Ida Bauer in his creation of her as Dora; we see that Freud sought to legitimate his already-formed theories with his telling of her narrative; we see how he wished to appropriate and circumscribe the relating of her experience which we get only through him; we understand that the text tries to encompass her; we understand that Dora is more than a character in a fictionalized account, she is a human being who will not be written.

In laying out chronologic, narrative time, (in other words, in writing a scientific history) Freud committed a number of errors, both in reporting the time of his own analysis and the time of his analysis of Dora, or Ida Bauer. Steven Marcus describes Freud's problem with time and Dora's case history thus: There is one further touch of puzzlements. Freud got the date of his case wrong. When he wrote or rewrote it, either in January 1901 or in 1905, he assigned the case to the autumn of 1899 instead of 1900. And he continued to date it incorrectly, repeating the error in 1914 in the *History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* and again in 1923, when he added a number of new footnotes to the essay on the occasion of its publication in the eighth volume of his *Gesammelte Schriften*. Among the many things suggested by this recurrent error is that in some sense he had still not done with Dora . . . The modern reader may be inclined to remark that these questions of date, of revision, problems of textual status and authorial uncertainties of attitude would be more suitable to a discussion of a literary text - a poem, play, or novel - than to a work of "science." But such a conception of the nature of scientific discourse - particularly the modes of discourse that are exercised in those disciplines which are not preponderantly or uniformly mathematical or quantitative - has to undergo a radical revision. (Marcus, p.64)

While Marcus calls for a radical revision of our understanding of "scientific" texts, the building of science, the justification of psychoanalysis on the grounds that it was quantifiable and uniform was exactly what Freud was after. Time is a problem in the reporting of the Dora case, no matter what psychological motives we might ascribe to Freud, in part because different judgments might be made about the validity of Freud's assessment, depending on what age Dora actually was at the time of her

treatment and at the time of the incidents she relates. But to this topic we will later return.

## 5 A CLOSER LOOK AT DORA AS FREUD WROTE HER

If it is true that the causes of hysterical disorders are to be found in the intimacies of the patients' psycho-sexual life, and that hysterical symptoms are the expression of their most secret and repressed wishes, then the complete exposition of a case of hysteria is bound to involve the revelation of those intimacies and the betrayal of those secrets. It is certain that the patients would never have spoken if it had occurred to them that their admissions might possibly be put to scientific uses; and it is equally certain that to ask them themselves for leave to publish their case would be quite unavailing. In such circumstances persons of delicacy, as well as those who were merely timid, would give first place to the duty of medical discretion and would declare with regret that the matter was one upon which they could offer science no enlightenment. But in my opinion the physician has taken upon himself duties not only towards the individual patient but towards science as well; and his duties toward science mean ultimately nothing else than his duties toward the many other patients who are suffering or will someday suffer from the same disorder. Thus it becomes the physician's duty to publish what he believes he knows of the causes and structure of hysteria, and it becomes a disgraceful piece of cowardice on his part to neglect doing so, as long as he can avoid causing direct personal injury to the single patient concerned. *Freud, Dora - An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*

Professional interest in Dora's treatment is first of all compelled by the extent to which Freud was blind to his own impulses and reactions. While Freud's conscious innocence of his own involvement has already been demonstrated by an analysis of his words and behavior, his inexperience is also thrown into sharp relief by the findings of modern clinical research. Today knowledgeable psychoanalysts and other psychotherapists freely admit, for example, that they may be aroused when a patient talks about sex; they recognize the situation as an occupational hazard. When Freud analyzed Dora he was unaware of this and avowed that it is an easy matter to prevent sexual stimulation of both the therapist and the patient by dry

and direct speech. All it took was to call a penis a penis. Because he had to believe what he was doing was scientific and ethical, Freud shoved his sexual arousal out of his conscious awareness. Yet his feelings surfaced in a variety of ways, to the detriment of the treatment.

Hannah Decker, *Freud, Dora, and Vienna 1900*

The *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria* (1905) is, in the Collier edition copyright 1963, 112 pages long, divided into five sections: 1) Prefatory Remarks, 2) The Clinical Picture, 3) The First Dream, 4) The Second Dream, 5) Postscript. The whole case repays consideration, as do the two pieces published with it, “Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to Bisexuality” (1908) and “General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks” (1909). Dora is interesting as a case study for all the reasons I’ve enumerated above, and it is interesting as a narrative. Narrative theory lets us understand Freud in new ways, seeing Dora as a hero and Freud as an author. Because we are interested here in how Freud established his authority, the Prefatory Remarks offer the most to our inquiry, since they are written as and function as an *apologia*. We have already discussed most of the material that is covered in The Clinical Picture, but we will go a little further into it in this chapter to look at Dora’s account of her experience in the analysis, Freud’s interpretation of Dora’s experience, the family circumstances as Freud thought they mattered, and finally, to see what Freud thought Dora’s case could do for psychoanalysis. The dream analyses are instructive for our purposes, mostly because of their structure and the balance of interpretive space and power. The postscript is most applicable to Freud’s notions of what Dora’s case could do for psychoanalysis and what psychoanalysis failed to do for Dora. The document is essentially presented with an apologetic frame provided by the Prefatory Remarks and the Postscript. We will focus on the Prefatory Remarks as they build authority, spend some time in further consideration of The Clinical Picture and look primarily at the structure of the dream analyses. As we continue, note well my claims from chapter five, that Freud wanted Dora to prove five pet theories: 1) Interpretation of dreams can be used to remedy neurosis. 2) Instinctual infantile sexuality – sexual impulses operate normally in the youngest children with no need for outside stimulation. 3) The deleterious effects of masturbation on mental health. 4) Bisexuality as an indication of neurosis is useful in psychoanalytic treatment. 5) Primary and secondary gains for the patient from hysterical illness.

### **Freud’s *Apologia***

On the first page of Dora’s case in the Prefatory Remarks, Freud says that his purpose is to give a “detailed report of the history of a case and its treatment” (p.1) to substantiate the views he put

forward in 1895 and 1896 on the pathogenesis of hysterical symptoms and upon the mental processes occurring in hysteria. Again, what Freud is doing here, his great narrative task, his great narrative move, is writing a story that will contribute to the larger narrative of psychoanalysis and the still larger narrative of science. He wants the prefatory remarks to justify the step he has taken in publishing the Dora case and to diminish the expectations to which it will give rise. Freud's justification seems to go far beyond these express ones and they are very tightly woven in the first eight pages of the case.

I've considered these eight pages in terms of four questions that I think get to the heart of how Freud gained the authority he wanted. First, what accusations, both from the past and anticipated in the future, did Freud think he was responding to? Second, to whom was he justifying his findings and the publication of those findings? Third, why does the publication of Dora's case so need justification? Finally (and the answers to this line of inquiry far outweigh the others), what justification did he use both for the publication of the case and the "failure" of the analysis? As I mentioned in chapter five, Freud discusses three kinds of incompleteness in the Dora case - 1) the lack of analytic results, 2) omission of technique (which Freud says is okay, because transference never happened), 3) the fact that this is only a single case history and while it might be considered representative of hysteria in general, it is not to be considered conclusive or inclusive concerning all cases. In the Prefatory Remarks to Dora, Freud writes:

In 1895 and 1896 I put forward certain views upon the pathogenesis of hysterical symptoms and upon the mental processes occurring in hysteria. Since that time several years have passed. In now proposing, therefore, to substantiate those views by giving a detailed report of the history of a case and its treatment, I cannot avoid making a few introductory remarks, for the purpose partly of justifying from various points of view the step I am taking, and partly of diminishing the expectations to which it will give rise. Certainly it was awkward that I was obliged to publish the results of my inquiries without there being any possibility of other specialists testing and checking them, particularly as those results were of a surprising and by no means gratifying character. But it will be scarcely less awkward now that I am beginning to bring forward some of the material upon which my conclusions were based and make it accessible to the judgement of the world. I shall not escape blame by this means. Only, whereas before I was accused of giving no information about my patients, now I shall be accused of giving information about my patients which ought not to be given. I can only hope that in both cases the critics will be the same, and that they will merely have shifted the pretext for their reproaches; if so, I can resign in advance any possibility of

ever removing their objections. (p.1-2)

*What accusations, both from the past and anticipated in the future, did Freud think he was responding to?* It may be inferred from the way I've phrased the question that Freud was responding to accusations both real and imagined. In the past, Freud says, he was accused of not giving enough information concerning his patients. He is responding here especially to the reception of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, which he says "showed inadequate comprehension by other specialists" (p.5). I've discussed its reception earlier, along with the assertion that part of Freud's agenda with Dora was to prove that interpretation of dreams can be used to remedy neurosis. With the publication of Dora, Freud says, he anticipates being accused of giving information about patients that ought not be given" (p.14). Freud worries over the sexual nature of the case, while wanting to use it to prove that hysteria almost always has a psycho-sexual origin. Freud worries that the case will be used for "private delectation" (p.14) that even the specialized (he calls them "authorized") audience for whom he's writing will have among its members those who would use the case for satisfying their own prurient interest. Freud's concern over past and anticipated accusations provides a direct link to the publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams* and further supports my claim that he meant for Dora to help prove the points he tried to make with it.

*To whom was he justifying his findings and the publication of those findings?* Freud's audience seems to be simultaneously very, very wide and quite narrow. The first audience Freud mentions is "the world." This would support Webster's argument that Freud suffered from a Messiah complex, at least in scope. The order in which he addresses the issue of his varied audiences goes in microscopic and back out to telescopic order. From "the world" Freud moves to "narrow-minded critics," to "Vienna," to "physicians," to Dora herself, to "those who would read Dora's case history for their own private delectation" (p.3), to other specialists, and finally, to all readers at large. Webster's assertion aside, the fact that Freud mentions opening the case to "the world" indicates how he had guarded it and kept it until he could write sufficiently about it and until he felt Dora's identity could not be revealed, her privacy not invaded by his very real obligation to science. Freud's concern for Dora, that she would be the only person who could know her real identity and that she had somehow healed prior to his publishing her case, supports my notion that, whatever else he might have been, Freud was a conscientious and caring doctor.

*Why does the publication of Dora's case so need justification?* To this question the answer is three-fold, but very simple. The publication of Dora so needs justification according to Freud because of the sexual nature of it and the explicit language used to discuss the case. It needs justification because

the study is something fairly new, and it needs justification because there has been no opportunity for triangulation. Freud is the only physician on the case and he has not triangulated against other cases of his, nor has he consulted with anyone except Fleiss (in the letter quoted in chapter five) concerning Dora, so his colleagues have not had the opportunity to offer their insights into the case.

*What justification did he use both for the publication of the case and the “failure” of the analysis?* In addition to the narrative layering I’ve considered earlier in this examination, Freud builds authority through a very tight argument that the failure of the analysis is what allows for its publication. I use the terms “layering” and “builds” here to convey the idea that Freud consciously set down foundations upon which he expanded and developed a case for his authority that is logically unquestionable. The metaphor could as easily be one of weaving, where we see Freud thread his loom and weave a very tight cloth through his claims. In any case, we maintain the idea of a gradual construction that depends on one thing following another. In the Prefatory Remarks there are separate but related justifications of both the publication of the case and of the analysis itself and they are interwoven to answer the other three questions above. The claims Freud makes to authority answer his anticipated accusations, address the reasons for the justification and finally, extend to his audience whom he qualifies in a way. Freud ends the Remarks by narrowing his audience to his colleagues in medicine and analysis and admonishes them to suspend their judgment, if they disagree with him, until their own work proves him right.

### **Tightly-woven Threads of Justification**

The tightest, most elegant warp threads of narrative and scientific authority in the Remarks and throughout the work are the two claims that are interdependent: the case falls short of what should be accomplished by an analysis and the publication of the case is made possible by its shortcomings. Consider the claims that follow and see how Freud weaves them together to present his case as tightly as he can and to authorize his readers or exclude those who would disagree with him. Again, all of these claims come from the first eight pages of Dora’s case.

- 1) There are technical difficulties with case studies.

Even if I ignore the ill-will of narrow-minded critics . . . , the presentation of my case histories remains a problem which is hard for me to solve. The difficulties are partly of a technical kind, but are partly due to the nature of the circumstances themselves. If it is true that the causes of hysterical disorders are to be found in the intimacies of the patients’ psycho-sexual life, and that hysterical symptoms are the expression of their most secret and

repressed wishes, then the complete exposition of a case of hysteria is bound to involve the revelation of those intimacies and the betrayal of those secrets. It is certain that the patients would never have spoken if it had occurred to them that their admissions might possibly be put to scientific uses; and it is equally certain that to ask them themselves for leave to publish their case would be quite unavailing. (p.2)

Freud seems to mean by this that there is a problem of confidentiality and that it is difficult to record accurately the reports of the patients and maintain analytical integrity in a session. He later refers to this problem as one of medical discretion and claims that he made very clear notes while every detail was fresh in his mind.

2) There are circumstantial difficulties in the presentation of case studies.

In such circumstances persons of delicacy, as well as those who were merely timid, would give first place to the duty of medical discretion and would declare with regret that the matter was one upon which they could offer science no enlightenment.(p.2)

If it is true, Freud says, that hysteria has psycho-sexual causes, and that hysterical symptoms are the expression of their most secret and repressed wishes, then a complete exposition of a case would require the revelation of those intimacies and the betrayal of those secrets. No delicate person would reveal their innermost secrets if they thought that they would be laid bare in the interest of science. However, Freud says that it is the physician's obligation to further the cause of science.

3) Physicians have taken upon themselves duties toward science as well as toward the individual patient.

But in my opinion the physician has taken upon himself duties not only towards the individual patient but towards science as well; and his duties toward science mean ultimately nothing else than his duties toward the many other patients who are suffering or will some day suffer from the same disorder.(p.3)

The individual patient is important to all subsequent patients. A physician's duties toward science mean ultimately nothing else than a duty toward the many other patients who are suffering or will some day suffer from the same disorder. The primary duty a physician has to the individual patient in publishing a case is to avoid causing direct personal injury to the single patient concerned.

4) Freud claims that he has taken every precaution to see that his patient is not hurt by his publication of her case.



I think I have taken every precaution to prevent my patient from suffering any such injury. I have picked out a person the scenes of whose life were laid not in Vienna but in a remote provincial town, and whose personal circumstances must therefore be practically unknown in Vienna. I have from the very beginning kept the fact of her being under my treatment such a careful secret that only one other physician - and one in whose discretion I have complete confidence - can be aware that the girl was a patient of mine. I have waited for four whole years since the end of the treatment and have postponed publication till hearing that a change has taken place in the patient's life of such a character as allows me to suppose that her own interest in the occurrences and psychological events which are to be related here may now have grown faint. Needless to say, I have allowed no name to stand which could put a non-medical reader upon the scent; and the publication of the case in a purely scientific and technical periodical should, further, afford a guarantee against unauthorized readers of this sort.(p.4)

Several factors figure in to his "every precaution." First, Dora wouldn't be known in Vienna because, as he says, the scenes of her life are laid out in a remote provincial town. Second, only "one other physician" in whose discretion he has "complete confidence" (Fleiss) can be aware that she was his patient. Finally, enough time passed between the analysis and the publication - four years - that even her interest in the psychological events he relates here will have grown faint.

5) Although sexual matters are discussed with frankness, this is not a case for exciting prurient interest.

Now in this case history - the only one which I have hitherto succeeded in forcing through the limitations imposed by medical discretion and unfavourable circumstances - sexual questions will be discussed with all possible frankness, the organs and functions of sexual life will be called by their proper names, and the pure-minded reader can convince himself from my description that I have not hesitated to converse upon such subjects in such language even with a young woman. Am I, then, to defend myself upon this score as well? I will simply claim for myself the rights of the gynaecologist - or rather much more modest ones - and add that it would be the mark of a singular and perverse prurience to suppose that conversations of this kind are a good means of exciting or of gratifying sexual desires.(p.3)

Freud takes a clinical approach to these conversations, saying that it would be "the mark of a singular and perverse prurience to suppose that conversations of this kind are a good means of exciting or of

gratifying sexual desires.”

6) The short duration of the case helped overcome the technical difficulties in preparing a study of it for publication.

I will now describe the way in which I have overcome the technical difficulties of drawing up the report of this case history. The difficulties are very considerable when the physician has to conduct six or eight psychotherapeutic treatments of the sort in a day, and cannot make notes during the actual sitting with the patient for fear of shaking the patient's confidence and of disturbing his own view of the material under observation. Indeed, I have not yet succeeded in solving the problem of how to record for publication the history of a treatment of long duration. As regards the present case, two circumstances have come to my assistance. In the first place the treatment did not last for more than three months; and in the second place the material which elucidated the case was grouped around two dreams (one related in the middle of the treatment and one at the end).(p.4)

Freud claims that a case that had gone on longer - he tells Dora at one point that her recovery could likely take a year and here he says that had it lasted a year it would have been impossible to analyze in such a succinct and careful manner. Here is where he says that he has not succeeded in solving the problem of how to record for publication the history of a treatment of long duration. The circumstances of Dora's case helped because the treatment lasted only three months and because the material which elucidated the case was grouped around two dreams.

7) The record is not phonographically exact, but is trustworthy.

The wording of these dreams was recorded immediately after the sitting, and they thus afforded a secure point of attachment for the chain of interpretations and recollections which proceeded from them. The case history itself was only committed to writing from memory, after the treatment was at an end, but while my recollection of the case was still fresh and heightened by my interest in its publication. Thus the record is not absolutely - phonographically - exact, but it can claim to possess a high degree of trustworthiness. Nothing of any importance has been altered in it except in several places the order in which the explanations are given; and this has been done for the sake of presenting the case in a more connected form.(p.4)

Freud says he recorded the wording of the dreams immediately after the sitting so that they “form a secure chain of attachment” from which the interpretation follows. Neither has he altered anything

of importance, he says, other than sequence, for the sake of "presenting the case in a more connected form."

8) This case history presupposes a knowledge of the interpretation of dreams, so it will necessarily seem unsatisfactory to any reader to whom this presupposition does not apply.

In this instance there was no validity in the objection that the material upon which I had based my assertions had been withheld and that it was therefore impossible to become convinced of their truth by testing and checking them. For every one can submit his own dreams to analytic examination, and the technique of interpreting dreams may be easily learnt from the instructions and examples which I have given. I must once more insist, just as I did at that time, that a thorough investigation of the problems of dreams is an indispensable prerequisite for any comprehension of the mental processes in hysteria and the other psychoneuroses, and that no one who wishes to shirk that preparatory labor has the smallest prospect of advancing even a few steps into this region of knowledge.(pp.8-9)

Precluding the possibility of being misread, Freud makes the readership somewhat exclusive by saying that familiarity with the interpretation of dreams is requisite for understanding the case and that anyone who tries to read the case without it will only be bewildered and will "be inclined to project the cause of his bewilderment on to the author and to pronounce his views fantastic."

9) Though the case is particularly good for utilizing dreams in analysis, it turned out poorer than Freud would have wished.

While the case history before us seems particularly favoured as regards the utilization of dreams, in other respects it has turned out poorer than I could have wished. But its shortcomings are connected with the very circumstances which have made its publication possible. As I have already said, I should not have known how to deal with the material involved in the history of a treatment which had lasted, perhaps, for a whole year.(p.6)

The main problem with the case is its short duration, but its "shortcomings" are connected with the very circumstances which have made its publication possible. You can see that Freud is doubling back here, reinforcing what he said earlier and admitting that the case falls short. He is making a very strong, but very subtle rhetorical move here, making himself appear more trustworthy by admitting that his work falls short of what he would want.

10) The case is only a fragment.

The present history, which covers only three months, could be recollected and reviewed; but its results remain incomplete in more than one respect. The treatment was not carried through to its appointed end, but was broken off at the patient's own wish when it had reached a certain point. At that time some of the problems of the case had not even been attacked and others had been only imperfectly elucidated; whereas, if the work had been continued, we should no doubt have obtained the fullest possible enlightenment upon every particular of the case.(p.6)

Again, with the same subtle move, Freud calls our attention to the limited scope of what he thinks he can do with this case, preparing us to allow him some latitude in what he extrapolates later because he has been so modest in his claims for it.

11) The analysis was limited by the state of psychoanalysis at the time of Dora's treatment, which has since been revolutionized.

Readers who are familiar with the technique of analysis as it was expounded in the *Studien uber Hysterie* will perhaps be surprised that it should not have been possible in three months to find a complete solution at least for two of the symptoms which were taken in hand. This will become intelligible when I explain that since the date of the *Studien* psychoanalytic technique has been completely revolutionized. At that time the work of analysis started out from the symptoms, and aimed at clearing them up one after the other. Since then I have abandoned that technique, because I found it totally inadequate for dealing with the finer structure of a neurosis.(p.6)

Formerly, the treatment of neuroses or hysteria would have started with symptoms and worked through the symptoms, clearing them up one by one. At the time of publication, analysis had moved from the practice of the doctor diagnosing and choosing where to begin to the patient relating whatever was on his or her mind and letting the "talking cure" reveal the underlying source of the problem.

12) A single case history cannot give insight into all the types of this disorder and it's not fair to expect from a single case more than it can offer.

It is...obvious that a single case history, even if it were complete and open to no doubt, cannot provide an answer to all the questions arising out of the problem of hysteria. It cannot give an insight into all the types of this disorder, into all the forms of internal structure of the neurosis, into all the possible kinds of relation between the mental and the somatic which are to be found in hysteria.(p.7)

Freud ends the Remarks with this further admonition to his readers - an admonition that is also a kind of exclusion - "Anyone who has hitherto been unwilling to believe that a psycho-sexual aetiology holds good generally and without exception for hysteria is scarcely likely to be convinced of the fact by taking stock of a single case history. He would do better to suspend his judgement until his own work has earned him the right to be convinced.

This is a justification that is brilliant and tightly-woven. This supports my argument that Freud's need for scientificity drove his analysis and his publication of the analysis of Dora. Freud's need for scientificity drove him to create this narrative about Dora that fit into the larger master-narrative of the creation of scientific knowledge. These points, that move from interpretation to the weaving of a narrative, interpretation that is itself a narrative, show Freud's assumption of narrative authority. These twelve points of authority assumption also support my somewhat more modest argument that Freud had Dora's best interest at heart, but his need to prove his own theories overshadowed his ability to treat her adequately: Freud makes this near water-tight claim that the treatment failed because there was no positive transference in the short time he had Dora in analysis, but that the brevity of the treatment is what makes it publishable and the ability to publish it is what makes it useful to a larger scientific community. Publishability, however, is not only based on brevity, but on Freud's very real concerns for Dora - she cannot possibly be harmed by this publication Freud says, because she is far-removed from it in both time and space.

I would argue that the damage to Dora has long since been done by the date of publication of the fragment of her analysis - that the patient who came to be known as Dora was given short shrift because of her father's agenda for her treatment and because of Freud's agenda of what he could accomplish both for his own work and for the larger world of psychoanalytical science.

Freud did not trust Dora's father and did not let her father's account of her illness figure very prominently in her treatment, I think Freud's perceptions were colored by the father's statements and may have been what allowed Freud to think of Herr Zellenka as a viable suitor for Dora, which in turn led him to believe that Dora's reactions to the man were abnormal. As we look at section two. The Clinical Picture, it will become increasingly more clear that Freud's real concerns were heavily weighted toward putting across his interpretation of the case and toward making inroads into the narrative that he saw as the discovery of psychoanalysis. Looking at the distribution of topics considered in the two dream sections, a feature of the text that might seem insignificant, supports my claim that Freud saw this as a case to vindicate and substantiate his earlier, ill-received *Interpretation of Dreams*. Of course he has said that he saw it that way himself, but he has not said that his single-mindedness in making

her narrative his narrative to prove his theories cheated Dora out of the treatment she might have had.

### Freud Writing, Dora Dreaming

Freud sets out his purpose in the first paragraph of section two at the same time that he creates willing readers. Remember in his Prefatory Remarks that he qualified and authorized his readers – they were necessarily people with a technical interest in the case and the topic of the case (a move accomplished to some degree by the journal in which he published it) and then they were further qualified by his admonition at the end of the section that if they didn't agree with him they were to conduct their own experiments until they did. This is a hugely authoritarian move and it is accomplished through narrative – not only through appropriating Dora's narrative, but having appropriated it, choosing where to tell the story and telling those who would read the story how to receive it. In this second section, Freud's move toward evoking a desired reader response is somewhat kinder. He assumes a kindness on the part of the reader and invokes it. There is an ease and elegance to this assumption of authority and it is beautifully linked with the purpose – a purpose that clearly makes my case of Freud's need to prove his dream theory. Freud writes:

The following fragment from the history of the treatment of a hysterical girl is intended to show the way in which the interpretation of dreams plays a part in the work of analysis. It will at the same time give me a first opportunity of standing some of my views upon the mental processes of hysteria and upon its organic determinants. I need no longer apologize on the score of length, since it is now agreed that the exacting demands which hysteria makes upon physician and investigator can be met only by the most sympathetic spirit of inquiry and not by an attitude of superiority and contempt. p.9

Notice how Freud is here assuming and simultaneously creating in his reader a kind of charity toward his findings, a much less heavy-handed move than he has made in the previous section.

As in my section on the Prefatory Remarks I'm considering The Clinical Picture in view of four questions. First, what are the family circumstances surrounding the case and how do they come to bear on Freud's interpretation of it? Second, what do we get of what Dora had to say about her own situation as Freud reports it? Third, how does Freud interpret what Dora says and how much of that does he tell? Finally, what did Freud think the case was doing for the making of knowledge in psychoanalysis? A close reading will reveal that Freud gave primary importance to the creation of psychoanalytic knowledge and that he values his interpretation primarily as it relates to the end of

the creation (he would say, in his Platonic approach to it, "discovery") of that knowledge. He gives very little weight to the family circumstances, a little more weight to Dora's account, and almost equal weight to his interpretation and what it means to psychoanalysis. The weight I am talking about is measured in terms of the attention he gives each area.

*What are the family circumstances surrounding the case and how do they come to bear on Freud's interpretation of it?* The family circumstances themselves have been described at length in chapter five. Briefly, Dora is caught in this unholy, intimate circle that consists of her father, her father's mistress and her father's mistress' husband. Secondary characters are Dora's older brother, her mother, and the children belonging to the mistress and her husband. Dora presents the primary symptom of aphonia. She disapproves of her father's affair, has been friendly formerly with the mistress and with her husband, but comes to realize that she is being offered to the husband as payment for his looking the other way in regard to her father's affair with his wife. Her Father wants Freud to persuade her to quit giving him trouble about the affair - he actually lies to Freud about the affair and wants him to enter into a collusion to convince Dora that the affair is a figment of her imagination. Freud ultimately diagnoses Dora's aphonia as an hysterical response to the suggestion of oral sex with Herr Zellenka, the mistress' husband, but it's important to note that Freud thinks her response abnormal. A healthy girl, he says, would not recoil from sex with an attractive man (no matter that the man was thirty years her senior and married). Freud finds the family circumstances only marginally useful for his analysis of the case. The family circumstances are useful according to Freud, because they are necessary for inquiring into heredity and because they reveal the dynamics between the families and provide information concerning the Zellenkas, but they are, he says, not only unreliable, but often "indistinct" (p.10). Dora's father ends his account of Dora's symptoms and the family situation by saying,

She keeps pressing me to break off relations with Herr K. And more particularly with Frau K. (The Zellenkas), whom she used positively to worship formerly. But that I cannot do. For, to begin with, I myself believe that Dora's tale of the man's immoral suggestions is a phantasy that has forced its way into her mind; and besides, I am bound to Frau K. By ties of honorable friendship and I do not wish to cause her pain. The poor woman is most unhappy with her husband, of whom, by the by, I have no very high opinion. She herself has suggested a great deal with her nerves, and I am her only support. With my state of health I need scarcely assure you that there is nothing wrong in our relations. We are just two poor wretches who give one another what comfort we can by an exchange of friendly sympathy. You know already that I get nothing out of my own wife. But Dora, who inherits

my obstinacy, cannot be moved from her hatred of the K.'s She had her last attack after a conversation in which she again pressed me to break with them. Please try and bring her to reason.(p.20)

About Dora's father's report, in keeping with his assessment that family reports are at best indistinct and not very useful to an analysis, Freud writes:

Her father's words did not always quite tally with this pronouncement; for on other occasions he tried to put the chief blame for Dora's impossible behaviour upon her mother – whose peculiarities made the house unbearable for every one. But I had resolved from the first to suspend my judgement of the true state of affairs till I had heard the other side as well.(p.20)

Freud is too circumspect to call Dora's father a liar, but it is clear that he doesn't believe him and that Freud will not adopt the agenda Bauer sets out for him. Again we have evidence that Freud wanted to learn what Dora had to say, not to merely believe what her father had to say. In this passage Freud mentions an aunt of Dora's who is an intellectual (Freud observes Dora's intellectual capacity and, while he admires it, he seems to think that it may be one of the root causes of her unhappiness [p.16]) and an uncle who is a hypochondriac. He uses these pieces of information only to consider her heredity.

*What do we get of what Dora had to say about her own situation as Freud reports it?* In forty-eight pages we get six small passages of Dora's own words. Even though he claims in the Prefatory Remarks that he is only telling Dora's story and clearly delineates where her story leaves off and his interpretation begins, that is not the case. Virtually the whole case is Freud's interpretation and it is sprinkled with Dora's account – as if his interpretation is the stew and Dora's own words are a garnish – a handful of parsley, say, or a sprinkling of black pepper. Two of the six passages refer directly to interactions with Herr K, three refer to her father and one relates her memory of Herr K.'s sexual arousal, but doesn't remember remembering it.

Freud gives us this story as the first example of the information he gets from Dora. While it is the first chronologically, she tells it to him after having told him about a time walking around a lake with Herr K., where he had made to her some kind of "proposal," so Freud calls it "second in order of mention." This passage comes twelve pages in to the second section and though it is given from Dora's point of view to a certain extent, it is not in her own words:



When the first difficulties of the treatment had been overcome, Dora told me of an earlier episode with Herr K., which was even better calculated to act as a sexual trauma. She was fourteen years old at the time. Herr K. had made an arrangement with her and his wife that they should meet him one afternoon at his place of business in the principal square of B— so as to have a view of a church festival. He persuaded his wife, however, to stay at home, and sent away his clerks, so that he was alone when the girl arrived. When the time for the procession approached, he asked the girl to wait for him at the door which opened upon the staircase leading to the upper story, while he pulled down the outside shutters. He then came back, and, instead of going out by the open door, suddenly clasped the girl to him and pressed a kiss upon her lips. This was surely just the situation to call up a distinct feeling of sexual excitement in a girl of fourteen who had never before been approached. But Dora had at that moment a violent feeling of disgust, tore herself free from the man, and hurried past him to the staircase and from there to the street door. She nevertheless continued to meet Herr K. Neither of them ever mentioned the little scene; and according to her account Dora kept it a secret till her confession during the treatment. For some time afterwards, however, she avoided being alone with Herr K. The K.'s had just made plans for an expedition which was to last for some days and on which Dora was to have accompanied them. After the scene of the kiss she refused to join the party, without giving any reason.

In this scene - second in order of mention, but first in order of time, the behaviour of this child was already entirely and completely hysterical. I should without question consider a person hysterical in whom an occasion for sexual excitement elicited feelings that were preponderantly or exclusively unpleasurable; and I should do so whether or no the person were capable of producing somatic symptoms. (pp.21-22)

Notice, if you will, that not only is the incident not reported in Dora's words, but she becomes obscured in the narrative. She is no longer Ida Bauer, not even is she Dora, she is "the girl." Dora is given the name of Dora in this passage as a function of the narrative and when the story passes over to Freud is when she loses her name. "Dora told me..." says Freud and then Dora passes into the impersonal pronoun, "she" and from the impersonal pronoun, Dora is once more once-removed from herself. Ida Bauer into "Dora" into "she" into "the girl" melts the identity of Ida Bauer until she is given over entirely, sacrificed to the cause of science. This objectification, this ever-greater obfuscation, is revealed in the language, in the story Freud tells that is the story he takes from her and claims for his own purposes. The next passage where Dora gets to speak for herself is the passage in which she

remembers Herr K.'s arousal and she gets four words:

I questioned the patient very cautiously as to whether she knew anything of the physical signs of excitement in a man's body. Her answer, as touching the present, was "Yes." but as touching the time of the episode, "I think not."(p.24)

This conversation is referring to Dora's episode with Herr K. that is related above and Freud is trying to lead up to a determination of whether or not Dora's disgust is aroused because she felt what Freud would call Herr K.'s "erect member" against her when he kissed her. Later Freud will say that Dora's intuition of some potential for oral sex is what frightened her still more than the multi-layered situations between her and Herr K. We can speculate about how Freud missed the mark with Dora - it seems only natural to me that any of the dynamic elements of Dora's situation with K. would have been enough to frighten her and evoke the effect that Freud calls hysterical - but that speculation begs the question of what happened to so make Freud miss the mark with her. My approach of the application of narrative theory, the consideration of Freud's establishment of authority through appropriation of story moves us much further along toward a useful reading of the balance of Freud's genius and his limitations. Notice, as we proceed, the real dearth of any talk at all by Dora. Freud pledges in the Prefatory Remarks to clearly mark where Dora's account leaves off and his begins, but I would say that this is all his account, that he has claimed her story so entirely, he is writing her so entirely, that she is no longer the center of the case, but that he is. Freud and his interpretation and his ideas about what it can do for psychoanalysis move to the forefront. Again, part of the reason for this shift is because of his need for proving the validity of his theories, part of it is from his desire to bring his work to the level of a hard science, and part of the shift is affected by the narrative itself. The third instance of a report almost directly from Dora - at least from her point of view, but not in her words - is where we see how she feels about her father's relationship with Frau K.:

The uppermost layer of all her associations during the sittings and everything of which she was easily conscious and of which she remembered having been conscious the day before was always connected with her father. It was quite true that she could not forgive her father for continuing his relations with Herr K. and more particularly with Frau K. But she viewed those relations in a very different light from that in which her father wished them to appear. In her mind there was no doubt that what bound her father to this young and beautiful woman was a common love-affair.(p.25)

This is only a report of her feelings, a report of her report. This is a very good example of the kind of narrative layering I claim Freud does in my introduction, where he takes her story and tells it himself, "just telling us what she told him" so that it becomes in a way indisputable. It's not, after all, his story, so you must believe him. In the fourth example, the two agree in their estimation of Dora's father. It is one time when their views find accord and it is somewhat difficult to pull his ideas away from hers to know what Freud is saying on his own and what he is reporting of her ideas and emotions. This is a crucial point of agreement, because it is here that we see that Dora's father has commodified her and Freud knows it. Freud qualifies his claim so that the scope of it is narrowed, but it is clear that he understands the mercantilism inherent in Bauer:

He was insincere, he had a strain of falseness in his character, he only thought of his own enjoyment, and he had a gift for seeing things in the light that suited him best. I could not in general dispute Dora's characterization of her father; and there was one particular respect in which it was easy to see that her reproaches were justified. When she was feeling embittered she used to be overcome by the idea that she had been handed over to Herr K. as the price of his tolerating the relations between her father and his wife; and her rage at her father's making such a use of her was visible behind her affection for him. At other times she was quite well aware that she had been guilty of exaggeration in talking like this. The two men had of course never made a formal agreement in which she was treated as an object for barter: her father in particular would have been horrified at any such suggestion. But he was one of those men who know how to evade a dilemma by falsifying their judgement upon one of the conflicting alternatives. If it had been pointed out to him that there might be danger for a growing girl in the constant and uncontrolled companionship of a man who had no satisfaction from his own wife, he would have been certain to answer that he could rely upon his daughter, that a man like K. could never be dangerous to her, and that his friend was himself incapable of such intentions, or that Dora was still a child and was treated like a child by K. But as a matter of fact things were in a position in which each of the two men avoided drawing any conclusions from the other's behavior which would have been awkward for his own plans. It was possible for Herr K. to send Dora flowers every day for a whole year while he was in the neighborhood, to take every opportunity of giving her valuable presents, and to spend all his spare time in her company, without her parents noticing anything in his behavior that was characteristic of lovemaking. (p.27-28)

Once more in this passage we get far more of Freud's interpretation than any of Dora's account. Freud reports that vacillation of Dora's ideas on the point of her father's being willing to offer her in exchange for cuckolding another man (and, I assume, there must be some accounting for her mother's having turned a blind eye). The case goes on for twenty pages before Dora speaks again, and again, it is her father's relationship with Frau K. that bothers her:

"I can think of nothing else," she complained again and again. "I know my brother says we children have no right to criticize this behaviour of father's. He declares that we ought not to trouble ourselves about it, and ought even to be glad, perhaps, that he has found a woman he can love, since mother understands him so little. I can quite see that, and I should like to think the same as my brother. but I can't. I can't forgive him for it." (p.47)

Freud says the incessant repetition of the same thoughts concerning her father allows him to derive still further important material from the case in the form of the supervalent thought that is her lack of ability to forgive her father for his relations with Frau K. Again we see Freud's concern for the pathogenesis and prognosis more than for the patient.

The final instance of Dora's getting to speak, however circumscribed and overwritten with Freud's interpretation is in the relating of an incident in which she and a cousin met Herr K. in the street. Certainly if we take Freud's account, which is all we have, it is apparent that most of Dora's problems stem back to her association/affiliation with the K.'s. And it is instructive to see that the times we see her almost speak - the intersections at which Freud allows her voice to come through a little - are in the descriptions of her relationships with the K.'s. Within a discussion of repression <sup>1</sup> when "no" sometimes means "yes" because a repression is so deep and unconscious. Freud tells about Dora's account of her reaction to the meeting:

Dora admitted that she found it impossible to be as angry with Herr K. as he had deserved. She told me that one day she had met Herr K. in the street while she was walking with a cousin of hers who did not know him. The other girl had exclaimed all at once: "Why, Dora, what's wrong with you? You've gone white as a sheet!" She herself had felt nothing of this change of colour; but I explained to her that the expression of emotion and the play of features obey the unconscious rather than the conscious, and are a means of betraying the former. (p.51)

---

<sup>1</sup> It is crucial to understand that Freud is here (and in most instances) not talking about a kind of societal or outwardly-imposed repression, but a repression that is inward, that happens within a psyche and is self-imposed.

This is the final example of Dora's getting to be even represented by Freud in *The Clinical Picture* and it is clearly another co-optation. Not only has the narrative been co-opted, but Freud is here laying claim to Dora's unconscious as he explains its relationship to her conscious self to her.

*How does Freud interpret what Dora says and how much of that does he tell?* Pages fourteen through seventeen are the beginning of Freud's account of the family circumstances surrounding Dora's case, including the histories of the aunt and uncle, which he considered relevant factors in the analysis of Dora's inherited propensity for hypochondria and other nervous disorders. Freud claims that in every case of hysteria, every case, of hysteria he has discovered both a psychic trauma and a disturbance in the sphere of sexuality. In Dora's case, Freud says that the cause of her hysterical symptoms is either Herr K's advances or childhood influences. We have looked at Freud's judgement of Dora's reactions to Herr K. She is, he determines, far advanced in her hysteria. What does he base this assessment on? Her disgust in reaction to what we are made to believe were unwanted, unsolicited sexual advances from a man much older than she was, who was married to her woman-friend, a woman-friend who was causing her tremendous distress. Freud considers this distress over her father's affair <sup>2</sup>merely a case of projection. Freud claims that because Dora feels guilty about her feelings for Herr K., she accuses her father – he says that this is a manifestation of paranoia in delusion-formation.

Freud gives almost equal weight and time to his interpretation of Dora's case and to what he thinks it can do for psychoanalytic knowledge. Virtually the whole of "the Clinical Picture" is taken up with Freud's interpretation of Dora's case. As I indicated in the previous section on Dora, all of pages 27-47 are Freud's words about Dora. Dora does not speak in that section, nor is she quoted. Except for the telling of the dreams, all of Dora's words <sup>3</sup>are recorded above.

When I first read Dora, having read enough secondary sources to be theoretically situated in the conversation concerning her case and what is widely considered Freud's mishandling of it, I had faith in him when he said in the Prefatory Remarks that he was conscientious about letting her words speak for themselves, clearly indicating where her narrative leaves off and his interpretations begin. It was a naive reading on my part. What I now see is that he took her voice from her as surely as if he had dealt her the psycho-sexual trauma that led to her aphonia in the first place. As Freud uses a kind of narrative layering – a doubling up of his story on top of Dora's, so is Dora doubly aphonic. Her voice is taken first by the somaticization caused by her family circumstances and her father's sexual bartering, however much a case of self-imposed ignorance it was on his part. And her voice is then taken, her

<sup>2</sup>Bear in mind that every time Dora comes close to having a voice in this, she is either relating her discomfort with her father's sexual relations with Frau K., or her responses to Frau K.'s emasculated mate

<sup>3</sup>n.b. In many cases, Dora's words aren't her own at all, they are rather what Freud says she said.

words are taken, by the very man who would have wanted to do right by her if he could have, if he had not been so driven by his need to prove his big ideas to the world. This is the solution to the problem Freud so pondered. Why did he fail Dora? Because he saw her as a means for achieving his ends. She was a case that fit into his systematic, codified, deterministic, closed narrative, not a human being.

In 1900, Freud began arguing for the use of dreams as interpretive tools offering psychoanalysts and the psychoanalytic project a perfect tool for reaching the sources of pathogenesis. His argument goes that once dreams are interpreted, they can be replaced by perfectly constructed thoughts which find “a recognizable position in the texture of the mind” (p.8). Dreams, he claims, provide a road along which consciousness can be reached by the mental material which has been cut off from consciousness and repressed and become pathogenic. The dream, he says, is a detour by which repression can be evaded. Dream interpretation, then, is essential for psychoanalysis.

Connections and sequences are incoherent, Freud says, for the patient and then necessarily for the analyst. How can authorities give such coherent accounts of hysteria when the memory paths are blocked by repression? Dream analysis is key, he says. The theoretical significance for dream interpretation<sup>4</sup> is that it is necessary for memory repair because it allows the physician to overcome these four main obstacles to coherence and healing: 1) intentional repression or discretion; 2) anamnestic knowledge; 3) true amnesia or paramnesia; 4) doubt or loss or falsification of memory.

These are no small claims for what dream interpretation can do for psychoanalysis and they lead, Freud says, to understanding symptom formation. In Dora’s case Freud’s argument is woven very tightly indeed. The dreams lead to his understanding of both early childhood influences and the trauma she experienced at the hands of Herr K.<sup>5</sup> The symptom formation in this incident of somatic illness began with disgust, the memory of K.’s pressure against her body and her mouth (which Freud believes included her feeling his erection, though she seems not to remember), this pressure later becomes a pressure in her throat that renders speech impossible for her, and finally culminates in an avoidance of men.

In sections three and four, Freud presents Dora’s first and second dreams, the first analyzed by the two of them together, the second analyzed by Freud alone. For our purposes, it is instructive to consider how much of the analysis of the dreams is Freud’s and how much say Dora gets – even how much space or time she gets in the text. I will look here only at the structure of the two dream sections in order to show that, in this place where Dora has the most opportunity to speak, her words are far outweighed.

---

<sup>4</sup>This is not so far afield from Dora’s analysis – remember my claim that dream theory is what he was trying to prove with Dora and that it forms the basis of most of the analysis.

<sup>5</sup>I will save it for another inquiry, but it is a quandry for me – how could Freud have understood that K.’s advances were traumatic for Dora and still thought that her reaction to him was hysterical, abnormal in a girl in her early teens?

overshadowed, overcome, by Freud's. This is where my assertion that he used her case to prove his dream theory, to create an historico-scientifically transcendent work, comes most to bear. The analysis of the first dream begins (p. 56) with one paragraph of introduction, and follows with this structure:

- 1 paragraph of Dora relating the dream
- 1 paragraph of Freud's commentary
- 18 paragraphs of dream analysis in dialogue between Freud and Dora
- 2 long paragraphs concerning the significance of dream theory for psychoanalysis
- 11 paragraphs of Freud's dream analysis
- 2 long paragraphs of dream theory
- 20 paragraphs of Freud's commentary on Dora's dream, followed by a break
- 6 paragraphs of Freud's commentary, followed by a break
- 15 paragraphs of interpretation of the dream

Out of a total of seventy-eight paragraphs, Dora has her say completely (if we can say that when we are working with text that is necessarily mediated by Freud) in one paragraph and her comments are intermingled with Freud's through eighteen others.

The second dream analysis is as heavily-weighted with Freud's commentary including interpretation and remarks concerning the significance of the case for psychoanalysis. Section four begins on page 85 and following one paragraph of introduction is structured thus:

- 1 paragraph of Dora describing the dream
- 11 paragraphs of Freud's interpretation
- 1 paragraph that is an addition of Dora's comment asking if anything has been revealed
- 11 paragraphs of Freud's interpretation
- 1 paragraph wherein Dora dismisses Freud, telling him she's giving a fortnight's notice and will not return beyond the New Year for treatment
- 12 paragraphs of dream analysis including both Freud's and Dora's comments
- 2 paragraphs of commentary concerning the significance of the case for psychoanalysis.

Again, the real weight goes to Freud's interpretation of Dora's story, his co-optation of something so private, so fundamentally her own as her dreams. Out of forty-two paragraphs this time, Dora gets a voice in one, and a partial voice in eleven more.

## Postscript

The Postscript reiterates the justifications Freud makes in his Prefatory Remarks and adds only information concerning the characters in the family circle. It functions as another justification, a kind of summing up, and has as little of Dora herself in it as the rest of the case does.

Dora's narrative, which becomes Freud's narrative, is a complex piece of writing, a piece of writing that, as both Marcus and Budd claim, might well be considered its own genre. It is rich in potential for analysis of character, plot, and point-of-view, and raises other narrative issues such as the reliability of the narrator. The case study, too, needs to be considered in terms of the ethics of treatment for the patient. Freud acknowledges and understands the problems inherent in the presentation of case material, but argues that the good of the individual patient must be sacrificed to the greater good of the advancement of scientific knowledge. The real narrator becomes Freud, who is, in a way, writing his own story, the story of psychoanalysis, the story of science. By taking Dora's story and making it his own, Freud renders her successful analysis impossible. Freud effectively steals Dora's voice. She comes to him aphonic and she leaves him doubly-aphonic.



## 6 CONCLUSIONS: THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY

I can only conclude with the wish that the fates may prepare an easy ascension for those who found their sojourn in the underworld of psychoanalysis uncomfortable. May it be vouchsafed to the others to bring to a happy conclusion their works in the deep.

*Freud - History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*

There are questions that remain to be answered. In the first place we must ask ourselves whether the hypotheses which can be based on Freud's assumptions are verifiable and permit the formulation of new hypotheses; and then we must inquire whether there are other assumptions on the basis of which more fruitful hypotheses can be built. These are problems which promise to keep psychoanalytic inquiry busy for a long time to come.

*Ernst Kris - Psycho-Analysis as an Independent Science*

Opposed to formal *a priori* whose jurisdiction extends without contingency, there is a purely empirical figure; but on the other hand, since it makes it possible to grasp discourses in the law of their actual development, it must be able to take account of the fact that such a discourse, at a given moment, may accept or put into operation, or on the contrary, exclude, forget, or ignore this or that formal structure. It cannot take account (by some kind of psychological or cultural genesis) of the formal *a priori*; but it enables us to understand how the formal *a priori* may have in history points of contact, places of insertion, irruption, or emergence, domains or occasions of operation, and to understand how this history may be not an absolutely extrinsic contingency, not a necessity of form deploying its own dialectic, but a specific regularity. Nothing, therefore, would be more pleasant, or more inexact, than to conceive of this historical *a priori* as a formal *a priori* that is also endowed with a history: a great, unmoving, empty figure that irrupted one day on the surface of time, that exercised over men's thought a tyranny that none could escape, and which then suddenly disappeared in a totally unexpected, totally unprecedented eclipse: a transcendental syncopation, a play of intermittent forms. The formal *a priori* and the historical *a priori* neither belong to

the same level nor share the same nature: if they intersect, it is because they occupy two different dimensions.

*Michel Foucault - The Archaeology of Knowledge*

This close analysis of *A Fragment of a Case of Hysteria* leaves us with the beginnings of an answer to Freud's perennial question - how did he fail Dora? This answer is arrived at by a careful look at the piece of intellectual history that is considered the pre-history of psychoanalysis, juxtaposed with an exploration of the historical and scientific zeitgeist into which psychoanalysis was born. Freud failed Dora by stealing her already-lost voice, by taking her history as his own, laying claim to not only her outer experience in the interest of scientific inquiry, but to her inner experience in the form of her dreams. Freud made Dora doubly-aphonic, so that he was not only unable to heal her by affecting the positive transference he so wanted, but he stole her story and her voice to accomplish his own ends of proving the transcendent scientificity of psychoanalysis. Narrative theory, looking as it does at issues of time, sequence, history legitimacy and authority offers a solution to problems posed by any closed, systematic theory, such as a Freudian-conceived psychoanalysis. Narrative theory opens an inquiry in a way that other approaches to the making of psychoanalytic knowledge have not. When we begin to consider how and why an argument is made, looking at its causes, or its aetiology, we begin to get answers that we never would otherwise. This application of narrative theory is a boon for science and for narrative. When we marry the two, applying one to the other in a way that assumes a charitable, critical reading, we learn about stories and we learn about how scientific knowledge is made.

Freud often wrote of the necessity of psychoanalysis achieving the stature of the natural sciences, such as physics,<sup>1</sup> and goes to great lengths to use hard-science language to talk about psychological functions. This passage from *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* provides an example of Freud's use of terms to scientificate psychoanalysis. It is also a clear example of the narrative arguments he made toward the purpose of scientism:

Whereas the psychology of consciousness never went beyond the broken sequences which were obviously dependent on something else, the other view, which held that the psychical is unconscious in itself enabled psychology to take its place as a natural science like any other. The processes with which it is concerned are in themselves just as unknowable as those dealt with by other sciences, by chemistry or physics, for example; but it is possible to establish the laws which they obey and to follow their mutual relations and interdependences unbroken over long stretches - in short, to arrive at what is described as an 'understanding' of the field

---

<sup>1</sup>This argument is covered quite thoroughly in Frank J. Sulloway's book, *Freud: Biologist of the Mind*.

of natural phenomena in question. This cannot be effected without framing fresh hypotheses and creating fresh concepts; but these are not to be despised as evidence of embarrassment on our part but deserve on the contrary to be appreciated as an enrichment of science. They can lay claim to the same value as approximations that belongs (sic) to the corresponding intellectual scaffolding found in other natural sciences, and we look forward to their being modified, corrected and more precisely determined as further experience is accumulated and sifted. So too it will be entirely in accordance with our expectations if the basic concepts and principles of the new science (instinct, nervous energy, etc.) remain for a considerable time no less indeterminate than those of the older sciences (force, mass, attraction, etc.). Every science is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since our science has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here. We make our observations through the medium of the same perceptual apparatus, precisely with the help of the breaks in the sequence of 'psychical' events: we fill in what is omitted by making plausible inferences and translating it into conscious material. In this way we construct, as it were, a sequence of conscious events complementary to the unconscious psychical processes. The relative certainty of our psychical science is based on the binding force of these inferences. Anyone who enters deeply into our work will find that our technique holds its ground against any criticism. (p.15-16)

This passage exemplifies how Freud's approach to science is antithetical to Foucault's. While Foucault configures the natural sciences as a storehouse of history, not as a historian might, but more like a historiographer might, Freud sees science as moving toward a true knowledge, a kind of "certainty" based on the binding force of inferential exploration. Clearly, Freud is not only serving, but writing a grand narrative of scientific knowledge.

Follow Freud's assertions in this passage. They are: 1) The view that held that the psychical is unconscious allowed psychology to take its (rightful, Freud implies) place as a natural science like any other; 2) However unknowable the processes science deals with are, they are governed by laws which we discover through the framing of hypotheses and concepts that themselves enrich science; 3) The science of psychoanalysis will bear up against any criticism precisely because it is based, like all science, on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of psychical apparatus, with omissions filled in by plausible inferences. Freud wrote the *Outline* in the last year of his life – biographers have pinned down the time to within two months – in 1938, at first while waiting for his exile to London,

and later, while waiting for his death from cancer.<sup>2</sup> From this passage, we get a clear sense of Freud's idea of science and scientific justification. Sciences aren't hard or soft, they are "older" or "younger" and they are all natural.

## Nineteenth Century Science and History

William Coleman's book, *Biology in the Nineteenth Century* (1971), gives us an idea of the scientific world into which Freud was attempting to gain entrance. Understanding the scientificism to which Freud aspired is necessary if we are to understand not only the view of history he embraced, but the lengths he went to to make history and to secure his position in it.<sup>3</sup> It also helps explain the status he gained and why he is still a "whole climate under which we conduct our differing lives" (p.595), as Auden wrote in his elegy – why Freud became, like Lenin, an inevitability. This understanding is important at at least two levels – first, in seeing the aridity of Freudian finality as he would have it written as a part of scientific knowledge or history; second, in a comprehension of the stultifying effects his authorial gnosis had on his patients. Coleman writes, in a passage that finds accord with Joseph Rouse's "Narrative Construction of Scientific Discourse," this description of the unfolding of biology, its themes and issues:

Our point of reference need no longer be a timeless set of truths, presumably given at the Creation. Intellectual satisfaction would henceforth be found by a careful determination of antecedent conditions and ensuing consequences. The laws of nature were invariant and all natural processes capitalized on prior events. The future was being built on the acquisitions of the past. The indissoluble relation of the latter to the former constituted historical process and was deemed, in spite of earlier telling criticism by Hume and Kant, a truly causal connection. (p.9)

---

<sup>2</sup>A personal note – Freud's description of the early days of psychoanalysis written in the last months of his life, a detailed account of work begun some fifty years prior to his writing, is very like Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography*, which Franklin started writing at the age of fifty and picked back up mid-sentence, thirteen years later. Strachey writes in the Editor's Note in the preface to the *Outline* that Freud's style reaches a "higher level of succinctness and lucidity" here than anywhere else, and this at the age of 82, run out of his homeland by German occupation and dying. Like Franklin's *Autobiography*, Freud's ideas are best distilled for an audience already familiar with his work in the *Outline*. I mention this only because I think it's interesting and important to see these texts in terms of their writers' lives – both men had profound effects on history and large and lasting realms of thought and knowledge; both men were writing earnest accounts of what in their past endeavors they deemed important, in anticipation of reaching the end of their lives.

<sup>3</sup>I'm not interested in going into it here, but volumes have been written about Freud's so-called conspiracy to control psychoanalysis. Among many others, Phylliss Grosskurth's *The Secret Ring* claims that Freud established the various psychoanalytic societies to quell work that departed from his own. My claim is less paranoid and smaller in scope – I am simply saying that Freud's ambition and drive for scientificity blinded him to the humanity and the very real problems of people who came to him for help, namely, Dora.

While Rouse argues that scientific discourse is built narrative upon narrative and dependent on a kind of consensus that determines what work gets done (through funding, publication in refereed journals, etc.), Coleman is trying to contextualize biology, the making of a knowledge that was supposedly invariable, a present that came from the past in direct causality. Coleman is describing a science that might support popular notions of science – that it is “scientific” and thereby somehow infallible. Coleman writes that cosmology, geology and biology offered argument and evidence that “progressive change” was the most salient characteristic of natural phenomena. Coleman continues to write a story of ever-increasing specialization into physiology, a physiology that seems to confirm the now-clicheed “nothing is so certain or so constant as change” in natural science. This ever-increasing specialization of course required the study of cell theory, individuation, and transformation. The metaphor for human and animal physiology was (understandable in the nineteenth century) the machine. Coleman describes the method and work of the French physiologist, Claude Bernard, preeminent after 1850, still working in France at the time that Freud was with Charcot at the *Salt-Petriere* and the Paris Morgue, thus:

only that endeavor which, in a given experimental situation, can repeatedly produce precisely similar results deserves the name of science. Mere observation of organic processes is always interesting but, lacking precisely controlled conditions, evolves only incidental and nonreproducible data. On such data no secure science . . . could ever be erected. Certainty of the datum, meaning essentially repeatability of that datum, must become the foundation of physiology and of scientific medicine. (p.154)

We have seen Freud’s relation to Charcot and Mesmer and how those connections undermined his claims to science.<sup>4</sup> Freud firmly believed, though, that the psyche could be described in scientific terms. Peter Gay has called Freud’s project “Newtonian.” I would agree that Freud believed that he was inventing cures as revolutionary as a new calculus, that he was tracking hysteria formation as surely as Newton measured the orbit of the moon, and that he was discovering and naming laws of personality formation as inescapable as the law of gravity. I offer the Coleman passages here to illustrate that Freud was entering a positivistic, systematic field of study, and that the pressure he felt for acceptance of his “new” science must have been tremendous. While Foucault provides a point from which we can be repositioned to re-claim, re- analyze (but not revise) history, and Morson asks us to consider how narratives that emerge out of closed systems become inevitabilities, closing off the possibility of possibility, Keith Jenkins distills an approach to history (and subsequently, for our purposes, toward

---

<sup>4</sup>Freud’s connection to Wilhelm Fleiss certainly didn’t help – there are many accounts of Fleiss’ medical malpractice misadventures that read like tragedy and comedy – a fact that is widely-known and well-documented.

science) that offers the same renewal that adopting Foucault's archive over Freud's history does.

It is not my intention to re-write Freud, even if I thought I could accomplish such a monumental task in my lifetime. And while I am not interested in revisionist history, in claiming Freud, for, say, feminism, why not use the tools we have from the work done in narrative and discourse theory to help us better understand the constraints under which he worked and wrote?

Foucault's notion of archive frees the history of thought from its subjection to transcendence. Though my argument is fundamentally dependent on Foucault's configuration of historical knowledge into archival knowledge, Foucault is not alone in calling for a re-configuration of history. In this chapter I argue that freedom from subjection to transcendence is precisely what Freud needed, but precisely what it was impossible for him to get. The reasons for the impossibility of Freud's escape from scientific transcendence are further elucidated in chapter four, but the foundations for my argument are laid out here. My claim goes beyond Freud to say that our ideas of validity (historical, scientific, narrative) should be re-configured in ways that moving from history to archive allow. I juxtapose Foucault's approach to history with Freud's, which necessarily re-positions any body of knowledge in relation to those who would pit themselves against it – in this case, I refute Jeffrey Masson. I am not interested in refuting the substance of Masson's argument – the scope of the argument is what I challenge.

## Toppling the Monumental Freud

One of the most exciting passages of Morson's *Narrative and Freedom* is at the very beginning, the second paragraph of the introduction where he is talking about, not literature, not Bakhtin, but about the fall of Lenin and the resulting rise of possibility. Morson describes the picture accompanying a front page *New York Times* headline story from May 24, 1991, of crowds of smiling people clambering over a toppled monumental Lenin. It was a familiar scene at the end of the last decade, the beginning of this one. Morson has this to say:

Statues of the man who established the final system, which was sure to reach perfection rapidly and was destined to survive forever, were overthrown in a kind of ritual return to "history". There is no more Leningrad. In Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, and in Petersburg itself, people have voiced appreciation that they have dethroned not just another regime or an ideology, but a supposed inevitability. Like executing the tsar, overturning Lenin was a kind of metahistorical act, in this case asserting the openness of time. For good or ill, the future was no longer guaranteed. After decades of certainty, the possibility of possibility

was reborn . . . (p. 1)

While Freud's power has arguably been not as far-reaching as Lenin's was, the parallel between closed systems and the stultifying effect they have on their subjects is apparent. It might be argued that overturning Freud would likewise be a kind of metahistorical act that would assert the openness of individual human actualization of psychological potential and psychic wholeness. A generous reading of the work of Freud's detractors would suggest that perhaps re-opening the future is what they are about – that they pull his ideas down to make way for possibility.

To challenge the schematic structuralist system Freud imposed to prove the scientific validity of his work, as I am doing here, is not to try to topple his monumental contribution to the knowledge of the twentieth century. Though I would argue, along with Steven Marcus, that we need to begin to change our ideas about scientific validity that is not quantifiable or mathematic – Freud operated under a model and within a climate that precipitated (if not necessitated) his claims to scientism. It was this model, which simultaneously restricted and advanced him, that made Freud into an inevitability.

### From History to Archive: Foucault's Far-Reaching Questions

Jeffrey Masson, in the introduction to *The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory*, writes that his findings on Freud's work, because they were at odds with Freudian doctrine, were "seen as something more than a historical investigation; (it) threatened to call into question the very fabric of psychotherapy" (p.xxxi). Earlier in the introduction, Masson has claimed, "My interpretations, the critics seemed to feel, put in jeopardy the very heart of psychoanalysis" (p.xxx). Masson's claims are big. His argument is that he has torn down the very foundation of psychoanalysis, which calls everything that has come after into question. As startling as Masson's work may have been to the psychoanalytic community and the larger reading world when it was first presented and later published, it does not go far enough to call into question the very fabric, the very heart, of psychoanalysis. Masson seems to overlook the fact that there are so many other pivotal psychoanalytic theories that don't require (and never would have required) a belief in childhood sexual abuse.<sup>5</sup> As we will see when we turn to our examination of the unconscious, Freud and Masson are working from entirely different world-views.

<sup>5</sup> What is important here is that Masson thinks that he calls all of psychoanalysis into question by

<sup>5</sup> I certainly do not deny the existence of childhood sexual abuse, nor do I think that Freud questioned its relationship to hysterical illness. I am merely arguing that his concern was with the patient, not with the perpetrator. It is ironic that Freud gets the blame for the repressed memory movement and all the damage it did to lives and families [Crews], when his method would never have been to turn on the patient's family, but would have been to help the patient exorcise the memory, affect a positive transference and move on into psychically healthy existence.

<sup>6</sup> I think that Freud would have dismissed Masson's outrage by simply pointing out that the life of the un- or subconscious is as real and as important as what Masson would identify as real life – that the perception or sense memory of

“proving” that Freud and his loyal followers suppressed the seduction theory. Masson overestimates the scope of his claims. I appreciate what Masson may be trying to do, if his move to question the foundation of psychoanalysis is a move that frees us all – thinkers, psychoanalytic practitioners and patients, all possessors of psyches, and sundry others who would use psychoanalysis as a frame of reference for literary or other criticism. However, I contend that a move as bold or as big as Masson thinks his is, is unnecessary. Perhaps my move is bigger, but I am not so bold as to go it alone – my claims are built on the ideas of others and I am contributing what I can by applying their ideas to psychoanalysis. I am asking for a re-configuration of the way we understand history and science, not so that we can discard the knowledge we have collectively worked so hard to make, but so that we can historicize it, contextualize it, and when we can, continue to utilize it. The questioning we need is not of one foundational theory that was or was not suppressed (though it is intriguing to consider, when we think about how arguments are made, that looking at evidence that is held back from public view can tell us perhaps more than that which is put forward), but our questions need to be much more far-reaching. Far-reaching questions are an end toward which we move through Foucault.

Through Foucault, at many interstices we are exhorted to ask and assisted in asking far-reaching questions. In the conclusion to *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* Foucault suggests a way to approach and read history, which I would extend and apply to the reading of the history of the science of psychoanalysis. While the *Archaeology* is devoted largely to the genesis of knowledge in natural science, it deals also with the philosophical bases from which we encounter knowledge in general, how we make it, understand it, and talk about it. For these reasons, I find this passage in particular very useful to my historical (archival) endeavor. The passage is long, but repays consideration here:

Of course, we have had to abandon all those discourses that once led us to the sovereignty of consciousness. But what we have lost over the last half-century, we are hoping to recover in the second degree, by means of the analysis of those analyses, or at least by the fundamental questioning that we apply to them. We will ask where they came from, towards what historical destination they are moving without being aware of it, what naivete blinds them to the conditions that make them possible, and what metaphysical enclosure encloses their rudimentary positivism. And so in the end it will not matter that the unconscious is not, as we believed and affirmed, the implicit edge of consciousness; it will not matter that a mythology is no longer a world-view, and that a novel is something other than the outer

---

violation matters as much in symptom-formation as actual physical/sexual abuse. Masson speaks from a perspective of wanting to punish perpetrators, while Freud is far more interested in alleviating hysterical somatization. I'll save a deeper exploration of this topic for another project.



slope of lived experience; for the reason that establishes all these new 'truths' is under strict supervision: neither itself, nor its past, nor that which makes it possible, nor that which makes it ours escapes the attribution of transcendence. For it is to it now – and we are determined never to abandon this – that we will now pose the question of the origin, the first constitution, the teleological horizon, temporal continuity. . . . That is why, if we must tolerate all these structuralisms, whether we like it or not, we will not allow any taint to that history of thought that is our own history. (p. 202)

The salient point of this passage is consistent with the move from history to archive and elucidates precisely the kind of shift we are trying to make with our understanding of Freud's work and with psychoanalysis in general. Foucault says we have abandoned discourses which once led to the sovereignty of consciousness – consciousness is the very topic under study in psychoanalysis, as Freud reminds us – but we will regain what we've lost by means of the analyses of our analyses. To Reason we pose all the questions of origin and temporal continuity. You might see that Foucault then calls into question those things that Freud's work tries to establish so firmly – origin, which asks questions of causality, and temporal continuity. We are re-configured in terms of how we conceive of time in Foucault's model, and Morson's sideshadowing, which would allow greater possibility for all lives, those of characters in opened narratives and our own. Foucault's goal may be unrealizable, because what he asks of us is that we step outside ourselves to see our own history in a way that may be impossible. It could be argued that we can never be divorced from our own situatedness enough to escape from the taint of that history of thought that is our own history.<sup>7</sup> The questions Foucault promotes however, are, twenty-five years after his asking them, pertinent to my inquiry into the history of psychoanalytic knowledge.

I began this inquiry several years ago with an interest in author and hero, subject and object, self and other. I wanted to begin to know how these relationships are created and how they are configured through language. I began, then, with a very wide question and I became more and more focused until I was looking at one author, Freud, who is the real subject of the case study of Dora, who is the real self we see. As Marcus writes, "It is his [Freud's] own mind which is important to him (p.86)." Dora would seemingly be the hero, but Freud writes himself in as hero. Dora definitely is objectified, used as the object of Freud's narrative study to prove his points, to give him the authority he wanted, to help him gain the scientific legitimacy he so needed for psychoanalysis. Freud is the self that emerges and Dora is the other, a relationship that is made clear by the time they each get in the case study to tell the story.

---

<sup>7</sup>For a more complete discussion of situatedness, see Stanley Fish on Jacques Derrida in chapter 15 of *Doing What Comes Naturally*.

What Foucault advocates is what I am attempting in this inquiry and it is precisely what is called for now in the study of the piece of intellectual history that is psychoanalysis – as we look at the history of psychoanalysis and as we think of it today. We will now, Foucault says, regain all that we have lost, by an analysis of these analyses. The implication in Foucault’s argument – that we have lost something by abandoning discourses that led to the sovereignty of consciousness but that we can get back all of what we have lost through re-analysis – answers charges against the kind of questioning I’m doing here made by people who see this type of endeavor as relativistic, as saying that nothing is true (Cheney). Foucault says, “Of course” we have had to abandon all discourse that led to the sovereignty of consciousness – there is no question for Foucault of whether we can keep these discourses or not, as they are. Foucault’s aim is more sustainable, more interesting, and more capable of teasing out the deeper philosophical questions that emerge from the concepts of psychoanalytic theory than is the position taken by those who want to destroy Freud (Crews, Gellner, Masson, Webster, to name only a few). Even Webster’s well-researched, well-argued and scholarly responsible work, *Why Freud was Wrong*, does not offer as rewarding an end when the argument is drawn out to a logical conclusion, as re-reading Freud through Foucault’s concept of archive does. A re-positioning of our relationship to history, to science, and to knowledge, is a far more radical move than what is accomplished by Freud’s recent detractors, but it leaves us in a much better place because we have contextualized and historicized Freud’s work (or any work or field of knowledge) toward the goal of understanding and using it.

Of all post-enlightenment discourses, what leads more directly to the sovereignty of consciousness than psychoanalysis? The process itself as well as the literature of psychoanalytic theory are inextricably bound up with, absolutely, inherently dependent on, the sovereignty of consciousness. Psychoanalytic method, as Freud conceived of it, depended on bringing the unconscious, or that which had been repressed, to consciousness. After making conscious whatever had been repressed, the patient needed to achieve a transference of emotion onto the analyst, transform their emotions from negative to positive (thus, the term, “positive transference”) to ameliorate their symptoms and, in a larger sense, to make peace with whatever unconscious “knowledge” was making them sick.<sup>8</sup> “Where did it come from?”, asks Foucault, indicating that the tracing of origins such as I’ve done in earlier chapters is a beginning of the re-analysis that will be rewarded. “Toward what historical destination did it move (possibly) without being aware of it?” What could not have been foreseen that came as a result of developments

---

<sup>8</sup> It should go without saying, but I want to make it clear that I am aware that this is something of an oversimplification and that it fails to take into account chemical or organic causes of mental illness. Current commonly accepted treatment for mild and clinical depression [Stewart and Stotland, 1993] combines variants of Freud’s talking cure and the use of psychopharmaceuticals for both treatment and diagnosis. I emphasize the method here because it so depends on consciousness.

in this body of knowledge? Foucault is, of course, writing about a figurative destination, what I have previously referred to as “drawing an argument out to its logical conclusion.” One historical destination of psychoanalytic theory, it might be argued (has been argued by Frederick Crews), has been the recovered memory movement – a destination of which it was most probably ignorant. What naivete blinded it to the conditions that made it possible? What metaphysical enclosure encloses its rudimentary positivism? The questions Foucault poses anthropomorphize knowledge in a way that force us to make a distinction between the awarenesses, if you will, of the knowledge itself and the awareness of Freud, himself. Foucault is talking about knowledge as naive, as aware or unaware, as bound by metaphysical enclosure.

Foucault continues here, admitting that he is certain neither of victory nor of his weapons, but, he says, it seems to him that the task (of his *Archaeology*) is to free the history of thought from its “subjection to transcendence.” What might this have done for Freud’s work? How much more responsibly might he have been able to treat his patients had he not felt a constant burden of proof, a continual onus to ever and always be quantifying, structuralizing, codifying the aberrations and workings of the widely varied human mental and emotional states?

Though Foucault is writing about natural science (Freud considered psychoanalysis as natural science as physics or astronomy), and the application of his questions to the human science of psychoanalysis advances us far beyond the destination at which we arrive by throwing it away in an effort to prove it wrong and ourselves right. Foucault’s goals for his analysis are my goals. He characterizes them with these words:

My aim was to analyze this history, in the discontinuity that no teleology would reduce in advance; to map it in a dispersion that no pre-established horizon would embrace; to allow it to be deployed in an anonymity on which no transcendental constitution would impose the form of the subject; to open it up to a temporality that would not promise the return of any dawn. My aim was to cleanse it of all transcendental narcissism; it had to be freed from that circle of the lost origin, and rediscovered where it was imprisoned; it had to be shown that the history of thought could not have this role of revealing the transcendental moment that rational mechanics has not possessed since Kant, mathematical idealities since Husserl, and the meanings of the perceived world since Merleau-Ponty – despite the efforts that had been made to find it there. (p.203)

Freud’s desires for the discovery and establishment of psychoanalysis as a science exactly oppose those of Foucault’s for the excavation of a history of knowledge.

This piece of intellectual history has tremendous implications for the history of knowledge. I return to my claims from chapter two. The questions we ask about individual lives, Dora's personal life and Freud's professional life in this case, may be asked about societies. We can ask these questions about the scientific community to which Freud wanted entrance and the larger realm of conscious thought and reference that he now inhabits. No matter what Freud's blindness or insight from narrativity, no matter to what destination he was ultimately led, he gave us new ways of thinking and seeing that have been lasting and influential.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anzieu, Didier. *Freud's Self-Analysis*. Madison, Conn: International Universities Press, 1986.
- Alexander, Peter. "Rational Behavior and Psychoanalytic Explanation." *Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Ed. Richard Wollheim. New York: Doubleday, 1974.
- Brennan, Teresa. *The Interpretation of the Flesh: Freud and Femininity*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail, Mikailovich. *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays*. Ed. Micheal Holquist and Vadim Liapunov. Trans. and notes by Vadim Liapunov. Austin: U of Texas P, 1990.
- Barratt, Barnaby B. *Psychoanalysis and the Modernist Impulse: Knowing and Being Since Freud's Psychology*. Baltimore: Hopkins UP, 1993.
- Bernheimer, Charles and Claire Kahane, eds. *In Dora's Case: Freud - Hysteria - Feminism*. NY: Columbia UP, 1985.
- Booth, Wayne. "Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin and the Challenge of Feminist Criticism". *Critical Inquiry*, Vol 9 (1982).
- Brennan, Teresa. *The Interpretation of the Flesh: Freud and Femininity*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Breuer, Joseph and Sigmund Freud. *Studies on Hysteria*. Reprint of 1955 edition. NY: Basic Books, (no new date given).
- Chesler, Phyllis. *Women and Madness*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972.
- Coles, Robert. *The Call of Stories: Teaching and the Moral Imagination*. Boston: Houghton, 1985.
- Crews, Frederick. *Freud's Legacy in Dispute*. NY: NYREV, 1995.
- Danow, David K. *The Thought of Mikhail Bakhtin: from Word to Culture*. New York: St. Martin's, 1991.
- Decker, Hannah S. *Freud, Dora, and Vienna 1900*. NY: The Free Press, 1991.
- Derrida, Jacques. *The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1987.
- Deutsch, Felix. "A Footnote to Freud's 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria'". *In Dora's Case: Freud - Hysteria - Feminism*. NY: Columbia UP, 1985.







- Dinnerstein, Dorothy. *The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise*. NY: Harper and Row, 1976.
- Draenos, Stan. *Freud's Odyssey: Psychoanalysis and the End of Metaphysics*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1987.
- Dworkin, Andrea. *Intercourse*. NY: The Free Press, 1987.
- Edelson, Marshall. *Psychoanalysis: A Theory in Crisis*. Chicago: UP, 1988.
- Farrell, John. *Freud's Paranoid Quest: Psychoanalysis and Modern Suspicion*. NY: NY UP, 1996.
- Felman, Shoshana. *Writing and Madness*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
- Felman, Shoshana, ed. *Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise*. Baltimore: Hopkins, 1977.
- Flax, Jane. *Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West*. Berkeley: California UP, 1990.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. NY: Barnes and Noble, 1993.
- - -. *Madness and Civilization*. New York: Random House, 1965.
- Freud, Sigmund. *The Interpretation of Dreams*. NY: Random House, 1950.
- - -. *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. NY: Basic Books, 1962.
- - -. *Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*. NY: Collier, 1963.
- - -. *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*. NY: Norton, 1969.
- - -. *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*. NY: Collier, 1970.
- - -. *The Future of An Illusion*. NY: Norton, 1985.
- Gallop, Jane. *Thinking Through the Body*. New York: Columbia UP, 1988.
- Gay, Peter. *Freud: A Life for Our Time*. NY: Anchor, 1989.
- Gay, Volney. *Reading Freud: Psychology, Neurosis and Religion*. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983.
- Gellner, Ernest. *The Psychoanalytic Movement: The Cunning of Unreason*. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1993.
- Johnson, Robert A. *Femininity Lost and Regained*. NY: Harper and Row, 1993.
- Jung, C.G. *Aspects of the Feminine*. Princeton: UP, 1982.
- Kerr, John. *A Most Dangerous Method*. NY: Knopf, 1993.

- Kofman, Sarah. *The Childhood of Art: An Interpretation of Freud's Aesthetics*. NY: Columbia UP, 1988.
- - -. *The Enigma of Woman: Woman in Freud's Writings*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
- Kurzweil, Edith and William Phillips, eds. (*Literature and Psychoanalysis*). NY: Columbia UP, 1983.
- Lyotard, Jean-Francois*. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989.
- - -. *Driftworks*. Columbia, NY: Semiotext(e), 1984.
- - -. *The Postmodern Explained*. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1993.
- Mahoney, Patrick*. *Freud as a Writer*. NY: International Universities Press, 1982.
- Mannoni, Octave*. *Freud: The Theory of the Unconscious*. London: Pantheon, 1985.
- Malcolm, Janet*. In *The Freud Archives*. NY: Random House, 1983.
- Marcus, Steven*. "Freud and Dora: Narrative, Case History, Story". In *Dora's Case: Freud - Hysteria - Feminism*. NY: Columbia UP, 1985.
- - -. *Freud and the Culture of Psychoanalysis*. NY: Norton, 1984.
- Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff*. *The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory*. NY: Penguin, 1985.
- - -. *Ed*. *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1985.
- - -. *Final Analysis: The Making and Unmaking of a Psychoanalyst*. NY: Harper, 1991.
- May, Todd*. *Between Genealogy and Epistemology*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1993.
- McCaffrey, Phillip*. *Freud and Dora: The Artful Dream*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1985.
- McGrath, William J*. *Freud's Discovery of Psychoanalysis: The Politics of Hysteria*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
- McGuire, William, ed*. *The Freud/Jung Letters*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1988.
- Meisel, Perry, ed*. *Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981.
- Miller, Jonathan*. *Freud: The Man, His World, His Influence*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972.
- Morson, Gary Saul*. *Narrative and Freedom*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1994.
- Ong, Walter J*. *Orality and Literacy*. NY: Routledge, 1988.
- Ricoeur, Paul*. *Time and Narrative*. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1985.
- - -. *Freud and Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1970.

- Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith, ed.* *Discourse in Psychoanalysis and Literature.* NY: Methuen, 1987.
- Ritvo, Lucille B.* *Darwin's Influence on Freud: A Tale of Two Sciences.* New Haven: Yale UP, 1990.
- Roith, Estelle.* *The Riddle of Freud.* London: Tavistock, 1987.
- Rouse, Joseph.* "The Narrative Reconstruction of Science". *Inquiry.* 33. 179-96.
- Sass, Louis A.* *Madness and Modernism.* NY: Harper Collins, 1992.
- Showalter, Elaine.* *The Female Malady.* NY: Random House, 1985.
- Slipp, Samuel.* *The Freudian Mystique: Freud, Women and Feminism.* NY: UP, 1993.
- Smith, Joseph H. and Humphrey Morris, eds.* *Telling Facts: History and Narration in Psychoanalysis.* Baltimore: Hopkins UP, 1988.
- Stewart, Donna E. and Nada L. Stotland, eds.* *Psychological Aspects of Women's Healthcare.* Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1993.
- Timms, Edward and Naomi Segal, eds.* *Freud in Exile: Psychoanalysis and Its Vicissitudes.* New Haven: Yale UP, 1988.
- Ussher, Jane.* *Women's Madness: Misogyny or Mental Illness?.* Amherst: Massachusetts UP, 1992.
- Weber, Samuel.* *The Legend of Freud.* Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1982.
- Webster, Richard.* *Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, Science, and Psychoanalysis.* NY: Harper Collins, 1995.
- White, Hayden.* "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality." *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation.* Baltimore: Hopkins UP, 1987.
- Wisdom, J.O.* *Freud, Women, and Society.* New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1992.



# IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



**APPLIED IMAGE, Inc**  
1653 East Main Street  
Rochester, NY 14609 USA  
Phone: 716/482-0300  
Fax: 716/288-5989

© 1993, Applied Image, Inc., All Rights Reserved